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Bankrupted Slaves
Rafael L Pardo*
Responsible societies reckon with the pernicious and ugly
chapters in their histories. Wherever we look, there exist ever-present
reminders of how we failed as a society in permitting the enslavement of
millions of black men, women, and children during the first century of
this nation's history. No corner of society remains unstained. As such, it
is incumbent on institutions to confront their involvement in this horrific
past to fully comprehend the kaleidoscopic nature of institutional
complicity in legitimating and entrenching slavery. Only by doing so can
we properly continue the march of progress, finding ways to improve
society, not letting the errors of our past define us, yet at the same time
never forgetting them.
This Article represents a contribution toward this progress, by
telling what has been, until now, an untold story about institutional
complicity in antebellum slavery-that is, the story of how the federal
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government in the 1840s became the owner and seller of hundreds, if not
thousands, of slaves belonging to financially distressed slaveowners who
sought forgiveness of debt through the federal bankruptcy process.
Relying on archival court records that have not been systematically
analyzed by any published scholarship, this Article recounts how the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 and the domestic slave trade inevitably collided
to create the bankruptcy slave trade, focusing on a case study of the
Eastern District of Louisiana, home to New Orleans, which was
antebellum America's largest slave market. Knowing the story of the
black men, women, and children who found themselves subjected to sale
through the federal bankruptcy process is a crucial step toward
recognizing how yet another aspect of our legal system-one that has
brought in its modern incarnation financial relief to millions upon
millions of debtors-had deep roots in antebellum slavery.
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INTRODUCTION
August 19, 1841, was a red-letter day in the history of
bankruptcy law. The nation up to that point had experimented only ever
so briefly with bankruptcy as a mechanism for addressing the problem
of financially overburdened debtors-a roughly three-year experiment
that began in 1800 and ended in 1803 (the "1800 Act"). 1 After a nearly
four-decade hiatus, bankruptcy would once again be part of the legal
landscape. Regardless of one's politics-and mind you, the political
sentiments for and against this legislation were quite pronounced-the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 (the "1841 Act" or "the Act") 2 was a big deal. 3
News of the landmark legislation traveled slowly to New
Orleans. During the week following passage of the 1841 Act, the Daily
Picayune had little to no information for its readers.4 On August 20, the
Picayune reported that "[tihere was no news from Washington
yesterday," relying instead on a report from the Charleston Mercury to
inform New Orleanians that the House of Representatives had debated
the bankruptcy bill earlier in the week without voting on it and that
"there was no indication of the fate of [the bill]."5 Four days later,
although the Picayune had not yet received word about the 1841 Act,
1. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
2. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
3. See, e.g., F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 143 (1919) ("It must not be
denied that . .. [the 1841 Act] was the subject of great political contention, for its effect and the
struggle in the Congress over its repeal prove this."); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 31 (2001) ("The 1841 act was the brainchild of the Whig
party, which had made bankruptcy law a crucial plank in the platform that brought them the
presidency and control of the Senate the year before."); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 350 (1991) ("[T]he radical nature
of the 1841 law precipitated a firestorm of controversy involving the leading political figures of the
day.").
4. For background information on the Picayune, see ROBERT C. REINDERS, END OF AN ERA:
NEW ORLEANS, 1850-1860, at 227-28 (1964).
5. DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 20, 1841, at 2; see also LE COURRIER DE LA
LOUISIANNE (New Orleans), Aug. 20, 1841, at 3 ("Letters, dated at Charleston on the 15th of
August, and received here this morning, do not contain one word of news from Washington.").
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the newspaper optimistically predicted that the bill would be sent to
and signed by President John Tyler.6 By August 27, that optimism had
turned into pessimism as a result of incomplete information regarding
the decision of the House to table the bill, a death knell for the
legislation in the eyes of the Picayune's editors.7 Finally, ten days after
the bill's enactment, the Picayune celebrated the Bankruptcy Act of
1841,8 announcing "that another 'long agony' is over, and a new and
most important measure, in every respect, will soon be in operation." 9
As alluded to by the Picayune, debtors in the Crescent City and
the rest of the nation would have to wait to seek relief under the 1841
Act given the law's effective date of February 1, 1842.10 But once the
courts became open for bankruptcy filings, debtors did not hesitate to
seek relief. One such debtor was Arthur Morrell, a New Orleanian who
petitioned for relief on February 3, 1842, in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana." By the end of the month, on
6. The brief report on the legislation stated in its entirety as follows: 'It is considered pretty
certain that the Bankrupt Bill will pass both houses of Congress. Of course Tyler will not hesitate
in sanctioning that." DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 24, 1841, at 2.
7. From Washington, DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 27, 1841, at 2 ("In the House the
Bankrupt Bill was laid upon the table, by a vote of 110 yeas to 97 nays. This proceeding was
considered decisive as regards its fate."); cf. LE COURRIER DE LA LOUISIANNE (New Orleans), Aug.
26, 1841, at 3 ("The Bankrupt Bill, it is said, has received its quietus in the U.S. House of
Representatives .... ). For a discussion on how the House of Representatives resuscitated the
tabled bankruptcy bill, see CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 76-78
(Beard Books 1999) (1935).
8. The Picayune's enthusiasm for the 1841 Act can be attributed to its pro-Whig slant at
that time. See REINDERS, supra note 4, at 228 ("In policy the Picayune veered with the strongest
political winds. It was an 'independent' Whig journal until 1854 . . . ."). One bankruptcy historian
has noted that the 1841 Act "was commonly called the Great Whig Bankruptcy Act, and was lauded
by the Whigs as a wise and beneficent measure." NOEL, supra note 3, at 138.
9. Highly Important from Washington. Bankrupt Bill Passed., DAILY PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Aug. 29, 1841, at 2. A day before, The Louisiana Courier tersely reported without fanfare
that "[o]n the 19th instant, the Bankrupt Bill was returned to the Senate, with the President's
signature." LE COURRIER DE LA LOUISIANNE (New Orleans), Aug. 28, 1841, at 3. This muted
response is not surprising given that "[i]n politics the Courier was Democratic." REINDERS, supra
note 4, at 232. Democrats opposed the 1841 Act. WARREN, supra note 7, at 61. The newspaper did,
however, print the entire 1841 Bankruptcy Act in its August 30 issue. LE COURRIER DE LA
LOUISIANNE (New Orleans), Aug. 30, 1841, at 3. For background information on the Courier, see
REINDERS, supra note 4, at 231-32.
10. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 17, 5 Stat. 440, 449 (repealed 1843). In his history of U.S.
bankruptcy law, Noel inexplicably states that the 1841 Act "went into operation February 2, 1842,"
NOEL, supra note 3, at 138, even though he subsequently acknowledges that "[b]y the terms of the
act it was to take effect on the first day of February, 1842," id. at 139. The 1841 Act unequivocally
states that it "shall take effect from and after the first day ofFebruary next." § 17, 5 Stat. at 449
(emphasis added).
11. Petition for Writ of Possession at 1, In re Morrell, No. 19 (E.D. La. May 24, 1842). For a
discussion of the main archival sources consulted for this Article, see infra Section II.A. For a
discussion of the citation method used to refer to these sources, see Rafael I. Pardo, Documenting
Bankrupted Slaves, 71 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73, 87-90 (2018).
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February 26, the court had decreed Morrell a bankrupt, 12 thus giving
him the opportunity to seek a discharge of his debts. 13
Morrell, of course, was not alone in his plight seeking forgiveness
of debt. Like him, over eight hundred debtors in the Eastern District of
Louisiana sought relief from their financial distress under the
protective cover of the 1841 Act, 14 albeit within a very limited window
of time-a little bit over a year-as a result of the Act's repeal on March
3, 1843.15 Unlike Morrell, however, nearly all of those debtors received
their requested relief. Morrell was one of the few debtors denied a
discharge, 16 a jury having found that he was not entitled to such relief
because of his fraudulent conduct-specifically, concealment of certain
slaves from his creditors,17 slaves that, as argued by John M. Bach, the
assignee charged with administering Morrell's bankruptcy estate, were
"to be disposed according to Law, as part of the assets of said Morrell,
for the benefit of his said creditors."18
James, who was approximately thirty-two years old at the time
that Morrell filed for bankruptcy relief, 19 was one of the slaves whom
12. Petition for Writ of Possession, supra note 11, at 1.
13. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443.
14. See H.R. Doc. NO. 29-99, at 7 (1847).
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
16. According to the statistical report provided in 1847 to Congress by N.R. Jennings, the
Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, only two individuals failed
to receive a discharge. H.R. Doc. No. 29-99, at 7. While Jennings' report cautioned that "[t]here
are still many matters in bankruptcy unsettled, and reports of assignees and commissioners yet
to be made," he made that reference in explaining his estimate of "all the costs, fees, and expenses
arising from the bankruptcies" in the Eastern District. Id. While it would not be surprising that
some estates had not yet been fully administered four years after the 1841 Act's repeal, it would
be very surprising if there had been any pending matters in 1847 regarding a bankrupt's discharge
eligibility. See § 4, 5 Stat. at 443 (stating that the bankruptcy "discharge and certificate [were]
not ... to be granted until after ninety days from the decree of bankruptcy, nor until after seventy
days' notice in some public newspaper ... to all creditors who ha[d] proved their debts, and other
persons in interest").
17. John M. Bach, the assignee charged with administering Morrell's bankruptcy estate, filed
an objection on June 14, 1842, to Morrell's request for a discharge. Opposition of Assignee to the
Discharge, In re Morrell, No. 19 (E.D. La. June 14, 1842). The cover to Bach's objection contains a
notation stating, 'We the Jury, find the bankrupt not entitled to a certifficate [sic] of discharge,
having concealed certain slaves from his creditors[.]" Id. That notation is dated as having been
made in New Orleans on November 18, 1842. Id. Below the notation there is a signature under
which there is a word. Much of the signature and the word are illegible, but the remaining legible
letters and the context suggest that the subscribing individual identified himself as a juror. Id.
The legible letters in the signature are the initials "W" and "J" followed by a last name that begins
"McL." Id. A New Orleans directory from 1842 includes a listing for a "McLean, W. J. firm of Dick,
McLean & Hill, 85 Canal street." NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY FOR 1842, at 278 (New Orleans, Pitts
& Clarke 1842) [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY]. For a discussion of errors in that directory,
see Pardo, supra note 11, at 113 n.206.
18. Petition of John M Bach Assignee for Seizure of Slaves at 3, In re Morrell, No. 19 (E.D.
La. May 24, 1842) [hereinafter Bach Petition for Slave Seizure].
19. See Petition of John M. Bach Assignee to Sell Slave James at 2, In re Morrell, No. 19 (E.D.
La. Dec. 28, 1852) [hereinafter Bach Petition to Sell Slave James] ("[T]he assignee now prays that
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Morrell attempted to place beyond the reach of his creditors "through
simulated and fraudulent acts of sale .. . to his wife Lucy Ann Huyler"
and through a subsequent "simulated mortgage . .. to secure a
pretended note for the sum of $3000, drawn by said Morrell in the name
of his said wife, to one Charles J Cook, the brother in law of said
Morrell." 20 Morrell's fraudulent scheme came to Bach's attention within
several months after Morrell's filing. In response, the assignee
requested that the district court issue a writ commanding the U.S.
Marshal, Algernon Sidney Robertson, to seize Morrell's slaves,
including James, for delivery to Bach.21 While Robertson initially
succeeded in taking possession of two of Morrell's slaves and delivering
them to Bach, 22 James was not among them.
Subsequent documents filed in Morrell's case reveal that, when
the court issued the writ of possession to U.S. Marshal Robertson,
James "was run off at that time by the said Bankrupt [i.e., Morrell] from
the City of N Orleans to prevent the Assignee from getting possession
of [James]." 23 Eventually discovering James to be aboard a steamboat
in New Orleans in December 1845,24 Bach requested that the court
issue a writ instructing Robertson to take possession of James and then
deliver him to Bach.25 Although Robertson subsequently obtained
custody of James, he apparently escaped and eluded recapture for
approximately seven years, 26 at which point Bach petitioned the court
on December 28, 1852, for an order authorizing Robertson to sell James,
your honorable Court may grant an order of sale, authorizing & empowering him to sell the said
slave James, griff color, aged about forty two years . . . ."). Recall that Morrell filed his bankruptcy
petition in 1842. See supra text accompanying note 11.
20. Bach Petition for Slave Seizure, supra note 18, at 2-3.
21. See id. at 1, 3. While Bach's petition requesting the issuance of a writ of possession
referred to James as "Jim," id. at 2-3, a subsequent motion filed by Bach noted "that on the 24th
of May 1842 an attachment issued from the Court directed to the Marshall [sic] Commanding him
to take a Certain slave by name James," see Motion for Attachment at 2, In re Morrell, No. 19 (E.D.
La. Dec. 22, 1845) [hereinafter Motion for Attachment], thus indicating that the references to "Jim"
and "James" in both documents were to the same individual.
22. See Petition of J M Bach Assignee to Sell Negroes Belonging to the Estate of A Morrell at
3, In re Morrell, No. 19 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 1842) [hereinafter Bach Petition to Sell Slaves Drake and
China]. ;
23. Motion for Attachment, supra note 21, at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Bach Petition to Sell Slave James, supra note 19, at 2. For a discussion of the
experience of runaway slaves in Southern cities and how the urban landscape afforded them
unique opportunities to remain absconded, see RICHARD C. WADE, SLAVERY IN THE CITIES: THE
SOUTH 1820-1860, at 200-42 (paperback ed. 1967). Wade recounts the experiences of various
runaway slaves, including that of a Charleston slave who avoided recapture for at least two years,
see id. at 216-17, 316 n.25, and that of a New Orleans slave who "changed his name, forged some
papers, and then claimed he had never been a slave," id. at 217.
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now forty-two years old. 27 The court granted Bach's petition on the same
day that he filed it.28 Thirty-nine days later, at approximately noon on
Saturday, February 5, 1853, the U.S. Marshal auctioned James at the
St. Louis Hotel, selling him to George Clark for $505 in cash,29 about
$14,831 in today's dollars.30
Having recounted some of the key events in the Morrell
bankruptcy case, it is worth pausing to reflect on them and to absorb
their meaning. At first blush, the inclination might be to consider these
events as examples of two very familiar stories. First, since time
immemorial, individuals have had to confront the challenge of failing to
comply with financial obligations due to excessive indebtedness, and
the law has responded to that problem in various ways, including
providing for judicial sales of debtors' assets to pay the claims of
creditors. 31 Second, during the antebellum period, one of American
slavery's many horrors was the never-ending sale of black men, women,
and children-at least two million slaves between 1820 and 1860
according to one conservative estimate 32-with some of those sales
intended to satisfy the claims of creditors against indebted
slaveowners. 3 3
27. Bach Petition to Sell Slave James, supra note 19, at 2.
28. Id.
29. See Account Sales at 1, In re Morrell, No. 19 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 1853) [hereinafter Morrell
Account Sales]. For citations to court documents filed under the 1841 Act in the Eastern District
of Louisiana and titled "Account Sales," such citations refer to reports filed by the U.S. Marshal
documenting the property sold by him in a given bankruptcy case. See Pardo, supra note 11, at
91-93. The U.S. Marshal's report in In re Morrell indicates that he sold James "at the St. Louis
Exchange." Morrell Account Sales, supra, at 1. New Orleanians used that name to refer to the St.
Louis Hotel, a location that played a central role in the New Orleans slave market. See MAURIE D.
MCINNIS, SLAVES WAITING FOR SALE: ABOLITIONIST ART AND THE AMERICAN SLAVE TRADE 164
(2011). For further discussion regarding the various locations associated with the New Orleans
slave market, see infra Section IV.A. 1.
30. References to "today's dollars" are to 2017 dollars. Nominal dollar amounts from the
historical records consulted for this Article have been converted to 2017 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index estimates compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Consumer
Price Index (Estimate) 1800-, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
community/teaching-aids/cpi-calculator-information/consumer-price-index-1800 (last visited Aug.
11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/F4QP-LWW2].
31. See Thomas D. Russell, South Carolina's Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1241, 1245 (1993) ("The conduct of sales was among a sheriffs important duties. Most of
these sales were execution sales: sales connected with execution of a court's judgment. Execution
sales nearly always involved debt.").
32. See STEVEN DEYLE, CARRY ME BACK: THE DOMESTIC SLAVE TRADE IN AMERICAN LIFE 296
(2005).
33. See, e.g., Russell, supra note 31, at 1253:
In 1845 and 1846, in just over 100 sales at the beginning of twenty-two different
months, Fairfield District Sheriff Jeremiah Cockrell sold 311 slaves ... and a variety
of other personal property of between 80 and 90 debtors, and then distributed the total
proceeds of $127,589.50 to more than 225 creditors . . .. [T~he 311 slaves that Sheriff
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4:1071
One might be tempted to situate the Morrell case squarely at the
intersection of these two well-worn paths in American history,
concluding that the story is new in form, yet old in substance. 34 But
such a conclusion would be improvident. Failing to reckon with the
episode of American history of which the Morrell case is part and
parcel-the sale of slaves through the federal bankruptcy process-
would perpetuate what New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu described,
in his May 2017 remarks addressing the removal of the city's
Confederate monuments, as "[o]ne story forgotten or maybe even
purposefully ignored." 35
Unfortunately, historians and legal scholars to date have
overlooked the sale of slaves in bankruptcy.36 Almost all of the history
on both the domestic slave trade as well as on U.S. bankruptcy law fails
to mention this institutional vestige of American slavery. The few
scholars who have acknowledged bankruptcy slave sales have done so
only fleetingly, thus failing to recognize how and why these sales
constituted a crucial component of the federal government's complicity
in propping up slavery in antebellum America.
This Article begins the process of revealing the forgotten and
untold history of bankrupted slaves-that is, the black men, women,
and children who found themselves subjected to sale through the
federal bankruptcy process as a result of the desire of their indebted
Cockrell sold during the two-year period comprised 2.3% of the district's total slave
population in 1845.
A treatise from the 1850s on the law of slavery set forth the following proposition in its chapter
titled "Of the Incidents of Slavery": 'The slave is at all times liable to be sold, by process of law, for
the satisfaction of the debts of a living or the debts and bequests of a deceased master, at the suit
of creditors or legattees." GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE
SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9, 34 (Negro Univs. Press 1968) (2d ed. 1856).
34. Cf., e.g., WADE, supra note 26, at 284 ("[T]he historian who writes about slavery quickly
learns he is not engaged in a pioneering enterprise. The trail along the way is well marked and
the footprints clear and often big."); Gavin Wright, Foreword to RICHARD HOLCOMBE KILBOURNE,
JR., DEBT, INVESTMENT, SLAVES, at xi, xi (1995) ("[S]lavery has been the object of prodigious
historical research, including several massive and well-known quantitative projects.").
35. Mitch Landrieu's Speech on the Removal of Confederate Monuments in New Orleans, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/opinion/mitch-landrieus-speech-
transcript.html [https://perma.cclV9UX-7ZPF]; cf., e.g., Bonnie Martin, Slavery's Invisible Engine:
Mortgaging Human Property, 76 J.S. HIST. 817, 820 (2010) (discussing "reasons that the
mortgaging of people has slipped from our collective memory and the history of slavery").
36. See infra Section I.C.1; cf. HERBERT G. GUTMAN, SLAVERY AND THE NUMBERS GAME 12-
13 (paperback ed. 2003) ("Although many monographs and specialized studies have been written
about the enslaved Afro-American, an entire range of critical subjects-some inadequately studied
and others still unstudied-needs fresh empirical examination. New work is needed on such
subjects as ... the sale of slaves. . . ."); Wright, supra note 34, at xi:
Yet the financial aspects of slavery have been neglected. Even those historical
economists who have given a prominent interpretive place to the implications of slave
property as a form of wealth . . . have done so more on the basis of theory than on a
detailed examination of portfolios and credit relationships.
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owners to attain financial freedom from the debts that drove them into
bankruptcy. Though the term "bankrupt" under the 1841 Act referred
to a debtor whom a federal court had decreed to be eligible to seek a
discharge of his or her debts, 37 and though slaves themselves did not
file for bankruptcy, I use the term "bankrupted slave" (or its plural
form) throughout this Article to remind the reader of the awful reality
that "slaveholders' identities were merged with those of their slaves."38
As such, once a court decreed a slaveowner to be a bankrupt, his slaves
acquired the status of bankrupted slaves, subjected to a specific type of
subordination by the federal government, which would finally
culminate in a bankruptcy slave sale.
But why is it that the bankruptcy slave sale must be
substantively distinguished from the myriad nonbankruptcy slave
sales, in particular those conducted under the auspices of judicial
process that were a core feature of commercial life in antebellum
America? 39 The answer to that question lies in one of the defining
features of the 1841 Act. To effectuate the financial freedom of
individuals who sought bankruptcy relief, Congress designed the
system to demarcate the beginning of that new life once a federal
district court ordered that the individual be declared a bankrupt. Such
a declaration terminated all of the bankrupt's interests in his or her
property, with all rights and title to such property automatically vesting
in the assignee, who was the representative appointed to administer
the bankrupt's estate, a federally created res.40 In other words, the
bankrupt's prebankruptcy property became the federal government's
property, including any slaves in which the bankrupt had an interest.
Accordingly, for a brief window in this nation's history,
bankruptcy legislation made the federal government a widespread
holder of property interests-usually a full ownership interest-in
slaves. In stark contrast, the other nonbankruptcy judicial processes
that resulted in slave sales during the antebellum period generally did
not entail the federal government becoming the holder of such interests.
The bankrupted slave thus represents extremely entrenched
involvement by the federal government in the domestic slave trade-to
37. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
38. WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SouL: LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE MARKET 200
(1999).
39. On the prominence of judicial slave sales, see, for example, Russell, supra note 31, at 1241
("The South Carolina courts of law and equity acted as the state's greatest slave auctioneering
firm . .. [Most slave auctions took place on the courthouse steps."); Judith Kelleher Schafer, New
Orleans Slavery in 1850 as Seen in Advertisements, 47 J.S. HIST. 33, 33 (1981) (stating that "[m]ost
of the [slave] sales [in New Orleans in 1850] were auctions occasioned by a legal procedure').
40. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843).
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wit, frequently becoming the owner of slaves until they could be sold to
a third-party purchaser at a bankruptcy sale. 41
In large part, this Article centers on providing an account of the
bankruptcy slave trade for the sake of uncovering the role of bankruptcy
law-a prominent and permanent feature of modern law that has
provided financial relief to millions upon millions of individuals-in
furthering slavery in antebellum America. But this Article also provides
an opportunity to respond to the clarion call sounded by historians
Eugene D. Genovese and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese in 1984. They noted
the lack of "an adequate history of antebellum southern law apart from
the law of slavery and, to some extent, the criminal law," 4 2 and thus
urged that legal historians ask "to what extent slavery, considered as a
social system, shaped the development of commercial, contract, and tort
law." 4 3 Since then, historians have begun to answer that call. 4 4 But
again, no one has yet examined how slavery may have shaped the
development of bankruptcy law, which falls under the umbrella of
commercial law, or for that matter how bankruptcy law may have
affected slavery. While this Article does not purport to a be an
exhaustive account examining these potentially causal relationships,
its detailed history provides the much-needed springboard for
launching continued inquiry into the significance of the bankruptcy
slave trade.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the key
provisions of the 1841 Act, outlines the salient features of the domestic
slave trade in antebellum America, and finishes with a discussion of
how these two institutions inevitably collided to form the bankruptcy
slave trade, pursuant to which the federal government itself became a
41. Cf. Russell, supra note 31, at 1241 ("[T]hrough the operation of law, many additional
actors, institutions, and norms joined the relationship of slaveowner and slave.").
42. Eugene D. Genovese & Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Slavery, Economic Development, and the
Law: The Dilemma of the Southern Political Economists, 1800-1860, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 2
(1984).
43. Id. at 3; see also James W. Ely, Jr., Book Review, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 265, 265-66
(reviewing ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975))
("Slavery in America has long been a subject of intense scrutiny by historians.... Much, however,
is left to be done. The treatment of slaves at the trial court level remains largely untouched, as
does the consideration of slavery in property, estate, commercial, and tort law." (footnotes
omitted)).
44. One example is the work of Thomas Morris, which explores a multitude of topics on the
intersection of antebellum law and slavery, among them (1) slavery and the law of successions and
(2) contract law in the sale and mortgaging of slaves. THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND
THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 81-131 (1996); see also JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL
LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA, at xiv (1994) ("The goal of this book is ... to examine
the operation of Louisiana law on slavery as seen in the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana and, conversely, to discover the effect of the institution of slavery on the development,
and in some instances the 'Americanization,' of Louisiana law.").
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slaveowner in the process of extending financial freedom to certain
debtors. The remainder of the Article explores how the bankruptcy
slave trade functioned in the Eastern District of Louisiana (the
"Eastern District"), home to New Orleans, antebellum America's largest
slave market. Part II sets the evidentiary backdrop for this Article's
case study, describing the sources and dataset used to document the
history of the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave trade. Part III
provides an account of the victims of that trade, exploring across
various dimensions the experience of the 480 black men, women, and
children (and then some) who found themselves ensnared by the federal
bankruptcy process because of their owners' desire for relief from
financial distress. Part IV then shifts focus to examining the
perpetrators of and profiteers from the Eastern District's bankruptcy
slave trade, documenting their complicity in making the sale of human
beings a key feature of the process for forgiving the debts of bankrupt
slaveowners. This Article concludes that we must never forget that the
1841 Act, the forbearer of modern bankruptcy law, caused great harm
and suffering to the black men, women, and children forced into the
condition of bankrupted slaves.
I. THE INTERSECTION OF BANKRUPTCY AND THE DOMESTIC SLAVE
TRADE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
The bankruptcy slave trade provides a new lens for looking at
two familiar subjects: the foundations of U.S. bankruptcy law and the
domestic slave trade in antebellum America. Much has been written
about both, and exponentially more about the latter. But no scholarship
to date has ever systematically explored the bankruptcy slave trade. 45
Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that, during the antebellum
period, bankruptcy legislation was evanescent, with both the 1800 and
1841 Acts suffering quick repeals, 46 thus failing to capture the attention
of historians interested in the domestic slave trade. And, in the
postbellum period, with the abolition of slavery,47 no longer would the
collision of bankruptcy and slavery be a possibility.48
Given that historical conditions channel any study of the
bankruptcy slave trade toward the 1800 and 1841 Acts, why focus on
45. See infra Section I.C.1.
46. See supra notes 1, 15 and accompanying text.
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
48. However, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878), played a pivotal role in "cater[ing] to white southerners'
economic needs at the height of Radical Reconstruction," ELIZABETH LEE THOMPSON, THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AFIER THE CIVIL WAR 4 (2004).
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the latter as the starting point of an inquiry into this unexplored
chapter of history? Simply put, the 1841 Act had much broader reach
than the 1800 Act by virtue of (1) making the relief available to a much
larger class of individuals, (2) allowing individuals to seek such relief
voluntarily, and (3) having operative effect at a time when the nation
consisted of more states (including ones that permitted slavery) and
more people. 49 The confluence of these factors produces a more ideal
historical moment, two decades before the outbreak of the Civil War,
for studying the intersection of the bankruptcy system and the domestic
slave trade, particularly when one considers that the historical record
for the 1841 Act is much larger than that for the 1800 Act.50
This Part sets the stage for this Article's case study of the
Eastern District's bankruptcy slave trade. Section L.A introduces the
reader to the provisions of the 1841 Act that featured prominently in
the operation of the bankruptcy system. Section I.B then turns to a brief
discussion of the domestic slave trade, focusing on the importance of
court-ordered slave sales to that system. Section I.C then explores how
these two systems collided to form the bankruptcy slave trade, first
commenting on the widespread failure of scholars to notice the collision.
Section I.C finishes by returning to the 1841 Act, pointing out how it
transferred ownership of slaves from their bankrupt slaveowners to the
federal government, thereby making it the key participant in the
bankruptcy slave trade.
A. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841
This Section provides an overview of the process by which a
bankruptcy case unfolded under the 1841 Act. For the reader already
familiar with the operation of the present-day system under the
Bankruptcy Code,5 1 the general principles covered here will be familiar
ground. The salient differences pertain to the specific content of the law
effectuating these principles. For the reader unfamiliar with
49. The 1800 Act limited bankruptcy relief to a limited class of individuals engaged in
commerce (i.e., merchants, bankers, brokers, factors, underwriters, and marine insurers), and
further provided that such relief would be creditor-initiated (i.e., involuntary from the perspective
of the debtor). See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 1-2, 2 Stat. 19, 20 (repealed 1803). For a discussion
of the more robust nature of bankruptcy relief under the 1841 Act, see infra Section I.A.
50. See James K. Owens, Documenting Regional Business History: The Bankruptcy Acts of
1800 and 1841, 21 PROLOGUE 179, 185 (1989) ("Because of the more comprehensive nature of the
1841 act, the records serve as an even more valuable source for business history. In addition, the
records are considerably more voluminous."). Compare Karen Gross et al., Ladies in Red: Learning
from America's First Female Bankrupts, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 24 (1996) (suggesting that there
were roughly 914 bankruptcy filings under the 1800 Act), with Pardo, supra note 11, at 86 tbl.1
(indicating that there were roughly 44,790 bankruptcy filings, if not more, under the 1841 Act).
51. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012).
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bankruptcy law, the sketch that follows will be sufficient to provide a
sense of the goals of the 1841 Act and how it functioned.
Generally speaking, bankruptcy represents one type of legal
response to the problem that arises when a debtor has insufficient
assets and income to repay his or her creditors in full. 5 2 To address the
individual's financial failure, the law must tackle four broad issues:
(1) the class of individual who should be eligible for bankruptcy relief;
(2) the scope of that relief-for example, whether all, some, or none of
the debtor's prebankruptcy debts should be forgiven; (3) what the
debtor must give up in exchange for that relief-for example, certain
prebankruptcy assets or a portion of future income; and (4) how to
allocate among the debtor's creditors what the debtor relinquished in
exchange for relief. The remainder of this Section discusses key features
of the 1841 Act that touched upon each of these issues with respect to
voluntary bankruptcy cases.53
1. Bankruptcy Eligibility and Discharge Eligibility
The 1841 Act represented a seminal moment in reorienting
bankruptcy law as a mechanism for debtor relief,5 4 shifting the focus
away from its origins primarily as a creditor-collection device.55 One of
the primary factors effectuating this shift was the ability of debtors to
seek bankruptcy relief voluntarily. Up until this point in time, debtors
lacked such control,56 instead subject to the will of their creditors who
would determine if and when bankruptcy proceedings should be
instituted against the debtor. 5 But rather than limit relief to a narrow
52. The 1841 Act did not extend bankruptcy relief to legal entities, such as corporations. See
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 440 (specifying persons eligible for bankruptcy relief)
(repealed 1843); see also KENNETH N. KLEE & WHITMAN L. HOLT, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME
COURT: 1801-2014, at 316 (2015) ("The Bankruptcy Acts of 1800 and 1841 included no provision
for bankruptcy cases regarding corporate entities."); NOEL, supra note 3, at 138 (stating that the
1841 Act's "only limitation in application was to natural persons"). Accordingly, the discussion in
the main text is limited to individual debtors (i.e., natural persons).
53. There were few involuntary cases under the 1841 Act. See, e.g., H.R. DOc. NO. 29-223, at
6 (1846) (reporting that 1,510 voluntary petitions and 27 involuntary petitions were filed in the
District of Connecticut under the 1841 Act); id. at 8 (reporting that 2,466 voluntary petitions and
84 involuntary petitions were filed in the Southern District of New York under the 1841 Act).
54. See NOEL, supra note 3, at 138 (noting that "[t]he [1841 Act] was substantially for the
benefit of debtors").
55. PETER CHARLES HOFFER ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 113 (2016)
("The [1841] Act 'shifted' the balance of power in court, through the mechanism of the voluntary
confession of bankruptcy, from the creditor to the debtor, a shift that has characterized the federal
law to this day.").
56. See NOEL, supra note 3, at 138 (noting that the 1841 Act "introduced the principle of
voluntary bankruptcy into our legislation").
57. See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 1-2, 2 Stat. 19, 21-22 (repealed 1803).
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class of individual,58 Congress under the 1841 Act classified "[a]ll
persons whatsoever, residing in any State, District or Territory of the
United States, owing debts" as potentially eligible for relief.5 9 Moreover,
only a narrow class of individual faced the threat of involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings.60 Accordingly, under the 1841 Act, the
overwhelming majority of debtors could initiate on their own terms the
process for obtaining forgiveness of debt with the hope of regaining their
financial freedom.
Of course, the ability to seek bankruptcy relief did not
necessarily ensure access to that relief. For example, just as the direct
costs of filing for bankruptcy (i.e., court fees and attorneys' fees) have
been a barrier to relief for present-day debtors,61 so too did debtors
under the 1841 Act confront such barriers. 62 Despite this qualification,
58. The 1800 Act's involuntary bankruptcy scheme applied only to a "merchant, or other
person residing within the United States, actually using the trade of merchandise, by buying and
selling in gross, or by retail, or dealing in exchange, or as a banker, broker, factor, underwriter, or
marine insurer" who committed one of the acts of bankruptcy enumerated in the statute. § 1, 2
Stat. at 20-21.
59. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1843). The 1841 Act's eligibility
provision seemingly classified as ineligible for bankruptcy relief an individual whose debts had
resulted from defalcation by the debtor while acting as a public officer or in a fiduciary capacity.
See § 1, 5 Stat. at 441 (providing that "[a]ll persons whatsoever, . .. owing debts, which shall not
have been created in consequence of a defalcation as a public officer; or as executor, administrator,
guardian or trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity,.. . shall be deemed bankrupts
within the purview of this act"); NOEL, supra note 3, at 138 (noting that the 1841 Act's "advantages
extended to all persons residing in the United States and not owing debts contracted in a fiduciary
capacity"). The Act's discharge provision, however, specified that all individuals whom the court
had declared to be bankrupts would be entitled to a discharge, with the exception of individuals
who had engaged in certain misconduct or fraud, including "any person who, after the passing of
this act, shall apply trust funds to his own use." § 4, 5 Stat. at 443-44. Examining the interplay of
these two provisions, the Supreme Court held that an individual who had incurred fiduciary debts
prior to enactment of the 1841 Act would be eligible to be declared a bankrupt and receive a
discharge, but that the scope of discharge would exclude the bankrupt's fiduciary debts. See
Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 202, 207-08 (1844); see also KLEE & HOLT, supra note 52,
at 328 (stating that, "[b]eginning with the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, debts for defalcation in a
fiduciary capacity have been included in the categories of nondischargeable debts" and discussing
Chapman). Presumably, an individual who had incurred fiduciary debts subsequent to the 1841
Act would have been eligible to be declared a bankrupt, but would have been ineligible for
discharge.
60. See § 1, 5 Stat. at 441-42 (providing for involuntary bankruptcy proceedings under a
limited set of circumstances against merchants, retailers of merchandise, bankers, factors,
brokers, underwriters, and marine insurers).
61. See Rafael I. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy Rights Seriously, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1115, 1123-
24 (2016).
62. See EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY AND COMMERCIAL
SOCIETY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 138, 268 n. 15 (2001); see also, e.g., RULES AND REGULATIONS IN
BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NORTH CAROLINA 9-11 (Fayetteville, Edward J. Hale 1842) [hereinafter N.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES]
(setting forth table of bankruptcy fees under the 1841 Act in the District of North Carolina). The
1841 Act provided that
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the fact remains that the introduction of voluntary bankruptcy relief on
such a wide scale constituted a radical departure from prior bankruptcy
law, both within and outside of the United States.63
Procedurally, for debtors to access the bankruptcy forum, the
1841 Act required that they file a petition with the district court located
in the federal judicial district where they resided or had their principal
place of business at the time of filing the petition.64 In the bankruptcy
petition, debtors would request that the district court issue a decree
declaring them to fall within the class of individual eligible to pursue
the relief available under the 1841 Act. 6
A debtor's eligibility for a bankruptcy decree hinged on the
satisfaction of certain conditions-specifically, (1) a declaration by the
debtor stating his or her inability "to meet [his or her] debts and
engagementS" 66 and (2) financial disclosures regarding the debtor's
liabilities and assets. 6 7 The disclosure requirements served the purpose,
among others, of providing the court and its officers adequate
information to perform the marshalling and distribution functions
entailed in allocating whatever the debtor had given up in exchange for
bankruptcy relief.68 Provided that the debtor complied with these
the [district] courts shall, from time to time, prescribe a tariff or table of fees and
charges to be taxed by the officers of the court or other persons, for services under this
act, or any other on the subject of bankruptcy; which fees shall be as low as practicable,
with reference to the nature and character of such services.
§ 6, 5 Stat. at 446.
63. By way of comparison, English bankruptcy law first allowed voluntary bankruptcy for
merchants in 1844 and for nonmerchants in 1861. Tabb, supra note 3, at 353-54. But see NOEL,
supra note 3, at 138 (stating, without citation to any source, that the 1841 Act "introduced the
principle of voluntary petitioning, eight years before the same doctrine entered the English laws").
64. § 7, 5 Stat. at 446.
65. See § 1, 5 Stat. at 441 (stating that, upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, debtors
"shall be deemed bankrupts within the purview of this act, and may be so declared accordingly by
a decree of such court'); see also, e.g., Petition of Charles Edward Forstall to Be Declared Bankrupt
at 1, In re Forstall, No. 393 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 1842) ("Respectfully represents Charles Edward
Forstall ... that he is unable to meet his debts and engagements, ... and prays that after due
proceedings had, he may be declared by a decree of the Court to be a Bankrupt, within the purview
of the said Act. . . .").
66. § 1, 5 Stat. at 441.
67. Id. (setting forth requirement that a debtor provide "a list of ... creditors, their respective
places of residence, and the amount due to each, together with an accurate inventory of . .. [the
debtor's] property, rights, and credits, of every name, kind and description, and the location and
situation of each and every parcel and portion thereof'). These financial disclosures were to be
"verified by oath" or alternatively "by solemn affirmation" if the debtor were "conscientiously
scrupulous of taking an oath." Id.
68. See, e.g., In re Plimpton, 19 F. Cas. 874, 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 11,227):
As the petitioner thus sets forth the amount of part of his furniture, and sets forth that
more of it is mortgaged, and to whom, I apprehend he complies with the act, as the
assignee can be under no difficulty in relation to it, and can see what part of it is under
incumbrance and what is not.;
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4:1071
conditions, the district court would declare him or her to be a
bankrupt,69 thereby opening the gates to the bankruptcy forum and
providing the bankrupt an opportunity to request a discharge from his
or her debts. In other words, the bankruptcy decree did not guarantee
that the bankrupt would obtain a discharge.
Upon obtaining a bankruptcy decree, the bankrupt could
petition the district court for a discharge. 70 To qualify for a discharge,
the bankrupt had to satisfy several conditions. First, the 1841 Act
required the bankrupt to surrender all of his or her property existing as
of the date of the bankruptcy decree, with the exception of a limited
amount of property necessary for the support of the bankrupt (and, if
applicable, his wife and children).71 Second, the bankrupt had to have
complied with all orders issued by the court. 72 Finally, the bankrupt
had to fall outside a particular class of individual-specifically, a class
defined mostly by reference to a limited set of circumstances relating to
a bankrupt's fraud or misconduct in connection with the bankruptcy
case. 73 If the bankrupt satisfied these discharge-eligibility rules, 74 the
Act required the court to grant the bankrupt a discharge certificate.75
In re Malcom, 16 F. Cas. 540, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1842) (No. 8,986) ("Another objection is, that the
schedule is not sufficiently definite. . . . It is not necessary that the petitioner should set forth a
perfect and complete exhibit of every article. But it must be so explicit that the assignee or his
agent may be enabled to find the property if necessary."); In re Frisbee, 9 F. Cas. 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y.
1842) (No. 5,130) ("Counsel must thus see the importance attached to the inventory. By the act,
the assignee must have such a description of the property as would fix its location and enable him
to identify it.").
69. See, e.g., Plimpton, 19 F. Cas. at 874 ("Another objection is, that the petitioner does not
set out an accurate inventory of his property and every portion of it. This is a question of fact, and
if he has not set it out properly, it would be fatal to his application.").
70. See § 4, 5 Stat. at 443.
71. See §§ 3-4, 5 Stat. at 442-43. This surrender of property constituted what the bankrupt
had to relinquish in exchange for a discharge, which will be further addressed in the discussion
below on the scope and price of discharge. See infra Section I.A.2.
72. See § 4, 5 Stat. at 443.
73. See id. at 443-44. To prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system by repeat filers, the 1841
Act also precluded a court from grating a discharge if the bankrupt had previously received a
discharge in a prior case, unless the proceeds from the liquidation of the bankrupt's estate were
sufficient to pay all creditors 75% of their claims. § 12, 5 Stat. at 447.
74. For a discussion of the modern-day distinction between "bankruptcy eligibility rules" and
"discharge eligibility rules," see Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the
Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 405, 416-17 (2005).
75. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443. It should be noted that the 1841 Act enabled creditors to prevent the
court from granting the bankrupt a discharge if "a majority, in number and value, of the creditors"
who had proved their debts filed at the discharge hearing "their written dissent to the allowance
of a discharge." Id. at 444. If that occurred, the bankrupt could demand a trial by jury (or
alternatively appeal to the circuit court). Id.; see also BANKER. D. MASS. R. XIII (1842):
But if a majority in number and value of the creditors, who have proved their debts
shall appear at such hearing and file their written dissent thereto, they shall state their
objections in writing; then, ... the bankrupt may demand a trial by jury, and the proper
1086
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2. The Scope and Price of Discharge
The most expansive form of discharge would have provided a
bankrupt under the 1841 Act with a release from all of his or her
prebankruptcy debts, notwithstanding the identity of the creditors or
the circumstances under which the debts had been incurred. On the
surface, this is what the 1841 Act's discharge provision purported to
do-that is, to provide the bankrupt "a full discharge from all his debts,
to be decreed and allowed by the court which has declared him a
bankrupt, and a certificate thereof granted to him by such court
accordingly." 76 The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the Act to
except from discharge any debt resulting from defalcation by the debtor
while acting as a public officer or in a fiduciary capacity. ' Additionally,
courts appear to have been split on the issue of whether a discharge
under the Act applied to debts owed to government creditors.78 Aside
issue will be directed by the court, and the trial and other proceedings had thereon in
the manner prescribed by the Act of [Clongress.
(repealed), reprinted in P.W. CHANDLER, THE BANKRUPT LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 47 (Boston,
James H. Weeks 1842). The 1841 Act provided that, if the jury found that the bankrupt had "made
a full disclosure and surrender of all his estate, as by this act required, and has in all things
conformed to the directions thereof, the court shall make a decree of discharge, and grant a
certificate." § 4, 5 Stat. at 444.
In addition to the aggregate creditor-dissent mechanism, creditors could, of course, object to
the bankrupt's discharge on independent grounds, such as the bankrupt's failure to surrender all
of his or her property. See, e.g., BANKR. D. MASS. R. XIII:
Whenever any creditors less than a majority in number and value, who have proved
their debts, .. . shall appear at the hearing of the petition of the bankrupt for his
discharge and a certificate thereof, and object thereto, they shall file their objections in
writing; and the court will thereupon proceed to examine and decide upon the same ...
having regard to the nature of the objections and the proofs required in support thereof.
reprinted in CHANDLER, supra, at 47.
76. § 4, 5 Stat. at 443. Bankrupts in their discharge petitions requested relief in the nature
of a full discharge. See, e.g., Petition of George A. Botts Bankrupt, for a Discharge at 1, In re Botts,
No. 545 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 1843) ("He therefore prays that after due notice and proceedings to be
had in the premises, He may be decreed by the Court to have a full discharge from all his debts
provable under the said Bankruptcy, and a certificate thereof granted according to the Act of
Congress." (emphasis added)).
77. See supra note 59.
78. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, held that "debts due the commonwealth
[we]re not barred by the bankrupt certificate" issued under the 1841 Act. Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson, 10 Pa. 466, 467-68 (1849). The court based its holding on English bankruptcy
practice, U.S. bankruptcy practice under the 1800 Act, and the language of the 1841 Act,
emphasizing the principle that a bankruptcy discharge would not apply to a government creditor,
absent an express provision in the statute to that effect, due to the government's status as a
sovereign. See id. at 468. Quite glaringly, the court failed to mention, see id. at 468-69, that the
1800 Act had expressly excepted from discharge debts owing to government creditors, see Act of
Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 62, 2 Stat. 19, 36 (repealed 1803). The court also refused to answer whether
the discharge would apply to a government creditor that proved its debt in order to participate in
the distribution from the bankrupt's estate, see § 5, 5 Stat. at 444, which the Hutchinson state
creditor had not done, see Hutchinson, 10 Pa. at 468.
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from these limited exceptions, a bankrupt's discharge under the 1841
Act encompassed all prebankruptcy debts, thus representing a very
robust form of relief.79
The discharge marked the beginning of the bankrupt's new
financial life, unfettered by his or her prebankruptcy debts. By cutting
off a creditor's ability to recover such debts as a personal liability of the
bankrupt,80 the 1841 Act severely limited a creditor's postbankruptcy
The Hutchinson court, however, was not unanimous in its holding, with Justice Coulter
adopting the dissenting view "that the state having yielded her sovereignty, so far as the passage
of the act of bankruptcy is concerned, is bound like individuals by its terms." Id. at 468.
Additionally, seven years after the Hutchinson decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that a discharge under the 1841 Act extended to debts owed to the federal
government, basing its decision on both the Act's express provisions and its legislative history. See
United States v. Zerega, 28 F. Cas. 804, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 16,786). Unlike the state creditor
in Hutchinson, the federal creditor in Zerega had proven its debt in the bankruptcy case. Id. This
fact did have some significance for the court. See id. at 805-06 ("This strongly implies the
understanding of the government that the certificate of discharge was to bar public debts, alike
with private ones."). But what seems to have struck the court the most is (1) that the express
language of the 1841 Act was quite expansive in "declar[ing] [that] the certificate and discharge of
the bankrupt, when duly granted, shall ... be deemed a full and complete discharge of all debts ...
which are provable," and (2) that, unlike the 1800 Act, Congress had failed to create under the
1841 Act an express discharge exception for government debts. Id. at 805. On this basis the court
presumed that Congress had changed its intent. See id. ("The presumption ... is exceedingly
forcible that the intention of the enactment was that it should operate alike upon debts due the
United States and individuals.").
Viewed through the lens of the Supreme Court's modern bankruptcy jurisprudence, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Hutchinson was incorrect. See Tenn. Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448-49 (2004):
Under our longstanding precedent, States, whether or not they choose to participate in
the proceeding, are bound by a bankruptcy court's discharge order no less than other
creditors.... [When the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the res is unquestioned,
our cases indicate that the exercise of its in rem jurisdiction to discharge a debt does
not infringe state sovereignty.
(citation omitted), quoted with approval in Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 364 (2006).
79. For a brief discussion of how Congress has dramatically reduced the scope of bankruptcy
discharge over time, see Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Does Ideology Matter in
Bankruptcy? Voting Behavior on the Courts ofAppeals, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919, 937-39 (2012).
Any increase in discharge exceptions increases the likelihood that "the debtor will exit bankruptcy
with a greater amount of nondischarged debt, thereby increasing the likelihood that bankruptcy
relief will fail to restore the debtor to economic productivity." Id. at 939-40.
80. See § 4, 5 Stat. at 444 (providing that the "discharge and certificate ... shall be and may
be pleaded as a full and complete bar to all suits brought in any court of judicature whatever").
Because the bankruptcy discharge had to be pleaded as an affirmative defense to a judicial
collection effort by a creditor, the possibility existed that the defense would be waived if not
properly raised, thus negating the benefit of discharge with respect to that creditor. See, e.g.,
Fellows v. Hall, 8 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.D. Mich. 1843) (No. 4,722) ("If the discharge were
obtained before the answer was filed, it should be set forth in the answer, or be made the subject
matter of a plea. If after answer filed, then special leave should be given to the defendant, that he
may plead it.").
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recourse to collect any unpaid, prebankruptcy amounts owed by the
bankrupt.81
As previously mentioned, in order to obtain a discharge, the
bankrupt had to surrender all of his or her nonexempt property existing
on the bankruptcy-decree date. 82 The 1841 Act provided that a
bankrupt could keep "necessary household and kitchen furniture, and
such other articles and necessaries of such bankrupt," as designated by
the assignee on the basis of "the family, condition, and circumstances of
the bankrupt, but altogether not to exceed in value . .. the sum of three
hundred dollars." 8 3 Additionally, the bankrupt would be allowed to keep
his "wearing apparel . .. and that of his wife and children." 8 4 In
summary, the bankrupt's exempt property would be limited to his
necessary goods, not exceeding a value of $300 in the aggregate (about
$7,595 in today's dollars), and his clothes and the clothes of his wife and
children.
When considering the scope and price of discharge, one can
conceive of the "net financial benefit" obtained by a bankrupt under the
1841 Act as the difference between (1) the total amount of discharged
debt and (2) the sum of the bankrupt's direct costs of obtaining
bankruptcy relief (e.g., court fees and attorneys' fees) and the value of
the bankrupt's nonexempt assets.85 Many cases under the Act were no-
asset cases-that is, cases in which the bankrupt did not have any
nonexempt assets for liquidation and distribution to creditors. 86
Accordingly, to many creditors it must have seemed that the typical
bankrupt obtained forgiveness of debt without having to pay much of a
price.87
81. Some possibilities for postbankruptcy collection on a discharged debt included informal
voluntary payments by the former bankrupt to the creditor, or alternatively a formal agreement
(i.e., a contract) between the parties that the former bankrupt would repay the debt. See
BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 124-28.
82. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
83. § 3, 5 Stat. at 443.
84. Id.
85. See Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives
Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 700
(1998).
86. See infra notes 261-262 and accompanying text. For a bankrupt who was especially
earnest in announcing his no-asset case, consider the schedule of liabilities and assets filed by
John Shaw Kennedy from New Orleans, indicating in the schedule's asset section, "None! All
having been used in the payment of my debts and Current Expenses." Schedule of Liabilities &
Effects of J.S. Kennedy at 1, In re Kennedy, No. 383 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 1842).
87. See BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 119. In a no-asset case, the price for discharge would
have been limited to the bankrupt's direct costs of obtaining bankruptcy relief. See supra text
accompanying note 86. Balleisen notes that, depending on the federal judicial district, court fees
under the 1841 Act could range from fifteen to fifty dollars for a simple case (i.e., one not raising
litigable issues). See BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 138; see also, e.g., H.R. DOC. No. 27-172, at 17-
2018] 1089
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
3. Creditor Repayment
In the event that an assignee's liquidation of the bankruptcy
estate generated proceeds for distribution,88 creditors had to prove their
debts in order to receive payment from the estate. 89 The court could
disallow a creditor's claim against the estate if the debt underlying the
claim was based on "fraud, imposition, illegality, or mistake."90 The
assignee would distribute the estate's proceeds on a pro rata basis to all
creditors who had proved their debts.91 As a general matter, the 1841
Act did not arrange creditors into distinct classes for purposes of
ascertaining priority entitlement to the estate's proceeds. 92 There were,
however, some exceptions to this rule.
First, the Act did not "annul, destroy, or impair ... any liens,
mortgages, or other securities on property" that were valid under state
law and undisplaced by specific provisions of the Act.93 Accordingly, if
a creditor had a valid, undisplaced lien on a particular piece of estate
property, that lien would give priority to the secured creditor over any
unsecured creditor to the proceeds generated from the sale of that
property.
Second, the Act did confer priority status to three types of
unsecured claims: (1) federal government claims, (2) certain surety
claims, and (3) certain wage claims not exceeding twenty-five dollars. 94
Accordingly, for those cases in which there were insufficient proceeds to
fully pay all unsecured creditors, priority unsecured creditors received
a distribution before any distributions were made to nonpriority
unsecured creditors. If there were insufficient proceeds to fully pay the
priority unsecured creditors, then the nonpriority unsecured creditors
did not receive any distribution.
18 (1843) (setting forth a table of fees under the 1841 Act for a no-opposition bankruptcy case in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, administered in the city or county
of Philadelphia, and listing a total amount of $30.45). Attorneys' fees for such a case would not
likely have exceeded twenty-five dollars. See BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 140.
88. See § 10, 5 Stat. at 447 (setting forth provisions on the liquidation of the bankruptcy
estate).
89. § 5, 5 Stat. at 444.
90. Id. at 445.
91. Id. at 444.
92. See id.
93. § 2, 5 Stat. at 442.
94. § 5, 5 Stat. at 444-45. For a brief discussion on the structuring of suretyship transactions
in antebellum America, see Thomas D. Russell, The Antebellum Courthouse as Creditors'Domain:
Trial-Court Activity in South Carolina and the Concomitance of Lending and Litigation, 40 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 331, 335-36 (1996).
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Finally, while the Act indicated that administrative expenses
associated with the case would be charged against the estate, 95 it did
not specify whether such expenses would be entitled to priority. The
practice, however, was that administrative expenses would be paid
before any distributions were made to priority or nonpriority unsecured
creditors.96 Accordingly, for those cases in which there were insufficient
proceeds to fully pay the estate's administrative expenses, priority and
nonpriority unsecured creditors did not receive any distribution.
Pursuant to these distribution rules, any amounts owed to
creditors that remained unpaid after the assignee had distributed the
estate's proceeds would be discharged, unless the debt was
nondischargeable. 97 Bankruptcy case statistics, which clerks of the
various federal district courts reported to Congress, reveal that creditor
dividends under the 1841 Act were quite paltry.98 Thus, while the Act
conferred substantial relief to bankrupts, the overwhelming majority of
whom received a discharge, 99 it proved to be of little benefit to
creditors.100
B. The Domestic Slave Trade
At the same time that tens of thousands of debtors sought
financial freedom under the 1841 Act, 101 hundreds of thousands of black
men, women, and children were sold into bondage. 102 As described by
95. See § 6, 5 Stat. at 446 (requiring district courts to "prescribe a tariff or table of fees and
charges to be taxed by the officers of the court or other persons, for services under this act, or any
other on the subject of bankruptcy").
96. See, e.g., BANKR. D.D.C. R. 41 (1842) ("The assignee shall be entitled to deduct in the first
instance, from moneys of the estate in his hands, all necessary expenditures and responsibilities
incurred by him, and allowed and certified by the court.") (repealed), reprinted in RULES AND
REGULATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 10 (Washington, D.C., Peter Force 1842) [hereinafter D.C. BANKRUPTCY
RULES]; BANKR. D.N.C. R. 44 (1842) (same) (repealed), reprinted in N.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES,
supra note 62, at 7; BANKR. D. VT. R. 57 (1842) (same) (repealed), reprinted in RULES AND
REGULATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, FOR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT 10 (Rutland, White & Guernsey 1842) [hereinafter VT.
BANKRUPTCY RULES]; BANKR. S.D.N.Y. R. 58 (1842) (same) (repealed), reprinted in RULES AND
REGULATIONS IN BANKRUPTCY, ADOPTED BY THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW-YORK 12 (New York, John S. Voorhies 1842).
97. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
98. See H.R. Doc. No. 29-99, at 8 (1847); H.R. DOC. No. 29-223, at 30-31 (1846).
99. See H. R. Doc. No. 29-99, at 8; H.R. DOC. NO. 29-223, at 30-31; supra note 16.
100. Unlike creditors, however, the individuals involved in the administration of bankruptcy
cases fared quite well, see BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 137-39, including in cases with bankruptcy
slave sales, see infra Section IV.B.
101. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 84 tbl.1 (presenting statistics on bankruptcy cases under the
1841 Act).
102. It has been estimated, for example, that 57,716 slaves were sold in South Carolina alone
during the 1840s. DEYLE, supra note 32, app. B at 295 tbl.A.1.
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Steven Deyle, "[t]he domestic trade . . . was the lifeblood of the southern
slave system, and without it, the institution would have ceased to
exist."1 03 To place this observation into context (at least for purposes of
this Article's case study), three factors should be considered: (1)
Southerners' financial investment in slaves, (2) the centrality of the
domestic slave trade to the Southern economy, and (3) the centrality of
courts to the domestic slave trade.
The economic scale of the South's commitment to slavery was
massive: it has been estimated that the value of the South's total slave
population by 1860 amounted to $3 billion, 04 an amount eclipsing the
value of all major types of U.S. assets and expenditures (e.g., livestock,
farm implements, machinery, capital investments in manufacturing,
railroads, and banks), with the exception of the assessed value of real
estate in the free states, which amounted to approximately $4.5
billion.105 Based on these numbers, it is quite clear that slaves
constituted the South's "primary source of wealth."106
The economic magnitude of slavery went hand in hand with a
"slave market [that] was everywhere in the antebellum South"'07 and
that "made the buying and selling of men, women, and children a
regular part of everyday life." 08 Like the scale of financial investment
in slaves, the number of slaves sold, both across and within state lines,
is staggering: "Between 1790 and 1860 Americans transported more
than one million. . . slaves from the Upper South to the Lower South;
approximately two-thirds of these slaves arrived there as a result of
sale. Moreover, twice as many individuals were sold locally." 09
All of this brings us to our last factor, the role of courts in the
domestic slave trade. Relying on the work of Michael Tadman on the
interregional slave trade1 0 and Thomas Russell on court-ordered slave
103. Steven Deyle, The Domestic Slave Trade in America: The Lifeblood of the Southern Slave
System, in THE CHATTEL PRINCIPLE: INTERNAL SLAVE TRADES IN THE AMERICAS 91, 93 (Walter
Johnson ed., 2004).
104. See id. at 95 ("According to economic historians, the total value of slave property in 1860
was at least $3 billion. This figure assumes an average price of only $750 per slave, which most
recent studies have indicated is probably too low.").
105. See id. at 96 tbl.5.1.
106. Id. at 106; see also, e.g., Roger Ransom & Richard Sutch, Capitalists Without Capital: The
Burden of Slavery and the Impact of Emancipation, 62 AGRIC. HIST. 133, 138-39 (1988) ("Slave
capital represented 44 percent of all wealth in the major cotton-growing states of the South in
1859.. . .").
107. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 115.
108. DEYLE, supra note 32, at 144.
109. Deyle, supra note 103, at 93.
110. MICHAEL TADMAN, SPECULATORS AND SLAVES: MASTERS, TRADERS, AND SLAVES IN THE
OLD SOUTH (1989).
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sales in South Carolina pursuant to state law,111 Deyle has estimated
that court-ordered slave sales in South Carolina constituted
approximately 45% of all slave sales in the state from 1820 to 1860.112
Regardless of whether that estimate is representative of the level of
court involvement in the domestic slave trade throughout the South, 1 13
it is evident that courts did in fact play a pivotal role: they helped
facilitate the liquidity of the slave market, 114 thereby "creating and
generating .. . norms of transactional life" in the domestic slave
trade.115 Moreover, as corroborated by the evidence from this Article's
case study on the bankruptcy slave trade,116 court-ordered slave sales
generated profits for the legal institutions and actors orchestrating
those sales, 117 thus requiring us to rethink the nature and extent of the
judicial branch's complicity in propping up slavery.
C. The Bankruptcy Slave Trade
During the 1840s, two major institutions of antebellum America,
the bankruptcy system and the domestic slave trade, found themselves
on a collision course. Some slaveowners would predictably seek
bankruptcy relief,1 18 which would be granted to them only if they paid
the price of discharge-that is, surrendering all of their prebankruptcy
property.119 And because state law defined their slaves as property, 12 0
those slaves would have to be surrendered and ultimately sold as part
of the bankruptcy process, with the sale proceeds distributed among the
various claimants in the slaveowners' bankruptcy cases. 12 1
Whether aware of it or not, Congress-in passing the 1841 Act-
and President Tyler-by signing the Act into law-had set the stage for
the emergence of the bankruptcy slave trade: Over a period that would
last more than a decade, 122 the federal government would be in the
111. Russell, supra note 31.
112. DEYLE, supra note 32, app. B at 293-95, 295 tbl.A.1.
113. Deyle raises concerns on this point. See id. app. B at 295-96.
114. See Russell, supra note 31, at 1276.
115. Id. at 1277.
116. See infra Section IV.B.
117. See Russell, supra note 31, at 1277.
118. Cf BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 247 n.32 ("[S]laveowners were more likely to deprive
themselves and their families of 'comforts' in order to buy more land and slaves. Insolvency appears
to have resulted more frequently from the latter pursuit than the former [i.e., overconsumption].").
119. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
120. See STROUD, supra note 33, at 11 ("[T]he cardinal principle of slavery-that the slave is
to be regarded as a thing,-is an article of property,-a chattel personal,-obtains as undoubted
law in all of these states." (footnote omitted)).
121. See supra Section I.A.2.
122. See infra text accompanying note 279.
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business of owning and selling bankrupted slaves. Surprisingly, this
significant chapter in the history of bankruptcy and slavery has
received virtually no mention in the literature. This Section begins by
describing that gap and then discusses why the bankruptcy slave trade
substantively differed from other types of slave sales conducted both by
the federal government and state governments.
1. The Literature Gap
At the risk of oversimplification, the history of the bankruptcy
slave trade is a story about a specific type of court-ordered sale-
specifically, the sale of bankrupted slaves ordered by a federal district
court. The story, of course, is a much more intricate one with far-
reaching effects. But thinking about the kernel of that story tightly
focuses how one ought to approach the two major bodies of extant
literature relevant to this project, one of which is substantially more
voluminous. The smaller body of work pertains to the history of U.S.
bankruptcy law. The much larger body of work, by orders of magnitude,
addresses slavery in antebellum America. Review of the latter can be
made a bit more manageable by concentrating on work that has touched
upon the domestic slave trade, both its interregional and intrastate
aspects.
Virtually all of the relevant literature has no mention
whatsoever about bankruptcy slave sales. For the few works that allude
to a bankruptcy slave sale, such mentions are fleeting references with
no in-depth commentary on the nature or significance of such a sale. As
such, by systematically examining federal district court records from
the 1841 Act to tell the story of bankruptcy slave sales, this study
"reflects a history that has remained invisible to many historians." 1 2 3
For the body of work on the history of U.S. bankruptcy law, I am
aware of only two published studies that have examined bankruptcy
case files related to the 1841 Act. One is a book-length study by Edward
Balleisen, which relies on case files solely from the Southern District of
New York. 124 The other is an article-length study about women who
sought bankruptcy relief under the 1800 and 1841 Acts (the "Gross
Stud ').125 Each study will be discussed in turn.
Setting the stage for his study, Balleisen begins by emphasizing
the significance of the 1841 Act, noting that "it coincided with and
emanated from power transformations in the scope and character of
123. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 171.
124. See BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 4, 229.
125. Gross et al., supra note 50, at 5-6.
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American capitalism." 126 He then points to the salience of his sample of
503 debtors who sought bankruptcy relief in the Southern District of
New York, observing that "[t]he commercial endeavors that brought
these individuals to bankruptcy court spanned nearly the full gamut of
the antebellum economy." 127 Balleisen further observes that over 20%
of his sample involved individuals whose financial failures occurred
outside of the district "in every region of the country and in nearly every
state." 128
As previously discussed, the domestic slave trade was a
significant component of the antebellum economy. 129 And yet Balleisen
does not really address the intersection of the 1841 Act with that trade.
To be sure, he does acknowledge that slavery loomed large on the
national psyche during this time period. For example, he refers to "a
nation so dominated by the realities of slavery"; 130 he observes that
"national politics [were] consumed by the question of slavery
extension"; 131 and he points the reader to scholarship on "the cultural
linkages among bankruptcy, slavery, and emancipation." 13 2 Balleisen
even briefly mentions the financial distress of slaveowners 133 that could
ultimately lead to the sale of their slaves. 134 But his study does not
address bankrupted slaves or the bankruptcy slave trade. 135
The same can be said of the Gross Study, which makes two
fleeting references to the intersection of bankruptcy and slavery, first
126. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 4.
127. Id. at 7.
128. Id. at 8. Balleisen identifies for the reader the geographic origin of the failures of these
"migratory bankrupts," id., in a map, which indicates that several failures occurred in the South,
including New Orleans, see id. at 10-11.
129. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
130. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 49.
131. Id. at 124.
132. Id. at 274 n.6.
133. See id. at 246 n.32. He does not mention, however, the possibility of financial distress by
slave traders, who may have ended up seeking bankruptcy relief. See DEYLE, supra note 32, at 121
("As in any speculative endeavor, the business [i.e., the slave trade] was filled with risks, any one
of which could wipe out a season's profits, lead to bankruptcy, or worse."); JOHNSON, supra note
38, at 52-53 ('The legal form of brokerage could allow [slave] traders who had been legally
bankrupted to stay in business.").
134. See BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 167 ("When southern slaveowners failed, their slaves
went onto the auction block.... Indeed, legal actions for debt may have accounted for as many as
one-half of all antebellum slave sales."); see also id. at 38 ("Debtors looked to sell whatever they
owned in order to make payments to their creditors. Real estate, stocks, slaves, commercial paper,
and furniture all poured onto the nation's markets, as hundreds of thousands of Americans
struggled to avoid a liquidity crisis." (emphasis added)).
135. Balleisen briefly observes that, "[u]nder the 1841 act, federal marshals and assignees took
possession of essentially every kind of movable property known to antebellum America," id. at 151,
including, "in the South, slaves," id. at 152. Aside from this fleeting mention of bankrupted slaves,
his work does not acknowledge them elsewhere.
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noting that "some [bankrupt women] owed money for slaves," 136 and
subsequently noting that "[sleveral women debtors owned slaves." 137
Aside from providing brief examples of each of these scenarios, 138 the
rest of the study discusses neither bankrupted slaves nor bankruptcy
slave sales.
Broad histories of U.S. bankruptcy law do not mention
bankrupted slaves, 1 3 9 nor does a study that examined bankruptcy case
files related to the 1800 Act. 140 Even scholarship on the history of
federal courts, which could potentially examine their role in the
domestic slave trade as a result of the antebellum bankruptcy acts, fails
to acknowledge the bankruptcy slave trade, 141 with one notable
exception.
In his mammoth work on the history of the federal courts in the
mid-Atlantic South during the antebellum period, Peter Fish devotes
most of a chapter to examining the experience of those courts in
administering the 1841 Act. 142 In discussing the topic of creditors' use
of the Act to invalidate fraudulent transfers by bankrupts, the main
example used by Fish involved the sale by a Virginian of his entire
estate, including three slaves (i.e., a mother and her two children), to
his son-in-law seven years before seeking bankruptcy relief.143 The
bankruptcy assignee in that case sought to undo the transfer and
recover the slaves, ultimately obtaining a ruling from the federal
district court that title to the slaves (including three additional slaves
that had been born to the mother subsequent to the transfer) had vested
in the assignee, but that their possession would not be transferred to
the assignee unless the sale proceeds from the bankrupt's remaining
assets were insufficient to satisfy his debts. 14 4 While the historical
record remains unclear whether the assignee ultimately sold the
136. Gross et al., supra note 50, at 18.
137. Id. at 19.
138. See id. at 18, 19.
139. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 3; WARREN, supra note 7; Charles Jordan Tabb, The History
of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
140. See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE (2002).
141. For example, one comprehensive history of the federal courts makes no mention of
bankrupted slaves or the bankruptcy slave trade when discussing the 1800 Act and the 1841 Act.
See HOFFER ET AL., supra note 55, at 92-93, 113. Moreover, in its sections examining slavery in
the federal courts during the time periods of 1801 to 1836 and 1836 to 1860, that history does not
discuss the involvement of federal courts in the sale of bankrupted slaves. See id. at 101-05, 123-
42.
142. PETER GRAHAM FISH, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE MID-ATLANTIC SOUTH: UNITED STATES
COURTS FROM MARYLAND TO THE CAROLINAS, 1836-1861, at 435-46 (2015).
143. See id. at 442-44.
144. See id. at 444-45.
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mother and her five children, 14 5 Fish clearly recognized the situation of
bankrupted slaves and their potential to be sold as part of the
bankruptcy process. 146 But aside from this one example, Fish's work
does not engage in any analysis of the bankruptcy slave trade.
Pivoting to the literature on slavery in antebellum America,
other historians have pointed out that the literature has generally
remained silent on aspects of the domestic slave trade that feature
prominently in the story about the bankruptcy slave trade. First,
Steven Deyle has been critical of the dearth of historical scholarship on
the local slave trade, which constituted the bulk of the domestic slave
trade:
Of the more than 2 million slaves who were sold in America between 1820 and 1860, more
than two-thirds were sold to local buyers. This includes intrastate sales between planters,
commercial sales through agents or brokers, and court-ordered sales. Local sales have not
typically been treated, or even generally thought of, as being part of the domestic trade.
In all of the published works on American slavery, few have paid more than passing notice
to this crucial aspect of the trade, and not one, including those specializing in the
interregional trade, have examined it in any depth. By focusing primarily on
professionally transacted interregional sales, however, it is easy to forget the crucial role
that the local slave trade played in southern society. Without this fundamental ability to
transfer property from one owner to another, the southern slave system could never have
functioned. 147
We see that Deyle's critique places the local slave trade at the
heart of slavery in antebellum America, with court-ordered sales a key
feature of that trade. 14 8 Thomas Russell, in turn, has critiqued slavery
historians for having failed to address or having paid insufficient
attention to court-ordered slave sales, 149 given their prevalence among
all types of slave auctions. 150 He has thus called for a "new image [of the
slave trade that] gives legal institutions a visible and prominent role in
constituting and ordering slave auctions."1 51
145. See id. at 445.
146. See id. at 443-44 ("The saga of 'Slave Susan' and her children marked the operation of a
national Bankruptcy Act that provided no exceptions for personal property in slaves."); id. at 445
("Meanwhile, Susan and her children remained in limbo, presumably awaiting final
distribution . . . of the bankrupt's other assets . . . .").
147. DEYLE, supra note 32, at 157 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 172 (stating that "court sales [were] a major component in the domestic slave trade"
(emphasis added)).
149. Thomas D. Russell, A New Image of the Slave Auction: An Empirical Look at the Role of
Law in Slave Sales and a Conceptual Reevaluation of Slave Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 473,
481-88 (1996).
150. See id. at 481 ("[C]ourt sales comprised a majority of all of South Carolina's slave auctions.
Whether other states followed a pattern similar to South Carolina's is presently impossible to say
with certainty. There is, however, no reason to think that any state would have differed
substantially.").
151. Id. at 477.
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In all likelihood, the bankruptcy slave trade was a subset of the
local slave trade.1 52 Moreover, bankruptcy slave sales constituted a
specific type of court-ordered slave sale.1 53 Accordingly, given the
inattention of slavery historiography to these two aspects of the
domestic slave trade (i.e., local sales and court-ordered sales), we can
expect that the bankruptcy slave trade will have received no more than
a brief mention, if any at all, in that literature. And in fact, the works
of Deyle and Russell corroborate this proposition. While both have
addressed court-ordered slave sales under state law, neither has
addressed the bankruptcy slave trade.1 54 Somewhat similarly, while
Judith Schafer's work on Louisiana slavery and Richard Kilbourne's
study of credit transactions in Louisiana's East Feliciana Parish during
the 1800s have discussed slave sales under state insolvency law,155 that
scholarship has not examined the bankruptcy slave trade.1 56
The bankruptcy slave trade is conspicuously absent from the
relevant historical literature.1 57 Having exposed this gap, I now discuss
why the bankruptcy slave trade substantively differed from other types
of slave sales conducted both by the federal government and state
governments.
152. See infra Section IIB.
153. See infra notes 400-406 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., DEYLE, supra note 32, at 166-72 (discussing various types of court-ordered slave
sales under state law); Russell, supra note 31 (examining the sale of slaves at sheriffs' sales,
probate court sales, and equity court sales under South Carolina law).
155. See, e.g., KILBOURNE, supra note 34, at 64 ("Of the thirteen credit sales of slaves in 1841,
no less than nine were sales by syndics for insolvent debtors. These were the so-called voluntary
surrenders of property for the benefit of creditors .... ); SCHAFER, supra note 44, at 173 ("Slaves
could be and often were converted into cash to satisfy debts of their owners, adding to the intrastate
slave trade. . . . If hope of financial equilibrium was dim, the slaveowner might declare insolvency,
necessitating the sale of all of his slaves."). In discussing the possibility that Louisiana slaveowners
might "declare insolvency," id., Schafer cites to provisions of Louisiana's Civil Code that did not
pertain to the state's insolvency law providing relief to debtors, but rather to the Civil Code's
provisions that created a cause of action allowing a creditor, under certain circumstances, to annul
a contract of its debtor with a third party as a result of the debtor's insolvency, see id. n.36 (citing
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1980-89 (1825) (current version at LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2036-2043
(2017))). For further discussion on Louisiana's insolvency law during the antebellum period, see
infra notes 169-177 and accompanying text.
156. In her work on New Orleans slavery viewed through the lens of newspaper
advertisements, Schafer makes a single passing mention to bankruptcy slave sales. See Schafer,
supra note 39, at 41 ("Sixty-eight percent of all slave sales reported in the New Orleans newspapers
were the result of some legal action. . . . Other legally caused auctions were for liquidation of
partnership, divorce, settlement of a lawsuit of any type, settlement of debt, or bankruptcy."
(emphasis added)).
157. Empirical scholarship on slave auctions in Mauritius during the 1820s and 1830s touches
upon the sale of slaves under that country's then-existing bankruptcy laws, but without any
extended discussion or analysis of the bankruptcy slave trade. See Shirley Chenny et al., Slave
Prices from Succession and Bankruptcy Sales in Mauritius, 1825-1827, 40 EXPLORATIONS ECON.
HIST. 419 (2003); Georges Dionne et al., Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in
Mauritian Slave Auctions, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 1269 (2009).
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2. Bankrupted Slaves as Federal Property
A bankruptcy slave sale mostly resembled other court-ordered
slave sales under federal nonbankruptcy law and state law. All of these
sales shared a similar goal: transferring title to a slave from the owner
to a third-party purchaser for a price. Moreover, the judiciary and its
officers, whether at the federal or state level, orchestrated all of these
sales. But the bankruptcy slave sale differed from other court-ordered
slave sales in one fundamental regard: the federal government owned
all of the bankrupted slaves that it sold, whereas the other court-
ordered slave sales generally did not involve government-owned slaves.
The remainder of this Section analyzes this crucial difference by
comparing the bankruptcy slave sale to its analogues under federal
nonbankruptcy law and state law, 15 8 using Louisiana as a point of
reference given this Article's case study of the bankruptcy slave trade
in the Eastern District of Louisiana. 159
As set forth in the Section discussing the functional operation of
the 1841 Act, Congress structured a collective proceeding in which
creditor claims against the bankrupt would be satisfied using the
proceeds obtained from liquidation of the bankrupt's prebankruptcy
property. 160 Accordingly, when thinking about analogues to bankruptcy
asset sales, we should look to nonbankruptcy judicial processes for the
satisfaction of creditor claims against a debtor that were
contemporaries with the 1841 Act.
Outside of bankruptcy, a creditor owed money by a debtor who
refused to pay could seek individual recourse through the courts, suing
the debtor for the money owed and obtaining a judgment entitling the
creditor to collect the debt from the debtor's property using the state's
coercive power. 161 Depending on the facts and circumstances, that
litigation could have taken place in state court or federal court. As such,
158. To be clear, the discussion in the main text addresses sales of slaves ordered by courts as
a result of some judicial process (e.g., bankruptcy proceedings, probate proceedings, the
enforcement of monetary judgments). It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore slave sales
initiated by governments that had voluntarily purchased slaves and subsequently sought to sell
them. While the historical record demonstrates that state and local governments did purchase and
sell slaves, see DEYLE, supra note 32, at 166 ("[S]laves were also sold by southern states and
municipalities. Sometimes these political entities bought slaves for public projects and then had
to sell them again when they were no longer needed."), court-ordered slave sales under state law
played a much more prominent role in the domestic slave trade, see id. ("The largest source of
state-sponsored slave selling, however, came from sales ordered by southern courts of law.").
159. See infra Part II.
160. See supra Section I.A.2.
161. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 4 (2012)
('The creditor can use her powers of persuasion to collect the debt, but if these prove insufficient,
she needs a judgment. A judgment allows her to call on the state to reach the debtor's assets.").
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individual creditors would have sought to enforce money judgments
both through the state system and the federal system. 162
Under either system, one way to enforce the money judgment
would have been through the writ of fieri facias ("fi. fa."), 163 a court
order (1) that instructed a government official-for example, a sheriff
in the case of a state judgment and a U.S. Marshal in the case of a
federal judgment 6 4 _"to cause the judgment to be satisfied out of the
judgment debtor's goods and chattels" and (2) that "was executed by
seizure and sale" of the property.165 Such executed property could have
included the debtor's slaves, 166 as evidenced in a New-Orleans
Commercial Bulletin advertisement announcing that Algernon Sidney
Robertson, the U.S. Marshal for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
would sell at public auction forty slaves that had been seized pursuant
to various fi. fa. writs. 167 Importantly, seizure of the property by the
government official (referred to as "levy") did not make the government
the property's owner, but rather merely the custodian of the property
until its sale or other disposition.168
162. Empirical work has documented that much of the work of antebellum state courts
involved the enforcement of money judgments. See Russell, supra note 94, at 347; Russell, supra
note 31, at 1245. Likewise, the enforcement of money judgments lay at the heart of the federal
judicial power. See Baird, supra note 161, at 7-8 ("Diversity jurisdiction was included within the
scope of the judicial power in large part to enable foreign creditors to collect what they were
owed.").
163. The writ of fieri facias was also referred to as a fi. fa. See, e.g., Griffin v. Thompson, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 244, 245 (1844).
164. See, e.g., Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400, 400 (1836) (describing sheriffs
enforcement of judgment issued by Alabama state court and U.S. Marshal's enforcement of
judgment issued by federal district court in Alabama).
165. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A Historical
Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155, 157 (1957).
166. See, e.g., Hagan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 400.
167. NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., June 18, 1842, at 2; see also NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., July
6, 1842, at 4 (announcing public auction of eleven slaves seized by Algernon Sidney Robertson, the
U.S. Marshal, to satisfy a money judgment rendered in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana). The city marshal of New Orleans, C. Claiborne, who among other duties
sold the property of judgment debtors pursuant to fi. fa. writs issued under nonfederal law, see,
e.g., NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Dec. 1, 1844, at 1 (announcing public sale of land "[b]y virtue of a
writ of fi fa to me directed by the Hon G Preval, associate judge of the City Court of New Orleans"),
would also sell slaves pursuant to such writs, see, e.g., NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Aug. 17, 1842,
at 4 ("By virtue of a writ of fi fa to me directed by the Hon Thos J Cooley, Senior Presiding Judge
of the City Court of New Orleans, I shall expose at public sale . .. [t]he slave GILBERT .. . [s]eized
to satisfy the judgment rendered in the above case."). Similarly, J.L. Thielen, sheriff of the District
Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Louisiana, sought to sell at public auction forty
slaves that he had seized pursuant to "an order of seizure and sale" in a suit involving the State of
Louisiana against the New Orleans and Nashville Railroad Company. NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL.,
Aug. 13, 1842, at 4.
168. See, e.g., Hagan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 403 ("The marshal or the sheriff, as the case may be,
by a levy, acquires a special property in the goods, and may maintain an action for
them. . . . [P]roperty once levied on, remains in the custody of the law. . . ."); Moore v. Withenburg,
13 La. Ann. 22, 23 (1858):
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The other major nonbankruptcy judicial process for the
satisfaction of creditor claims would have been state insolvency laws.
Louisiana's insolvency law, referred to as a "cession of property"169 or
"surrender of property,"170 could be voluntary or involuntary 171 and was
defined as "the relinquishment that a debtor ma[de] of all his property
to his creditors, when he f[ound] himself unable to pay his debts." 172
Importantly, surrendering the property did not transfer its title to the
creditors. 173 Rather, "the debtor preserve[d] his ownership of the
property surrendered" 1 74 and maintained the right to redeem it at any
point prior to its sale. 175 In 1842, the Louisiana Supreme Court, "[o]n
an attentive examination of the whole statute," reaffirmed these
principles, declaring that "the creditors acquire[d] no real right of
ownership or dominion over" the surrendered property and further
emphasizing that "the real ownership . .. remain[ed] in the debtor, who
[could] take back all his property on depositing in court a sum sufficient
to cover all his debts." 176 Accordingly, under Louisiana insolvency law,
The evidence shows that there never was any actual seizure of the steamboat Union by
the Sheriff under defendants' attachment. When that writ issued, the Union was
already in the hands of the United States Marshal. She was beyond the reach of the
State process, so long as the Marshal's possession lasted. And the Marshal's possession
lasted ... until the Union was sold by him ....
(citations omitted); see also Special Property, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
special property as "[p]roperty that the holder has only a qualified, temporary, or limited interest
in, such as (from a bailee's standpoint) bailed property").
169. LA. Civ. CODE book III, tit. IV, ch. 5, sec. I, § 5 (1825) (amended 1870 and repealed 1978).
170. Id. art. 2166.
171. Id. art. 2167.
172. Id. art. 2166.
173. See id. art. 2171 ("The surrender does not give the property to the creditors; it only gives
them the right of selling it for their benefit, and receiving the income of it, till sold.").
174. Id. art. 2174.
175. Id. (stating that the debtor "may divest the creditors of their possession of the
[surrendered property], at any time before they have sold it, by paying the amount of his debts,
with the expenses attending the cession").
176. Rivas v. Hunstock, 2 Rob. 187, 194 (La. 1842). I recognize that, under other state-law
insolvency systems, the representative for the creditors (e.g., an assignee) may have been deemed
to be the owner of the debtor's property. See, e.g., MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 163, § 5 (1838) (Boston,
Dutton & Wentworth 1849):
The said judge shall . .. assign and convey to the person or persons chosen or appointed
assignees ... all the estate, real and personal of the debtor .. .; which assignment shall
vest in the assignees all the property of the debtor, both real and personal, . . . and such
assignment shall be effectual to pass all the said estate ....
(repealed). Nonetheless, the point remains that Congress chose to implement a statutory design
that would make the federal government the owner of slaves, instead of following an alternative
path, such as the Louisiana example.
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debtors remained the owners of their property, including their slaves,
until sold at public auction by the syndic in charge of that process.177
Returning to federal bankruptcy law, recall that debtors had to
surrender all of their property as a condition to being declared a
bankrupt and thus gaining the opportunity to petition for relief in the
form of discharge. 178 Upon a federal district court declaring a debtor to
be a bankrupt through the issuance of a bankruptcy decree, the
assignee, as representative of the federally created bankruptcy estate,
acquired all of the bankrupt's property rights. 179 In the language of the
1841 Act,
[A]ll the property, and rights of property, of every name and nature, and whether real,
personal, or mixed, of every bankrupt ... who shall, by a decree ... be declared to be a
bankrupt ... shall, by mere operation of law, ipso facto, from the time of such decree, be
deemed to be divested out of such bankrupt, without any other act, assignment, or other
177. LA. CIv. CODE. art. 2180 (stating that "the sale [of surrendered property] is made by the
syndics, or some person appointed by them, at public auction"). The historical record clearly
indicates that syndic sales included slaves. See, e.g., NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., May 1, 1843, at 2
(advertising syndic sale of property surrendered by Nathan Nichols, including five slaves); NEW-
ORLEANS COM. BULL., Aug. 13, 1842, at 2 (advertising syndic sale of property surrendered by
Pierre Crocker, including one slave).
An issue worth considering here is the effect that the 1841 Act had in preempting state
insolvency laws, including Louisiana's system for the cession of property by debtors. The Louisiana
Supreme Court took the view that, when the 1841 Act became operative, it suspended the state's
insolvency law with respect to the commencement of new proceedings under that law, but that the
1841 Act did not affect state insolvency proceedings that had been commenced prior to the 1841
Act taking effect. See Beach v. Miller's Testamentary Ex'rs, 15 La. Ann. 601, 602 (1860) (citing
Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819)). Justice Story took a similar view in one
of his rulings as a circuit justice. See Ex Parte Eames, 8 F. Cas. 236, 237 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No.
4,237) (citing Sturges). It appears that many debtors in the Eastern District of Louisiana had
availed themselves of the state's insolvency law prior to seeking bankruptcy relief. See H.R. DOC.
No. 29-99, at 7 (1847) (setting forth statement by the clerk of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana that
in many instances, .. . the applicants had taken the benefit of the insolvent laws of the
State; [that] they filed similar schedules upon their application for the benefit of the
bankrupt law; [and that] hence more than half the amount of assets included [in the
table of statistics] . . . may be considered a mere nominal surrender, the property having
been disposed of and divided among the creditors, under the State laws).
The possibility thus arises that some Eastern District slaveowners who filed for bankruptcy relief
may have had their slaves sold by a syndic under Louisiana's insolvency law rather than by a
bankruptcy assignee under the 1841 Act. Compare, e.g., 1 U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF
LA., BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841 DOCKETS, 1842-1843, at 233 (located in Record Group (RG) 21, The
National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas) [hereinafter EDLA DOCKETS] (setting forth the docket for
the bankruptcy case filed by Morton P. Levy on May 25, 1842), with NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL.,
July 21, 1842, at 3 (announcing that, with "the consent of the Syndic of the creditors of Morton P
Levy," P.E. Tricou would sell "slaves surrendered by said bankrupt to his creditors"-Betsy,
Elizabeth, and Mary-at the St. Louis Exchange on August 13, 1842).
178. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
179. Cf., e.g., BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 272 n.56 (stating that, "for a foreclosure of property
surrendered by a bankrupt to stand, the mortgagee had to name the assignee, and not the
bankrupt as the owner").
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conveyance whatsoever; and the same shall be vested, by force of the same decree, in such
assignee as ... shall be appointed. 18 0
The 1841 Act further provided that the assignee would "be
vested with all the rights, titles, powers, and authorities, to sell,
manage, and dispose of the [bankrupt's property]." 181 Accordingly, if the
federal court declared a slaveowner to be a bankrupt, then the assignee,
as representative of the bankruptcy estate, became the owner of the
slaves, with the duty to sell them. 182 Notwithstanding the assignee's
discretion to designate "the necessary household and kitchen furniture,
and such other articles and necessaries of [the] bankrupt" as exempt
from sale, 183 it seems highly unlikely that an assignee would have
designated any slaves owned by the bankrupt as exempt from sale, for
two reasons. First, the assignee would likely have construed the specific
statutory language "necessary household and kitchen furniture" to limit
the scope of the general statutory language, "and such other articles
and necessaries," to exclude slaves.1 84 Second, because the assignee's
compensation for his services was based on a percentage of the proceeds
disbursed to creditors in the case, 185 and because slaves likely
constituted a significant portion of a bankrupt slaveowner's assets, 18 6
180. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 442-43 (repealed 1843).
181. Id. at 443.
182. § 10, 5 Stat. at 447 ("[(In order to ensure a speedy settlement and close of the proceedings
in each case in bankruptcy, it shall be the duty of the court to order and direct a collection of the
assets, and a reduction of the same to money, and a distribution thereof at as early periods as
practicable, consistently with a due regard to the interests of creditors[.j").
183. § 3, 5 Stat. at 443; see also supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing exempt
property under the 1841 Act).
184. Cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) ("But it is a
commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general . . . ."). This would
have especially been the case in Louisiana where state law defined slaves as real property rather
than personal property. See infra note 212. For further discussion of state laws that defined slaves
as realty, see MORRIS, supra note 44, at 66-77.
To illustrate an assignee's decisionmaking regarding exempt property, consider the case of
John Baptiste Lamothe, who filed for bankruptcy relief in September 1843 in the Eastern District
of Louisiana. Petition of John Baptiste Lamothe to Be Declared Bankrupt, In re Lamothe, No. 385
(E.D. La. Sept. 5, 1842). His schedule of assets listed two slaves, Mary-who was thirty-six years
old and valued at $600-and Charlotte-who was sixty years old and valued at $300. Schedule of
J.B. Lamothe, In re Lamothe, No. 385 (E.D. La. Sept. 5, 1842). The assignee determined that
Lamothe, his wife, and five children should be entitled to keep $271 worth of exempt property,
including "24 Old & assorted chairs," "4 Assorted Tables (old)," "2 Old Bedsteads with matrasses
[sic]," "1 Old Toilet," and "2 Old Armoirs." List of Furniture Given to the Bankrupt, In re Lamothe,
No. 385 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 1842). None of the exempt property, however, included Mary or
Charlotte. Id. Instead, the U.S. Marshal sold them in December 1842, Mary for $300 and Charlotte
for $145. Account Sales, In re Lamothe, No. 385 (E.D. La. Dec. 3, 1842).
185. See, e.g., BANKR. D.D.C. R. 42 (1842) (repealed), reprinted in D.C. BANKRUPTcY RULES,
supra note 96, at 10.
186. See infra note 495 and accompanying text.
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the assignee would have had a powerful economic incentive to sell a
slave rather than exempt him or her from sale. 187
Nothing in the plain language of the 1841 Act adverted to the
inevitable collision between bankruptcy law and the slave trade. But
Southern legal stationers who published preprinted forms for use in
bankruptcy cases certainly saw the connection,188 as evidenced by the
fact that they expressly included references to slaves in their sample
forms for the bankrupt's schedule of assets. 189 Federal district courts in
the South also recognized that the 1841 Act would draw them into the
slave trade: one court went so far as to promulgate a rule for the sale of
bankrupted slaves that was distinct from rules for the sale of other
bankruptcy assets, requiring a longer notice period for the sale of
bankrupted slaves. 190
With the 1841 Act, Congress ultimately designed a system for
creditor repayment in which the federal government would not only be
actively involved in the slave-selling business, but also the slave-
owning business. To be sure, it is not as if the phenomenon of court-
ordered sales of slaves owned by the government was unique to the
federal bankruptcy process. For example, state probate courts sold
many slaves. 191 Some of those sales may have involved estates that had
187. Cf. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 139 (discussing how "the bankruptcy system provided
hundreds of court offcials ... with substantial income," including assignees).
188. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 105 n.169 (discussing legal stationers).
189. See, e.g., BANKR. D. KY. INVENTORY ("Slave P. about - years old, and W. about - years
old: Title by bill of sale from S. D. (on Catalogue, No. 10) in adversary possession of-: suit against
him in - court: see brief: but both fugitives in State of -. See letters of -, in packet No. -, on
Catalogue-worth each, I suppose, about $500[.]"), reprinted in RULES, REGULATIONS, AND FORMS
OF PROCEEDINGS, IN MATTERS OF BANKRUPTCY, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
FOR THE KENTUCKY DISTRICT 26-27 (Frankfort, Wm. M. Todd 1842) [hereinafter KY. BANKRUPTCY
RULES]; BANKR. D.N.C. FORM NO. 3 (SCHED. B) ("The property of the Petitioner consists of the
following particulars, viz: . . . slaves, [describe;] ..... (brackets in original)), reprinted in N.C.
BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 62, at 12.
190. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama promulgated a series of rules
on May 30, 1842. See U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DIST. OF ALA., BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841
RECORD BOOKS, 1842-1844, at 51-53 (located in Record Group (RG) 21, The National Archives at
Atlanta, Georgia). One of those rules provided "that all personal property, except negroes, may be
sold by the assignee, upon giving three day's [sic] notice thereof by advertisement in the
Independent Monitor, a paper published in the city of Tuskaloosa [sic]." Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
For the sale of bankrupted slaves, the court promulgated a rule providing that "all sales of slaves
shall be made upon a notice of at least ten days, by two advertisements in the Independent Monitor,
a paper published in the city of Tuskaloosa [sic]." Id. (emphasis added). These rules appeared on
the front page of the Independent Monitor on June 8, 1842. District Court of the United States for
the Middle District of Alabama, INDEP. MONITOR (Tuscaloosa), June 8, 1842, at 1. For more
information on the record books from the Middle District of Alabama, see Bankruptcy Act of 1841
Record Books, 1841-1844, NATL ARCHIVES CATALOG, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/4576712 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cclN9G6-J52N].
191. See Russell, supra note 31, at 1247 tbl.1.
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escheated to the state,192 thus making the state the owner of the
decedent's property, including any slaves. But the key difference is that
such a scenario involved the state government as a slaveowner. I am
unaware of a legal process-other than the federal bankruptcy slave
sales described in this Article-that consistently and widely made the
federal government a slaveowner with a mandate to actively engage in
the domestic slave trade.1 9 3
And that is the tragic legacy of the 1841 Act staining our history.
When we think of the spectrum of individual and institutional
complicity in legitimating and bolstering slavery in antebellum
America, 194 the bankruptcy slave trade stands out as a muscular
exercise of federal power1 95 that facilitated financial relief for
slaveowners at the expense of the hundreds, if not thousands, of black
men, women, and children who were the victims of that trade.196 Put
another way, the bankruptcy slave trade is yet another poignant
example of how "the history of law and the issues of race are necessarily
and intimately linked."197
II. A CASE STUDY OF THE BANKRUPTCY SLAVE TRADE:
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Having established the importance of historically examining the
bankruptcy slave trade, this Article now turns to its case study on the
topic, which focuses on the sale of bankrupted slaves in the Eastern
District of Louisiana under the 1841 Act. Before presenting the study,
192. See generally, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 89 (10th ed. 2017) ("If an intestate decedent leaves no survivors entitled to take under
the intestacy statute, her probate property escheats to the state . . ).
193. The possibility exists that an owner of slaves in the antebellum territories could have
died without heirs. In that scenario, the decedent's estate presumably would have escheated to the
federal government, but only if the territorial legislature had failed to make an alternate
arrangement. Cf. Christianson v. Cty. of King, 239 U.S. 356, 365 (1915) ("The distribution of and
the right of succession to the estates of deceased persons are matters exclusively of state
cognizance, and are such as were within the competence of the territorial legislature to deal with
as it saw fit, in the absence of an inhibition by Congress.").
194. See JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 216 (stating that "the slave trade ... played a crucial role
in the reproduction of the slaveholding regime over time").
195. Cf. Tabb, supra note 3, at 350 ("[T]he radical nature of the 1841 law precipitated a
firestorm of controversy involving the leading political figures of the day. Many alleged that such
a law was not only bad policy but also unconstitutional.").
196. Cf. Russell, supra note 31, at 1278 ("Slave sales by operation of law expressed social
disregard for black families and slave humanity. Slaves thus sold experienced contradictions of
American liberalism: racism and economics at odds with both their individuality and their place
in families and communities.").
197. Id. at 1242.
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an explanation is warranted of why the first up-close look at the
bankruptcy slave trade should target this federal judicial district.
During the entire period of the 1841 Act's operative effect (i.e.,
from February 1, 1842, to March 3, 1843),198 the nation consisted of
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia, among which there were
thirty-eight federal judicial districts. 199 Of these districts, what makes
the Eastern District of Louisiana stand out as a prime candidate for a
case study on the bankruptcy slave trade? 200
As an initial matter, one can immediately rule out fifteen of the
thirty-eight federal judicial districts given their location within states
that had prohibited slavery. 201 Of the remaining twenty-three federal
judicial districts, the Eastern District immediately leaps out because it
was (and remains) the home to New Orleans, which not only had the
third-largest population of any U.S. city in 1840,202 but which is also
considered to have been antebellum America's largest slave market. 203
198. See supra notes 10, 15 and accompanying text.
199. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 75.
200. During this time period, the nation also consisted of three federal territories-Florida,
Iowa, and Wisconsin-in which the territorial courts administered the 1841 Act. See id. n.13. A
couple of reasons exist to exclude these territories as prime candidates for an initial case study of
the bankruptcy slave trade. First, two of the three territories (Iowa and Wisconsin) prohibited
slavery. Second, although the Territory of Florida permitted slavery, thus potentially making it a
viable candidate for the study of the bankruptcy slave trade, very few of its citizens sought relief
under the 1841 Act. See H.R. Doc. No. 29-223, at 30-31 (1846) (reporting forty-six as the total
"[n]umber of applicants for relief under the act" in three of the five judicial districts of the Territory
of Florida).
201. Those states were Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See 1
SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, at xxx
(Junius P. Rodriguez ed., 2007) (setting forth map of free states). It should be noted that these
states took different approaches to prohibiting slavery, with some abolishing it outright and others
gradually abolishing it. See, e.g., Revolutionary Ideology, Citizenship, and Slavery, in 1 SLAVERY
IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 92, 98-99; Junius P. Rodriguez, Gradualism, in 1 SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 318. Accordingly, during the period of the 1841 Act's operative
effect, some of these states undoubtedly had slaves among their citizens, as evidenced by data from
the 1840 census indicating a total of 1,102 slaves in the thirteen free states at that time. See DEP'T
OF STATE, COMPENDIUM OF THE ENUMERATION OF THE INHABITANTS AND STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES (Washington, D.C., Thomas Allen 1841). These data have been compiled in a
dataset made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
See Michael R. Haines, Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States,
1790-2002, INTER-U. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & Soc. RES. (ICPSR No. 2896, 3d ver. 2010),
https://www.icpsr.umich.edulicpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2896/version/3 [https://perma.cefP6DH-
QKSD].
202. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION OF THE 100 LARGEST URBAN PLACES: 1840
(June 15, 1998), https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tabO7.txt
[https://perma.cclNB4K-49HJ].
203. See, e.g., DEYLE, supra note 32, at 153; JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 1-2; MCINNIS, supra
note 29, at 164; WADE, supra note 26, at 198-99.
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Much historiography has examined the New Orleans slave trade,204
thus providing a crucial backdrop for comparative analysis with the
bankruptcy slave trade in the Eastern District. Finally, the 1841 Act
records from the Eastern District are quite extensive and highly
detailed, 205 thus facilitating a comprehensive and fine-grained account
of the bankruptcy slave trade in a particular federal judicial district.206
In using the Eastern District case study to create a portrait of
the bankruptcy slave trade, I do not claim, in any way whatsoever, that
the portrait is representative of the bankruptcy slave trade in other
federal judicial districts under the 1841 Act. To be sure, qualitative and
quantitative differences existed between the Eastern District and other
districts during this time period. I mention some of these so that the
reader can gain a better sense of ways in which the Eastern District
experience may have been unique from that in other districts.
On the qualitative front, surely there were many differences.
Here are just a few. For starters, the highly urban nature of the Eastern
District would likely have translated into a very different experience for
its bankrupted slaves than for those from rural judicial districts. 207
Moreover, there would have been differences across urban judicial
districts. For example, despite the fact that New Orleans and Richmond
were "the two largest slave-trading markets in the United States in the
1840s and 1850s,"208 Maurie Mclnnis has meticulously analyzed how
"the cultural dimensions and the physical experience of the trade in the
two cities were quite distinct." 209 Accordingly, we might expect the
experiences of bankrupted slaves in the Eastern District of Louisiana-
home of New Orleans-to have been different than that of bankrupted
slaves from the Eastern District of Virginia-home of Richmond.
204. See, e.g., FREDERIC BANCROFT, SLAVE TRADING IN THE OLD SOUTH 312-38 (1931);
JOHNSON, supra note 38; MCINNIS, supra note 29; Jonathan B. Pritchett & Richard M.
Chamberlain, Selection in the Market for Slaves: New Orleans, 1830-1860, 108 Q.J. ECON. 461
(1993); Schafer, supra note 39.
205. See infra Section II.A.
206. Unfortunately, 1841 Act case files no longer exist for certain federal judicial districts,
either having been lost or destroyed. For example, when looking to the Deep South, the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration, which maintains the records from the 1841 Act,
does not have in its holdings any case files from the District of South Carolina, the Northern
District of Mississippi, and the Southern District of Mississippi. See E-mail from Jennifer Audsley-
Moore, Archivist, Nat'l Archives at Kan. City, to author (Apr. 18, 2017, 11:13 AM EDT) (on file
with author); cf. also SCHAFER, supra note 44, at xv, 305 (stating that, in her study of Louisiana
slavery "based on the manuscript records of the Supreme Court of Louisiana," some cases
"disappeared in the chaos during and following the Civil War").
207. See infra notes 319-326.
208. Maurie D. McInnis, Mapping the Slave Trade in Richmond and New Orleans, BUILDINGS
& LANDSCAPES, Fall 2013, at 102, 102.
209. Id. at 103.
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In terms of substantive differences in the law, statutory gaps in
the 1841 Act would have created ample opportunity for the federal
district courts to engage in residual bankruptcy policymaking, 210
thereby giving rise to nonuniformity in the law's implementation across
districts. 211 Additionally, given that Louisiana entered the Union as a
civil law jurisdiction, followed by a period of adaptation to common law
concepts throughout the antebellum period, it very well might be that
substantive differences in Louisiana law yielded a bankruptcy slave
trade in the Eastern District unlike any other. 212
On the quantitative front, the Eastern District of Louisiana was
also statistically significantly different than other federal judicial
districts located in slave states and the District of Columbia. Here, two
examples will suffice: (1) the ratio of slaves to the district's total
210. See Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy
Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 387, 445 (2012) (stating that "courts function as lawmakers
in the bankruptcy arena because of their delegated policymaking powers" and observing "that,
from the earliest days of the Republic and with every iteration of the bankruptcy laws, Congress
has tasked the federal courts with administration of the bankruptcy system").
211. See BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 111:
The tendency to protect debtors also found wide acceptance in the interpretation of what
constituted an illegal preference or conveyance "in contemplation of bankruptcy."
Federal judges in Maine, Rhode Island, the southern and northern districts of New
York, the eastern district of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Maryland ... all gave relatively
narrow scope to these crucial terms.;
CHANDLER, supra note 75, at 11 n.1:
It is obviously the meaning of the Act, that the petitioner should set forth his actual
pecuniary condition with great particularity; but the degree of strictness required in
this particular, varies in different parts of the country, and depends somewhat upon
the rules which have been adopted by the several district and circuit courts.
The cover to Chandler's treatise identifies him as having been "one of the commissioners of
bankruptcy in Massachusetts" under the 1841 Act. Id. For a discussion on how "officers of the
bankruptcy court," among other insiders of the system, "had especially good access to bankruptcy
news, and so enjoyed entrepreneurial opportunities not readily available to other Americans," see
BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 145.
212. Cf. SCHAFER, supra note 44, at xiv:
A continuous influx of American influence, intensified by the immigration to Louisiana
of scores of attorneys trained in the common law, .. . caused Louisiana slave law to be
steadily "Americanized" to the extent that by the eve of the Civil War, slave law in
Louisiana closely resembled the law of slavery in the other states that would soon leave
the federal union. Americanization, however, was not a straight-line process. In several
unique and fundamental areas of Louisiana law, change came slowly, if at all.
By way of example, Louisiana law defined slaves as real property rather than personal property.
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (1825) ("Private estates and fortunes are those things which belong
to individuals.") (amended 1870 and 1978); id. art. 453 ("Immoveable things are in general, such
as cannot either move themselves or be removed from one place to another.") (amended 1870 and
repealed 1978); id. art. 461 ("Slaves, though moveables by their nature, are considered as
immoveables, by the operation of law."), invalidated by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to examine how differences in state law may have affected the bankruptcy
slave trade.
1108
BANKRUPTED SLAVES
population (the "slave ratio"), and (2) the ratio of filed bankruptcy cases
to the district's total nonslave adult population (the "bankruptcy ratio").
First, consider the slave ratio, which I have calculated for each
federal judicial district using data from the 1840 census. 213 While these
data predate the beginning of the 1841 Act's operative period by a
couple of years, 214 they nonetheless provide a useful benchmark for
thinking about the composition of the South's federal judicial districts
on the eve of the bankruptcy slave trade. Recall that the thirteen slave
states and the District of Columbia consisted of a total of twenty-three
federal judicial districts (the "slave districts"). 2 1 5 For this group of
jurisdictions, the median and mean slave ratios (rounded to the nearest
thousandth) were, respectively, 0.325 and 0.302; and the minimum and
maximum ratios were, respectively, 0.033 for the District of Delaware
and 0.581 for the Southern District of Mississippi. 2 1 6 The slave ratio for
the Eastern District of Louisiana was 0.462, which was statistically
significantly different than the mean slave ratio of 0.319 for the other
twenty-two slave districts. 217
Second, consider the bankruptcy ratio. 218 I calculated the total
nonslave adult population for each district-that is, the population
overwhelmingly likely to have filed for bankruptcy relief-using data
from the 1840 census. 219 Because that census predominantly used
nonuniform age categories across races when reporting population
statistics, the only way to maintain uniformity was to calculate the total
nonslave adult population for each district as the sum of the total
number of whites and free blacks who were ten years old or older. 220 Of
213. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 201. According to data from the 1840 census, there were a
total of 2,460,509 slaves in the thirteen slave states and the District of Columbia at that time. See
id.
214. See supra text accompanying note 198.
215. See supra notes 201-202.
216. Various tests of normality confirm that the slave ratio is a normally distributed interval
variable for this set of twenty-three observations.
217. A one-sample t-test reveals that the mean slave ratio of the other twenty-two slave
districts was statistically significantly different (n = 22, t = -4.0237, p = 0.0006) than a slave ratio
with a value of 0.462 (i.e., the slave ratio for the Eastern District of Louisiana).
218. I derived the data on the total number of bankruptcy filings in each slave district
pursuant to the methods set forth in Pardo, supra note 11, at 74-84.
219. While the 1841 Act did not establish age criteria as an eligibility rule for seeking relief,
see supra Section I.A.1, it seems reasonable to conclude that children and teenagers would have
been very unlikely to file for bankruptcy relief.
220. For free whites, the age categories at the younger end are (1) under five years, (2) five
years and under ten years, (3) ten years and under fifteen years, and (4) fifteen years and under
twenty years. See, e.g., DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 201, at 60-61 (reporting population statistics
by age category for free white males and females in the Eastern and Western Districts of
Louisiana). For free blacks, the age categories at the younger end are (1) under ten and (2) ten and
under twenty-four years. See, e.g., id. at 61 (reporting population statistics by age category for free
black males and females in the Eastern and Western Districts of Louisiana).
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course, this approach has the effect of overreporting the number of
nonslave adults (i.e., artificially increasing the denominator in the
bankruptcy ratio), thus potentially making the bankruptcy ratio
smaller than it should be. 2 2 1
With that caveat in mind, sufficient data exist to calculate the
bankruptcy ratio for twenty of the twenty-three slave districts. 222 For
this group of jurisdictions, the median and mean bankruptcy ratios
(rounded to the nearest thousandth) were both 0.006; and the minimum
and maximum ratios were, respectively, 0.001 for the District of
Georgia and 0.014 for the Southern District of Mississippi. 2 23 The
bankruptcy ratio for the Eastern District of Louisiana was 0.008, which
was statistically significantly different than the mean bankruptcy ratio
of 0.006 for the other nineteen slave districts. 224
221. I say "potentially" because there is, of course, a temporal mismatch in calculating the
bankruptcy ratio-that is, using bankruptcy filing data from most of 1842 and the start of 1843
and using population data from 1840. It seems safe to conclude that the nonslave adult population
in most, if not all, jurisdictions increased from 1840 to 1842. Any such growth would offset the
number of free children aged ten and older from 1840 currently included in the denominator of the
bankruptcy ratio, thus bringing the ratio more in line with the nonslave adult population from
1842.
222. For a discussion regarding the missing values, see Pardo, supra note 11, at 74-84.
223. Various tests of normality confirm that the bankruptcy ratio is a normally distributed
interval variable for this set of twenty observations.
224. A one-sample t-test reveals that the mean bankruptcy ratio of the other nineteen slave
districts was statistically significantly different (a = 19, t = -2.6597, p = 0.0160) than a bankruptcy
ratio with a value of 0.008 (i.e., the bankruptcy ratio for the Eastern District of Louisiana). The
various bankruptcy ratios reported in the main text are larger than the national bankruptcy ratio
for the 1841 Act reported by the Gross Study. See Gross et al., supra note 50, at 25 n.126. The
difference can be attributed to a variety of factors. First, the Gross Study uses 33,700 as the
number of bankruptcy filings, id., a number that is off approximately by at least 11,000 filings, see
Pardo, supra note 11, at 86 tbl.1. Second, the Gross Study uses 17,733,000 as its population
estimate, without explaining the source of that figure. See Gross et al., supra note 50, at 25 n.126.
According to the data from the 1840 census, the total population (i.e., free and slave) in the United
States and its territories at that time was 17,063,353. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 201. Based on
the Gross Study's higher figure, it appears that the authors may have estimated a post-1840 total
population figure, although they provide no explanation for their figure. Considering these two
factors, the Gross Study implemented too low of a numerator (i.e., undercounted bankruptcy
filings) and too high of a denominator (i.e., including population subgroups who could not file for
bankruptcy relief, such as slaves), thus producing a smaller national bankruptcy ratio than the
ratio that would have resulted using the higher number of bankruptcy filings and a lower
population figure. Finally, in reporting the national bankruptcy ratio, the Gross Study states that
it has presented the "filings as a percentage of population" and then lists those figures in a column
that has a percent symbol at its head. Gross et al., supra note 50, at 25 n.126 (emphasis added).
The study reports the national filing percentage as 0.0019, id., which would mean that the national
bankruptcy ratio in its decimal form, before conversion to percent form by multiplying the decimal
form by 100, would be 0.000019, an infinitesimally small figure. It is clear from the figures used
by the Gross Study, however, that the authors reported the bankruptcy ratio in decimal form,
without converting the ratio to percent form: dividing 33,700 by 17,733,000 yields approximately
0.0019, which is the figure that the Gross Study reports as the national filing percentage. Had
they multiplied this figure by 100, the percentage reported would have been 0.19. The Gross Study
commits the same error in reporting the national filing percentages for the 1800 and 1867 Acts,
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Despite the qualitative and quantitative differences discussed
here, and having emphasized that I do not purport to provide either a
definitive or exhaustive account of the bankruptcy slave trade, let me
emphasize the importance of this case study. It presents a great deal of
valuable information about a crucial aspect of the domestic slave trade
that has heretofore gone unnoticed or ignored. By gaining a concrete
sense of the contours of bankruptcy slave sales in a particular federal
judicial district, particularly the one that was home to the largest slave
market in antebellum America, our knowledge about the bankruptcy
slave trade can move away from theorization and abstraction, thereby
opening up fruitful lines of future inquiry.
The remainder of this Part sets forth the design of my case study
exploring the bankruptcy slave trade in the Eastern District of
Louisiana. I describe the sources consulted and the original dataset
created from the information in those sources.
A. Sources
To investigate and tell the story of the bankruptcy slave trade in
the Eastern District, the research for this Article has primarily
examined federal district court records in manuscript form from the
1841 Act, which are located throughout the country at various regional
facilities of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. 2 2 5
More specifically, the Article predominantly relies on seven sources to
document the bankruptcy slave trade under the 1841 Act in the Eastern
District of Louisiana:
(1) the bankruptcy sales record books maintained by the U.S.
Marshal for the Eastern District (the "Eastern District sales
books"), 226 which "contain[ ] records of land, stock household
furnishings, and personal possessions which were sold to
and its calculations for filings under the 1898 Act and 1978 Bankruptcy Code are erroneous,
constituting neither the decimal form nor the percent form of the bankruptcy ratios that result
from using the filing and population figures that the study's authors report. See id.
225. For a brief description of these types of records, see Owens, supra note 50, at 185. For
further discussion on the archival records of the federal district courts generally, see HOFFER ET
AL., supra note 55, at 515-16.
226. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF LA., BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841 SALES RECORD
BOOKS, 1842-1853 (located in Record Group (RG) 21, The National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas)
[hereinafter EDLA SALES BOOKS]; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 29-99, at 7 (1847) (referring to "the sales
book of the marshal" consulted by the Eastern District's clerk of court, N.R. Jennings, in reporting
to Congress "[tihe amount realized from the sales of property" in Eastern District bankruptcy
cases).
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satisfy the claims of creditors" in Eastern District
bankruptcy cases; 227
(2) the documents filed in the bankruptcy cases before the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (the
"Eastern District case files"), 228 which include "petitions,
inventories of the petitioner's property, orders, petitions for
the discharge of the bankrupt, reports of the assignee who
administered the estate, proofs of debts, depositions,
petitions by creditors for the appointment of an assignee,
rules, notices, schedules listing the assets and liabilities of
the petitioner, motions, oppositions, and attachments"; 2 2 9
(3) the docket books corresponding to the bankruptcy cases filed
in the Eastern District (the "Eastern District docket
books"), 230 which set forth "the case number, name of the
petitioner, and a brief abstract of papers filed and actions
taken" in each case; 231
227. Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Sales Record Books, 1842-1853, NATL ARCHIVES CATALOG,
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/4513390 (last visited June 26, 2017) [https://perma.ccl62FX-
MVRP].
228. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF LA., BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841 CASE FILES, 1842-
1843 (located in Record Group (RG) 21, The National Archives at Kansas City, Missouri).
229. Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Case Files, 1842-1843, NATL ARCHIVES CATALOG,
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/4513381 (last visited June 26, 2017) [https://perma.ccFMY4-
CK3S].
230. EDLA DOCKETS, supra note 177.
231. Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Dockets, 1842-1843, NAT'L ARCHIVES CATALOG,
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/4513372 (last visited June 26, 2017) [https://perma.cclK94J-XCRP].
The reports contained in the Eastern District docket books are arranged in chronological order by
case number, with each case number seemingly having been assigned based on the date of filing
of the bankruptcy petition. This organizational system is consistent with the system employed by
other federal judicial districts to maintain their bankruptcy docket books under the 1841 Act. See,
e.g., BANKR. D. MASS. R. III (1842) (providing that "[aJll petitions in bankruptcy shall be entered
by the clerk, in a docket and register book, kept exclusively for matters in bankruptcy, in the order
of time and with the dates affixed in which they are filed in the office") (repealed), reprinted in
CHANDLER, supra note 75, at 40; see also Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 13, 5 Stat. 440, 448 (stating
"[tiat the proceedings in all cases in bankruptcy ... shall be carefully filed, kept, and numbered,
in the office of the court, and a docket only, or short memorandum thereof, with the numbers, kept
in a book by the clerk of the court") (repealed 1843). While I have located excerpts of bankruptcy
rules promulgated by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, none of the
excerpted rules pertains to the court's procedure for maintaining the Eastern District docket books.
See Transcript of Record at 94, Houston v. City Bank of New Orleans, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 486 (1847)
(No. 144) [hereinafter Houston Record Transcript] (setting forth excerpt of bankruptcy rules
promulgated under the 1841 Act by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana);
Transcript of Record at 18-19, Nugent v. Boyd, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 426 (1845) (No. 158) [hereinafter
Nugent Record Transcript] (same). To date, I have been unable to locate a complete set of the
Eastern District bankruptcy rules.
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(4) the index listing the name and case number of the
individuals whose bankruptcy cases were commenced in the
Eastern District (the "Eastern District name index"); 232 and
(5) the Commercial Bulletin,233 the Picayune, and the New-
Orleans Bee, 2 34 three of the New Orleans newspapers that
published legal notices regarding Eastern District
bankruptcy cases, such as notices of bankruptcy sales
conducted by the U.S. Marshal. 235
These sources, with the exception of the newspapers, are
archival materials for which electronic access does not exist.2 36 Much of
the research for this Article has focused on the information that appears
in the Eastern District sales books. 237 I am unaware of any published
scholarship that has systematically analyzed those records. 238
232. The 1841 Act records located at the National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas, include the
minute books corresponding to the bankruptcy cases filed in the Eastern District. U.S. DIST. COURT
FOR THE E. DIST. OF LA., BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1841 MINUTES, 2/1843-1/1861 (located in Record
Group (RG) 21, The National Archives at Fort Worth, Texas). One of the minute book volumes
consists of the Eastern District name index. See Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Minutes, NAT'L ARCHIVES
CATALOG, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/4510563 (last visited June 26, 2017)
[https://perma.ccl25C9-69RE] (stating that "[t]he volume for February-December 1843 contains an
index to petitioners"). The maintaining of a name index in bankruptcy cases under the 1841 Act
appears to have been a practice that prevailed in other federal district courts. See, e.g., BANKR.
D.N.C. R. 18 (1842) (providing that "[t]he clerks shall also prepare and keep in the respective
offices, with alphabetical indexes thereto, suitable registers, into which shall be transcribed the
dockets of each case in bankruptcy, and such registers shall be preserved as a record of all
proceedings in bankruptcy" (emphasis added)) (repealed), reprinted in N.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES,
supra note 62, at 4.
233. For background information on the Bulletin, see REINDERS, supra note 4, at 227.
234. For background information on the Bee, see REINDERS, supra note 4, at 232.
235. The 1841 Act required publication of notices relating to a variety of matters in a
bankruptcy case in at least one public newspaper. See §§ 4, 7, 10-11, 5 Stat. at 443, 446-47. The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, pursuant to its authority granted to
engage in bankruptcy rulemaking, see § 6, 5 Stat. at 445-46 (stating that "it shall be the duty of
the district court in each district, from time to time, to prescribe suitable rules and regulations,
and forms of proceedings, in all matters of bankruptcy"), promulgated a set of local rules governing
petitions by assignees to sell estate property, which included the requirement that the assignee
provide public notice of his request in two newspapers, see Nugent Record Transcript, supra note
231, at 18 ('This application for sale shall be notified to the creditors in general, by ten days'
advertisement, to be inserted, at least three times, in two newspapers, unless specially ordered
otherwise."). For further discussion regarding newspapers published in New Orleans during the
time period of the 1841 Act regime, see Pardo, supra note 11, at 99 n.144.
236. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 91-109.
237. See id. at 91-93.
238. Edward Baptist's work on slavery and American capitalism very briefly discusses the
1841 Act. See EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 279 (2014). In that discussion, he provides the example of five slaves
being sold in the bankruptcy case of Samuel Thompson and Richard Charles, partners in trade
who operated a commercial firm in New Orleans. See id.; see also Statement of the Individual
Affairs of Samuel Thompson at 1, In re Thompson & Co., No. 12 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 1842) (stating
that "Richard Charles has no individual Property or other Assets nor any individual Liabilities").
Baptist draws the example from the Eastern District sales books, see BAPTIST, supra, at 487 n.39,
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To augment the information from the sales books, I have
surveyed the records from approximately 41% (i.e., 36 of 88) of the
Eastern District case files corresponding to those cases that involved
bankruptcy slave sales. 2 3 9 Of the two published studies examining
bankruptcy case files related to the 1841 Act,240 Balleisen's work
analyzes case files solely from the Southern District of New York, 241 and
the Gross Study entailed an initial review of "26,310 files under the Act
of 1841,"242 including "763 files in Louisiana" relating to that
bankruptcy regime. 243 Given the Gross Study's focus on the experience
of women debtors, of whom there were few, 2 4 4 that study analyzes a
mistakenly reporting the total amount paid by the purchasers of the five slaves, compare id. at
279 (stating that "Thomas, Henry, Peter, and Evelina and her son James ... brought only $1,125
on the block"), with Account Sales at 1, In re Thompson & Co., No. 12 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 1842)
(reporting that the U.S. Marshal sold Thomas, Henry, Peter, and Evelina and her son James for
the total amount of $1,265). Aside from this example, Baptist's work does not reference the Eastern
District sales books.
239. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 103.
240. See supra notes 124-138 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying note 127.
242. Gross et al., supra note 50, at 8.
243. Id. at 27. The Gross Study does not identify the women debtors according to the federal
judicial districts in which the bankruptcy cases were administered. Instead, the study (1) groups
the debtors by the regions corresponding to the six federal regional archives that, at the time of
the study, held bankruptcy case files from the 1800 Act and 1841 Act, see id. at 7 & n.34, 15 tbl.,
and (2) identifies "the states in which the women filed for bankruptcy," id. at 1 n.2. At first blush,
the study's reference to a review of "763 files in Louisiana" in connection with the 1841 Act, id. at
27, suggests that the study confined its review in that state to the Eastern District, where 763
cases were filed under the 1841 Act, see Pardo, supra note 11, at 109 n.182. However, the study's
list of women debtors from the 1841 Act, see Gross et al. supra note 50, at 10 & n.56, app. 2 at 40-
which, incidentally, fails to identify one of the eleven women debtors who filed in the Mid-Atlantic
Region, compare id. at 10 (noting "the most filings (eleven) in the Mid-Atlantic Region"), with id.
app. 2 at 40 (providing the names of ten debtors for the Mid-Atlantic Region)-suggests that the
study also reviewed case files from the Western District of Louisiana. The Gross Study's list of
1841 Act debtors identifies eight individuals from Louisiana. See id. app. 2 at 40. The names of
seven of those individuals appear in the Eastern District name index. While the name index fails
to include the names of three individuals who tiled for bankruptcy relief in the Eastern District,
those individuals have been identified, thus allowing for a full accounting of the 763 case files from
the Eastern District. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 109 n.182. Importantly, none of those case files
corresponds to an individual named Catherine Isabelle de Alpruente, whose name is included in
the Gross Study among the Louisiana women debtors under the 1841 Act. See Gross et al., supra
note 50, at 19, app. 2 at 40. If de Alpruente's bankruptcy case was administered in Louisiana, it
would suggest that the Gross Study reviewed case files from the Western District of Louisiana, of
which there are 114. See Bankruptcy Act of 1841 Case Files, 1842-1844, NAT'L ARCHIVES CATALOG,
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/23811272 (last visited July 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ECP3-97PJ]
(stating that the 1841 Act bankruptcy case files from the Western District of Louisiana are
"[a]ranged numerically by case number, 1-114").
244. The Gross Study identified a combined total of forty-nine cases involving only bankrupt
women under either the 1800 Act or the 1841 Act-specifically, one woman under the former and
forty-eight women under the latter. See Gross et al., supra note 50, at 10. To identify these cases,
the study relied on docket books and case files. See id. at 8. The study's authors emphasized that
their case tally likely undercounted the number of cases filed by or against women under both acts.
See id. at 8 n.38, 10-11. Among the various explanations for the possibility of undercounting, the
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limited number of bankruptcy case files, 2 45 only eight of which were
from Louisiana. 246
Accordingly, nearly all of the research presented in this Article
constitutes original historiography. 2 4 7 The analyzed materials tell both
quantitative and qualitative stories about the scope and nature of the
bankruptcy slave trade in a specific Southern jurisdiction, ultimately
providing us with a granular view of how the bankruptcy system and
its officials intervened in and took control over the lives of black men,
women, and children.
B. Dataset
The statistics presented in the remainder of this Article are
derived from an original dataset created from the information found in
the previously described sources, 248 with most of the information
originating from the Eastern District sales books. Accordingly, the unit
of observation in the dataset is a U.S. Marshal report on a bankruptcy
slave sale in a given case-that is, a bankruptcy asset sale conducted
by the U.S. Marshal that involved the sale of some property interest in
a slave, whether or not the sale of nonslave assets also occurred. 249
Pursuant to this coding protocol, the dataset excludes information from
any sale that did not involve the sale of some property interest in a
slave.
authors noted that "human error might have caused us to miss some easily identified women's
names." Id. at 8 n.38. Research for this Article has uncovered evidence of Southern women who
filed for bankruptcy relief under the 1841 Act and who are unaccounted for by the Gross Study. In
the Eastern District of Louisiana, Mrs. Widow Felix de Armas (listed as such in the Eastern
District docket books), Mary Chochrane, and Eliza A.D. Miller voluntarily filed for bankruptcy.
See In re Miller, No. 339 (E.D. La. filed July 27, 1842); In re de Armas, No. 229 (E.D. La. filed May
24, 1842); In re Cochrane, No. 188 (E.D. La. filed Apr. 29, 1842). Outside of the Eastern District,
Ann Christian and Harriet Herbert from the Middle District of Alabama and Margaret Love and
Sarah Motta from the District of South Carolina also sought bankruptcy relief. See In re Christian,
No. 627 (M.D. Ala. filed Mar. 7, 1843); In re Love, No. 203 (D.S.C. filed Dec. 21, 1842); In re Herbert,
No. 178 (M.D. Ala. filed Apr. 26, 1842); In re Motta, No. 26 (D.S.C. bankruptcy decree ordered Mar.
16, 1842).
245. See Gross et al., supra note 50, at 8-9 (discussing methodology for review of bankruptcy
case files and categories of demographic data obtained from them); id. at 10 n.53 ("All the
information about the women debtors, unless specifically identified, is derived from documents
within the actual bankruptcy files.").
246. Id. at 27 n.144. It appears that seven of the eight bankruptcy case files were from the
Eastern District of Louisiana. See supra note 243.
247. To the extent that there is overlap with the Gross Study, it is extremely limited. Other
than briefly mentioning bankrupted slaves, the study does not discuss them or, for that matter,
bankruptcy slave sales. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Section II.A.
249. The reader should note that there is one instance in the dataset involving a deviation
from this coding protocol. See infra notes 254-257 and accompanying text.
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For nearly all of the reports recorded by the U.S. Marshal in the
Eastern District sales books, he limited each report to a sale in a single
bankruptcy case. 250 As such, each report from the Eastern District sales
books usually generated a single observation in the dataset. On certain
occasions, however, the U.S. Marshal memorialized the results of
bankruptcy sales in multiple cases in a single report. In all but one of
those instances, the report nonetheless generated a single observation
because only one of the bankruptcy sales involved the sale of some
property interest in a slave. 251
One report memorialized the results of bankruptcy sales in two
separate cases, those of Julien Bossie and Widow Benjamin Bossie, 252
each of which involved the sale of slaves.253 In that report, the U.S.
Marshal described, in relevant part, the first item of property sold as
250. Keep in mind, however, that the U.S. Marshal did not always liquidate a bankrupt's
entire estate at a single sale, but rather did so over time in multiple sales. Accordingly, a single
bankruptcy case could generate multiple sale reports by the U.S. Marshal in the Eastern District
sales book.
251. For example, the U.S. Marshal's report regarding the sale of assets from four separate
bankruptcy cases on June 17, 1845, indicates that only one of those cases, In re Hunt, involved the
sale of a slave. See 2 EDLA SALES BOOKS, supra note 226, at 373 (setting forth account sales report
for "the Estates of J. Berry No. 468, G Clark Bogart No. 445, John F. Hunt No. 452, & Moss &
Harris No. 472"). Accordingly, that report generated a single observation in the dataset.
In another example, the U.S. Marshal's report regarding the sale of assets from two separate
bankruptcy cases, In re Cammack and In re Dixon, indicated that he had sold two slaves, "Slave
Charlotte" and "Slave Margaret," without specifying to whom the slaves belonged. See id. at 38-
40 (setting forth account sales report for the estates of Horace C. Cammack and Thomas Dixon).
Unfortunately, financial and time constraints precluded consultation of the Cammack and Dixon
case files to ascertain the nature of the property interests in the slaves. The U.S. Marshal report,
however, listed "Mrs. Cammack," presumably Horace's wife or a relative of his, as the purchaser
of both slaves. Id. at 39. On the basis of this information, it was inferred that both slaves had
belonged to Horace Cammack. Cf. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 154 ("Relatives ... of bankrupts
also made their presence known at bankruptcy sales .... These individuals often knew a good deal
about the affairs of a bankrupt, and thus had an advantage in recognizing assets that were worth
purchasing."); DEYLE, supra note 32, at 166 ("Southerners also sought protection by buying their
slaves through local dealers, brokers, and auctioneers . . . . [T]hese traders offered many of the
same benefits that came from local buying: the knowledge that an owner could purchase a slave
at a good price with confidence and trust."). As such, the report on the asset sales in Cammack and
Dixon generated a single observation. The possibility exists, of course, that both Cammack and
Dixon may have held partial interests in both slaves, thus warranting the inclusion of two
observations in the dataset from the single report. Given this possibility, the dataset may
undercount the number of cases from the Eastern District involving bankruptcy slave sales.
252. In re Bossie, No. 221 (E.D. La. filed May 19, 1842) (Widow Benjamin Bossie); In re Bossie,
No. 162 (E.D. La. filed Apr. 9, 1842) (Julien Bossie). All of the archival materials consulted for this
Article, including the records from the relevant bankruptcy case file, fail to provide Widow
Benjamin Bossie's first name, instead referring to her as "Widow Benjamin Bossie." See, e.g.,
Petition of R.P. Gaillard Assignee of Widow Benjamin Bossie, In re Bossie, No. 221 (E.D. La. Oct.
10, 1842). The Gross Study, which examined the case file for Widow Bossie, made a similar
observation. See Gross et al., supra note 50, at 9 n.42 (noting that "Mrs. Benjamin Bossie's file
does not include her first name").
253. See 1 EDLA SALES BOOKS, supra note 226, at 160 (setting forth account sales report for
"the Estates of Julien Bossie and Widow Benjamin Bossie").
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"[o]ne sugar plantation situated in the Parish of St. John the Baptist ...
together with 19 slaves belonging to the Partnership, two other slaves,
the private property of Julien Bossie and twelve other slaves the private
property of Widow B. Bossie." 2 54 Given that, of the slaves sold, two
belonged to Julien and twelve belonged to Widow Bossie, and thus
separately constituted property of their individual estates, this
description generated two observations for the dataset (i.e., one
corresponding to Julien's bankruptcy case and one corresponding to
Widow Bossie's bankruptcy case).
In addition to these two observations, the U.S. Marshal's report
on the asset sales from the Bossie estates generated a third observation.
The report's reference to the "Partnership"2 5 5 appears to have been to a
joint venture between Julien and Widow Bossie in running a sugar
plantation. 256 Because neither the report nor the records from the
bankruptcy case files identified the nature of the interest held by the
parties in the venture's slaves (e.g., a half-ownership interest held by
each party or a full-ownership interest in only certain slaves held by the
respective parties), it was not possible to account for this portion of the
sale in the separate observations corresponding to Julien's case and
Widow Bossie's case. Accordingly, an observation relating to the Bossie
venture was created in the dataset, even though no bankruptcy case
existed for that venture.257
Finally, on two occasions, the first volume of the Eastern District
sales books contained a report duplicating another report on a
bankruptcy slave sale that had appeared earlier in the same volume. In
both scenarios, which arose in In re Brander, McKenna & Wright and
In re Green, one of the reports was excluded from the dataset.
Importantly, in both instances, the duplicate report was not a mirror
image of the other report. In Brander, however, the differences between
the first report and the subsequent duplicate report were
254. Id.
255. See supra text accompanying note 254.
256. See Petition of R.P. Gaillard Assignee ... Praying for an Order of Sale at 2, In re Bossie,
No. 221 (E.D. La. July 9, 1842) (describing the sugar plantation and.nineteen slaves mentioned in
the U.S. Marshal's report as "[p]roperty belonging to the partnership of W[idow] Benjamin Bossie
& Julien Bossie").
257. Legal entities, such as corporations, were not eligible for relief under the 1841 Act. See
supra note 52. Accordingly, if the Bossie venture involved such an entity, bankruptcy relief would
not have been available to it. Moreover, while the Act provided for a joint case involving "partners
in trade," Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 14, 5 Stat. 440, 448 (repealed 1843); cf. H.R. Doc. No. 29-
99, at 7 & n.* (1847) (setting forth statistics for Eastern District bankruptcy cases commenced
under the 1841 Act and noting that "[tihere were 759 petitions filed in court, in which several
members of a commercial firm being joined, made the whole number of applicants 818"), Julien
Bossie and Widow Bossie did not file such a case, and their creditors did not file such a case against
them.
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nonsubstantive. Put another way, the key pieces of information-for
example, the sale date, the property sold, the purchasers, the amount
paid by the purchasers, and the charges to the estate-were
substantively the same. 2 5 8 Thus, for the Brander observation, it did not
matter which report I coded and which report I excluded from the
dataset.
But in Green, some of the differences between the first report
and the subsequent duplicate report were substantive. The key pieces
of information in both reports were nearly all substantively the same-
specifically, the sale date, the property sold, the purchasers, and the
amount paid by the purchasers. 259 The first report, however, listed
fewer charges to the estate than the subsequent duplicate report, thus
resulting in a lower amount of charges to the estate and a higher
amount of net proceeds than the duplicate report.260 It may have been
that the U.S. Marshal committed an oversight in the first report, failing
to include costs that he incurred in conducting the sale. For example,
the first report did not include a charge for mileage, whereas the second
report did include such a charge in the amount of $38.75. Perhaps, then,
the U.S. Marshal filed the subsequent duplicate report to ensure proper
reimbursement from the estate. On the rationale that the subsequent
duplicate report more accurately represents the true costs of sale, the
Green observation consists of data coded from the duplicate report and
not the first report.
The information from the Eastern District sales books reveals
that approximately 38% (293 of 763) of the district's bankruptcy cases
involved at least one asset sale conducted by the U.S. Marshal. Put
another way, a majority of the bankruptcy cases from the Eastern
District likely did not entail any distribution of proceeds to the
bankrupt's creditors, 261 a state of affairs consistent with the trend
under the 1841 Act for creditor distributions in bankruptcy cases
258. Compare 1 EDLA SALES BOOKS, supra note 226, at 46 (reporting that (1) the sale in In re
Brander, McKenna & Wright, No. 100 (E.D. La. June 17, 1842), took place on June 17, 1842; (2)
the property sold, including "Slave Charles," generated $541 in gross proceeds; (3) there were two
purchasers at the sale; (4) the charges to the estate amounted to $136.07; and (5) the net proceeds
amounted to $404.93), with id. at 206 (same).
259. Compare id. at 47 (reporting that (1) the sale in In re Green, No. 68 (E.D. La. June 17,
1842), took place on June 17, 1842; (2) the property sold, including "Slave Jim," generated $324.81
in gross proceeds; and (3) there were eight purchasers at the sale), with id. at 207 (same).
260. Compare id. at 47 (reporting (1) six distinct charges to the estate totaling $27.27; and (2)
net proceeds in the amount of $297.54), with id. at 207 (reporting (1) nine distinct charges to the
estate totaling $74.02; and (2) net proceeds in the amount of $250.97).
261. In some instances, individuals other than the U.S. Marshal sold assets from bankruptcy
estates. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 100-03.
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nationwide. 262 Based on the coding protocols discussed earlier in this
Section, of the 293 bankruptcy cases in which the U.S. Marshal
conducted an asset sale, approximately 30% (88 of 293) of those cases
involved a bankruptcy slave sale.
Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy cases in
the Eastern District-that is, approximately 88% (675 of 763)-did not
involve a slave sale by the U.S. Marshal. It would be a mistake for the
reader, however, to conclude that the bankruptcy slave sale was
nothing more than a statistical sideshow. The remainder of this Article
digs deeper into the numbers, which reveal that the bankruptcy slave
sale was a crucial part of the story of the 1841 Act in the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
III. THE VICTIMS OF BANKRUPTCY SLAVE SALES
"Martha aged 4 years." 263 "Slave Mortimer aged about 60
years." 2 6 4 "Robert and his son William." 265 "Slave Louisa aged 24 years
and her daughter Marcelain aged about 8 years."2 6 6 "Rosalie negress
aged about 40 years sickly & subject to Rheumatism." 267 "Julia the
runaway slave." 268 These are just a few of the descriptions recorded by
the U.S. Marshal in his reports of the bankruptcy slave sales that he
conducted. The pages of the Eastern District sales books abound with
these descriptions. The bankruptcy slave sale knew no limits. Four
hundred eighty souls sold (and then some2 6 9 ): young, old, father and
son, mother and daughter, infirm, and escaped.
The remainder of this Part gives the reader preliminary insights
into the number of bankrupted slaves in the Eastern District and their
backgrounds. By no means does this Part constitute an exhaustive
treatment on these matters. As will become apparent to the reader from
what follows below, future research on these topics will be required to
fully tell this multifaceted story. That said, we can begin to map the
262. See BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 120 ("In jurisdictions all over the country, the estates
of most bankrupts generated nothing for their creditors."); cf. id. at 263 n.51 (stating that "most
southern New York bankruptcies did not result in the payment of any dividends").
263. Account Sales, In re Botts, No. 545 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 1843) [hereinafter Botts Account
Sales].
264. Account Sales, In re Brander, McKenna & Wright, No. 100 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 1842).
265. Account Sales, In re Brown, No. 457 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 1843).
266. Account Sales, In re Cucullu, No. 464 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 1843).
267. Account Sales, In re Tricou, No. 705 (E.D. La. July 12, 1843).
268. Account Sales, In re Sauton, No. 228 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 1842).
269. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 110 (explaining coding protocol for excluding the sale of
fractional ownership interests in slaves from dataset documenting the Eastern District bankruptcy
slave trade).
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avenues for that research using the information presented here as a
reference point.
Section III.A quantifies the scope of victimization that occurred
under the Eastern District bankruptcy slave trade by detailing the
number of bankrupted slaves sold and the rate at which the U.S.
Marshal sold them. Section III.B discusses how the Eastern District
bankruptcy slave trade is mainly a story about urban slavery. Section
III.C explores the experience of the slaves while awaiting their sale at
auction-that is, the event that would terminate their status as
bankrupted slaves by transferring ownership from the federal
government to the auction purchasers.
A. The Scope of the Eastern District Bankruptcy Slave Trade
Having explained the various ways that the original dataset for
this Article undercounts the number of bankrupted slaves in the
Eastern District, this Article now provides a quantitative account
(albeit incomplete) of the victims of the bankruptcy slave trade. The
dataset consists of 101 observations derived from (1) ninety-eight
bankruptcy reports on bankruptcy slave sales conducted by the U.S.
Marshal, 270 with one of those reports generating two additional
observations; 2 7 1 and (2) a notice published in the Commercial Bulletin
announcing a bankruptcy slave sale conducted by the U.S. Marshal for
which no corresponding report exists in the Eastern District sales
books.272 Ninety-eight percent (99 of 101) of the observations in the
dataset include values for the number of slaves sold at each sale, 2 7 3
subject to the previously discussed limitations. Unless stated otherwise,
the statistics presented in this Section correspond to these ninety-nine
observations.
Under the 1841 Act, the U.S. Marshal for the Eastern District of
Louisiana sold 480 slaves in bankruptcy slave sales. In approximately
45% of those sales, he sold only one slave; and in approximately 83% of
those sales, he sold six slaves or less. While the median number of
slaves sold per bankruptcy slave sale was two slaves, the U.S. Marshal
sold, on average, approximately five slaves per bankruptcy slave sale. 2 7 4
270. See supra notes 248-251 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 252-257 and accompanying text.
272. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 99.
273. Two U.S. Marshal reports indicate that the only interest in a slave sold by him was a
fractional ownership interest. See id. at 110 n.188. Because the dataset excludes such interests
from the value recorded for the number of slaves sold at each sale, there are two missing values
for that variable in the dataset.
274. The median and mean number of slaves sold would not have substantively changed had
artificial values been provided for the two observations with missing values for that variable. See
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The fact that the average number of slaves sold at such sales exceeded
the median can be attributed to several sales involving a large number
of slaves-for example, forty slaves in the bankruptcy slave sale
conducted in George Botts' case; 2 75 forty-five slaves in the bankruptcy
slave sale in the joint case of Louis Alfred Ducros and Ernest Morphy; 276
and fifty-six slaves in the bankruptcy slave sale in John S. Armant's
case,277 the most slaves sold by the U.S. Marshal at any bankruptcy
slave sale in the Eastern District.278 Figure 1 illustrates the right-
skewed distribution of the number of slaves sold per bankruptcy slave
sale.
supra note 273 (discussing observations with missing values for the number of slaves sold). Those
artificial values could have been generated by multiplying the bankrupt's fractional ownership
interest by the number of slaves in which he had such an interest. Pursuant to this method, the
observation corresponding to the bankruptcy slave sale in In re Stewart & Macy could have been
coded as involving the sale of three slaves (i.e., a one-third interest multiplied by nine slaves), and
the observation corresponding to the bankruptcy slave sale in In re Pilcher could have been coded
as involving the sale of ten slaves (i.e., a one-half interest multiplied by twenty slaves). See Pardo,
supra note 11, at 110 n. 188. Had these two figures been provided as the missing values, the median
number of slaves sold would have remained two slaves, and the mean number of slaves sold would
have dropped very slightly from 4.87 slaves to 4.84 slaves.
275. Botts Account Sales, supra note 263.
276. Account Sales, In re Ducros & Morphy, No. 61 (E.D. La. June 22, 1842) [hereinafter
Ducros & Morphy Account Sales]. It should be noted that, although the citation to the U.S.
Marshal's report in In re Ducros & Morphy provides a single sale date, the report's title indicates
that the sale took place over a two-day period (i.e., June 22-23, 1842). See id.
277. Account Sales, In re Armant, No. 688 (E.D. La. June 8, 1843).
278. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 115 tbl.2 (tabulating the distribution of slaves sold in Eastern
District bankruptcy slave sales).
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVES SOLD IN
EASTERN DISTRICT BANKRUPTCY SLAVE SALES
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Beyond the absolute number of slaves sold, we can focus on what
the federal government's engagement in the bankruptcy slave trade
looked like over time. The first and last bankruptcy slave sales in the
Eastern District occurred, respectively, on April 11, 1842, and February
5, 1853,279 the latter constituting the sale of James in Arthur Morrell's
bankruptcy case. 280 During this period of ten years and nearly ten
months-or more precisely, a period of 3,953 days-the U.S. Marshal
sold full ownership interests in 480 slaves. Thus, in just the short,
thirteen-month period during which debtors could file for relief under
the 1841 Act, 281 slaveowners forced enough slaves into the bankruptcy
system to keep the federal government firmly entrenched in the
bankruptcy slave trade for over a decade in the Eastern District.28 2
279. Morrell Account Sales, supra note 29; Account Sales, In re Bergamini & Cestia, No. 3
(E.D. La. Apr. 11, 1842).
280. See infra note 499 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
282. Notwithstanding repeal of the 1841 Act, Congress provided that any unresolved
bankruptcy cases at the time of repeal would remain unaffected and could "be continued to ...
final consummation." Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614, 614.
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We can go even a step further by focusing on the rate at which
the federal government sold slaves in the Eastern District under the
1841 Act. From the first bankruptcy slave sale in April 1842 to the last
sale in February 1853, a period encompassing approximately 130
months, the U.S. Marshal sold slaves at a rate of approximately four
slaves per month.283 Because bankruptcy slave sales in the Eastern
District sharply tapered off beginning in 1844-to wit, only eleven such
sales occurred between January 1844 and February 1853-the sale rate
of four slaves per month obscures the rapid rate at which the federal
government sold bankrupted slaves during the first two calendar years
of the 1841 Act's operation. 284 Figure 2 illustrates the number of
bankrupted slaves sold by the U.S. Marshal during 1842 and 1843.
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF BANKRUPTED SLAVES SOLD IN THE EASTERN
DISTRICT BY MONTH AND YEAR, APRIL 1842 THROUGH DECEMBER 1843
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283. The sale of 480 slaves over a period of 130 months results in a figure, rounded to the
nearest tenth, of 3.7 slaves per month.
284. Cf. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 152 (observing that "[b]ankruptcy auctions ... primarily
occurred between the spring of 1842 and the end of 1844").
I
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The U.S. Marshal sold the overwhelming majority of bankrupted
slaves in 1842 and 1843-that is, approximately 96% (461 of 480) of the
total number sold. From the first bankruptcy slave sale in April 1842 to
the last sale in December 1843,285 a period encompassing twenty-one
months, he sold slaves at a rate of approximately twenty-two slaves per
month. 286 Or put another way, the U.S. Marshal sold the equivalent of
about two slaves every three days while the 1841 Act was in full swing.
During this concentrated period of time, the federal government
orchestrated a highly active bankruptcy slave trade in the Eastern
District.
To place the sale rate for bankrupted slaves in perspective, we
can look to the sale rate of slaves in other types of court-ordered sales.
Based on "data . . . from the sale books of sheriffs, masters in chancery,
and probate courts in five different South Carolina districts," Thomas
Russell has empirically examined the sale of "about 2,100 slaves
between 1823 and 1865."287 More specifically, his data sample consists
of the sale of 2,107 slaves over a period of 1,168 months. 2 8 8 The Russell
data therefore yield a slave-sale rate of approximately two slaves per
month, 289 one that is approximately half the rate of sale of Eastern
District bankrupted slaves under the 1841 Act. 29 0
To be sure, comparing the nonbankruptcy slave-sale rate from
the Russell data to the bankruptcy slave-sale rate from the Eastern
District is an apples-to-oranges comparison. The Russell data are
derived from a nonrandom sample of court-ordered slave sales
conducted under South Carolina law over an approximately four-decade
period in five rural districts. 291 On the other hand, the Eastern District
data are derived from a nonrandom sample-albeit one likely close in
number to the total population-of court-ordered slave sales conducted
under federal bankruptcy law over an approximately eleven-year period
in a single federal judicial district that, at the time, was home to one of
the country's largest cities and the country's largest slave market.
285. Recall that the 1841 Act did not take effect until February 1, 1841. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
286. For a tabulation of the number of bankruptcy slave sales and the number of bankrupted
slaves sold in the Eastern District by sale month and year, from April 1842 through December
1843, see Pardo, supra note 11, at 116 tbl.3.
287. Russell, supra note 31, at 1247.
288. See id. at 1247 tbl.1.
289. The sale of 2,107 slaves over a period of 1,168 months results in a figure, rounded to the
nearest tenth, of 1.8 slaves per month.
290. Compare supra note 289 (nonbankruptcy slave-sale rate of 1.8 slaves per month), with
supra note 283 (bankruptcy slave-sale rate of 3.7 slaves per month).
291. See Russell, supra note 31, at 1248-52.
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These differences, some of which are surely substantive, 292 warrant
caution in drawing any conclusions about the extent of victimization
produced by the bankruptcy system on slaves in the Eastern District.
Nonetheless, the fact that the system resulted in the sale of bankrupted
slaves at what appears to be a highly amplified rate underscores the
need for further lines of inquiry that will facilitate a more concrete
understanding of the federal government's complicity in the domestic
slave trade.
B. The Urban Nature of the Eastern District Bankruptcy Slave Trade
Before turning to a discussion about the experience of
bankrupted slaves while they awaited their sale, I provide a
preliminary analysis of the Eastern District bankruptcy slave trade as
mainly a story about urban slavery. Slaves, by virtue of being the
property of their slaveowners, generally found themselves physically
confined to the geographical orbit of their slaveowners, although
opportunities existed for slaves to move beyond that orbit for varying
periods of time, depending on myriad contextual factors. 293 Placing
aside the possibility of such opportunities, we can gain a sense of where
the Eastern District's bankrupted slaves likely resided by looking to the
geographic orbit of their bankrupt slaveowners.
During the time when the 1841 Act was in effect and individuals
could thus file for bankruptcy relief, 29 4 the Eastern District consisted of
twenty-four parishes, 295 among them the parish that was home to New
292. See supra notes 207-224 and accompanying text (discussing unique nature of New
Orleans and the Eastern District). In addressing whether his data on "South Carolina courts' slave
sales were representative of the rest of the South," Russell acknowledges that differences in
Louisiana's laws and legal institutions would preclude the conclusion that the South Carolina
experience was comparable to the Louisiana experience. See Russell, supra note 31, at 1252.
293. One such opportunity occurred when slaveowners hired out their slaves to third parties.
See, e.g., WADE, supra note 26, at 38 (" 'Hiring out' in its plainest form generally involved a contract
which included the price, length of service, some assurances on treatment, and the nature of the
work to be performed. Arrangements varied, some lasting only a week or for the duration of the
job, others for five years."); id. at 43 ("Hiring out, . . . whether publicly organized or privately
facilitated, sprung urban bondage out of the narrow confinements of the master-slave
relationship . . . ."); see also JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS, 1860-1880, at 2 (1973)
(noting that "the return on skilled labor was so high that many masters paid white artisans to
train their slaves and then hired them out"); MORRIS, supra note 44, at 132 ("Estimates of the
number of slave hires during the nineteenth century vary from 5 to 15 percent of the total annual
slave population."). The hiring out of slaves appears to have been a prevalent practice with respect
to municipal projects in New Orleans. See WADE, supra note 26, at 44-45.
294. Specifically, that period of time was February 1, 1842, through March 3, 1843. See supra
notes 10, 15 and accompanying text.
295. Although Louisiana's political subdivisions are known today as parishes, this has not
always been the case. When Congress organized the state into two federal judicial districts in 1823,
it specified that "[t]he counties ofAttakapas, Opelousas, Rapide, Natchitoches, and Ouachita, shall
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Orleans. 296 Because the Act's venue provision required that individuals
seeking bankruptcy relief file their petitions in the district where they
resided or had their principal place of business at the time of filing, 2 9 7
only individuals residing or having their principal place of business in
one of the Eastern District's twenty-four parishes could file a petition
for bankruptcy relief in the district's federal district court. The 1841 Act
further provided that notice of such a filing be published in at least one
newspaper printed in the district.298
Individuals in the Eastern District filed their petitions for
bankruptcy relief on forms preprinted by legal stationers, 299 as well as
on blank pieces of paper on which the request for relief had been
entirely handwritten. 300 Of the bankruptcy petitions consulted from the
Eastern District case files, those petitions almost always identified the
individual's residence or principal place of business, 301 regardless of the
manner in which the individuals presented their bankruptcy
compose one district, to be called the western district of Louisiana; and all the remaining part of
the said state shall compose another district, to be called the eastern district of Louisiana." Act of
Mar. 3, 1823, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 774, 775 (emphasis added) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 98 (2012)).
The 1840 census, which aggregated data according to federal judicial district, likewise referred to
the counties in each district of Louisiana. See DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 201, at 60 (referring to
the "counties and principal towns" in the Eastern and Western Districts of Louisiana). For a
discussion of Louisiana's transition from the county designation to the parish designation, see
Richard Campanella, Investigating Louisiana's Change from Counties to Parishes, KNOW LA.
(Spring 2017), http://www.knowlouisiana.org/a-mysterious-switch [https://perma.ccNCY8-XF9Q].
296. The 1840 census referred to the county in which New Orleans was located as "New
Orleans city and parish." DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 201, at 60.
297. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 7, 5 Stat. 440, 446 (repealed 1843).
298. See id. ("And upon every such petition, notice thereof shall be published in one or more
public newspapers printed in such district, to be designated by such court at least twenty days
before the hearing thereof .... ).
299. See, e.g., Petition of Elizabeth Norton Wife of Harvey Norton to Be Declared a Bankrupt,
In re Norton, No. 203 (E.D. La. May 9, 1842) [hereinafter Norton Bankruptcy Petition] (preprinted
bankruptcy petition). For a discussion of forms preprinted by legal stationers, see Pardo, supra
note 11, at 105 n.169.
300. See, e.g., Petition of Calvin Tate, In re Tate, No. 60 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1842) [hereinafter
Tate Bankruptcy Petition] (handwritten bankruptcy petition).
301. Additionally, other documents in the bankruptcy case files appearing on preprinted
forms- such as the discharge petitions filed by bankrupts and the petitions to sell estate property
filed by assignees-almost always identified the bankrupt's residence or principal place of
business. See, e.g., Petition of James A Chase, Bankrupt, for a Discharge at 1, In re Chase, No. 672
(E.D. La. Mar. 20, 1843) [hereinafter Chase Discharge Petition] ("Respectfully represent [sic]
James A. Chase of New Orleans in the Parish of Orleans and District of Louisiana that on the 10th
day of March last past he was duly declared Bankrupt . . . ."); Petition of L. Hermann Assignee of
the Estate of C.E. Forstall to Sell Property at 1, In re Forstall, No. 393 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 1843)
("Respectfully shows Lucien Hermann of N Orleans Assignee of the estate of Charles E. Forstall
of N Orleans declared by this Court as Bankrupt, that the said Charles E. Forstall at the time of
his Bankruptcy was seized and possessed of the estate and property in the schedule hereto
annexed. . . .").
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petitions. 302 Likewise, the legal notices in the New Orleans newspapers
that announced the filing of bankruptcy petitions almost always
identified the residence or principal place of business of the individual
seeking relief.3 0 3
By reference to some of the bankruptcy petitions (and other
documents) 304 from the Eastern District case files and legal notices from
the New Orleans newspapers, I identified the residence or principal
place of business of the bankrupt in approximately 84% (74 of 88) of the
cases with a bankruptcy slave sale. 3 0 5 Within that subset of cases, the
U.S. Marshal conducted eighty-five bankruptcy slave sales. Of those
sales, approximately 84% (71 of 85) occurred in cases involving a
bankrupt whose residence or principal place of business was in New
Orleans. For the approximately 16% (14 of 88) of cases for which I could
not identify the bankrupt's residence or principal place of business from
case file documents or from newspaper notices, reference to a New
Orleans directory from 1842 suggests that twelve of the fourteen cases
very likely involved bankrupts whose residence or principal place of
business was New Orleans. 306 Accordingly, it would appear that
302. See, e.g., Norton Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 299, at 1 ("Respectfully represents
Elizabeth Norton wife of Harvey Norton that she is separate in property & resides in the Parish
of Jefferson and State of Louisiana .... ); Tate Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 300, at 1 ("The
petition of Calvin Tate, respectfully sheweth, that your petitioner is a resident of the city of New
Orleans, in the State of Louisiana . . . .").
303. See, e.g., NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Nov. 15, 1842, at 2 ("Notice is hereby given, that
James Allen, of New Orleans, has filed in this Court his petition to be declared a bankrupt. . .
304. See supra note 301.
305. It should be noted that, on occasion, court documents and newspaper notices from the
same case did not provide the same location for the bankrupt's residence or principal place of
business. For example, in In re Norton, Elizabeth Norton's bankruptcy petition and discharge
petition, as well as a petition by the assignee in her case to sell estate property, all declared that
she was from Jefferson Parish. See Petition of R. Nugent Assignee of Elizabeth Norton at 1, In re
Norton, No. 203 (E.D. La. June 23, 1842); Petition of Elizabeth Norton Bankrupt for a Discharge
at 1, In re Norton, No. 203 (E.D. La. June 20, 1842); Norton Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 299,
at 1. In contrast, the Commercial Bulletin notice announcing that Elizabeth had filed a bankruptcy
petition indicated that she was from New Orleans. See NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., May 23, 1842,
at 1. In such instances, I recorded the information provided in the court documents rather than
the information provided in the newspaper notices. This approach reflects an assumption that the
parties to the case were more likely to be accurate in providing information in court documents
than were the third parties who published notices in their newspapers (i.e., noncourt documents).
306. For example, the caption to the U.S. Marshal's report on the bankruptcy slave sale in In
re Ducros & Morphy refers to the "Estate of Louis Alfred Ducros, Ernest Morphy, and Ducros and
Morphy." Ducros & Morphy Account Sales, supra note 276, at 1. A New Orleans directory from
1842, the same year that Ducros and Morphy filed their joint bankruptcy petition, see 1 EDLA
DOCKETS, supra note 177, at 61 (indicating that Ducros and Morphy filed their joint bankruptcy
petition on February 18, 1842), has only one listing for "Ducros & Morphy, commission merchants,
10 Conti street," NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 17, at 127. Moreover, that directory lists
"Ducros, L. A. of above firm [i.e., Ducros & Morphy], sheriff of the Commercial court, residence 393
Royal street," id., as well as "Morphy, Ernest firm of Ducros & Morphy, res. St. Philip between
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approximately 94% (83 of 88) of the Eastern District cases with a
bankruptcy slave sale involved bankrupts who resided or had a
principal place of business in New Orleans.
All of this suggests that the Eastern District bankruptcy slave
trade may very well have been an integral component of the New
Orleans slave market, which Laurence Kotlikoff has characterized as
having been "primarily a local slave market throughout the nineteenth
century." 307 Kotlikoff substantiates his descriptive claim by reference to
statistics regarding the residence of the slaves sold and the residence of
their purchasers: 308
Over two-thirds of the slaves sold in the market in any given year were slaves already
residing in Louisiana, and over 90 percent of slaves purchased were purchased by
Louisiana residents. The market was dominated by residents of New Orleans and its
immediate surrounding counties; 70 percent of slaves sold to Louisiana residents were
purchased by citizens of New Orleans .... 309
Two caveats, however, suggest that we ought to proceed with
caution before definitively making claims about the relationship
between the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave trade and the New
Orleans slave market. First, the fact that the bankrupt's residence or
principal place of business was in New Orleans does not necessarily
mean that his or her slaves resided in New Orleans. For example, in
the joint case of Louis Alfred Ducros and Ernest Morphy, all of the
slaves sold by the U.S. Marshal, a total of forty-five, belonged to
Ducros. 310 The report from the Eastern District sales books indicates
that twenty-three of the forty-five slaves were sold as part of "[a] certain
Sugar Plantation situated in the Parish of St. Bernard," without
Rampart and St. Claude streets," id. at 296. This evidence strongly suggests that Ducros and
Morphy resided and conducted their principal business in New Orleans.
307. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Quantitative Description of the New Orleans Slave Market, 1804 to
1862, in 1 WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 31, 33
(Robert William Fogel & Stanley L. Engerman eds., 1992); cf. DEYLE, supra note 32, at 157 ("Of
the more than 2 million slaves who were sold in America between 1820 and 1860, more than two-
thirds were sold to local buyers. This includes intrastate sales between planters, commercial sales
through agents or brokers, and court-ordered sales.").
308. Kotlikoff "analyzes the Fogel and Engerman sample of New Orleans invoices that
represent over 5,700 slaves sold during the years 1804 to 1862." Kotlikoff, supra note 307, at 32
(citing ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS
OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974)).
309. Id. at 33; see also Herman Freudenberger & Jonathan B. Pritchett, The Domestic United
States Slave Trade: New Evidence, 21 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 447, 461 (1991):
[A] 1most half (49.8 percent) of the slaves sold to Louisiana residents [in 1830] were sold
to residents of New Orleans. . . . That such a large percentage of the sales was to
residents of New Orleans raises questions about the assumption that that city was a
center for the regional slave trade in 1830.
310. See Ducros & Morphy Account Sales, supra note 276, at 1-2 (listing slaves sold under
heading titled "Surrendered by L. A. Ducros").
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individually identifying any of those slaves. 311 The report then
individually identifies the remaining twenty-two slaves sold by the U.S.
Marshal, but without providing any information regarding their
residence. 312 Thus, notwithstanding that Ducros appears to have
resided and had his principal place of business in New Orleans, 313 we
witness that slightly more than half of his slaves resided outside of New
Orleans in St. Bernard Parish at the time of the bankruptcy slave sale.
This example thus illustrates how the bankrupt's residence or principal
place of business is an imperfect proxy for ascertaining the residence of
bankrupted slaves.
Moreover, if we define a slave market to be local based on a
certain threshold of slaves and purchasers residing in the same locale
as the market, it is necessary to know the purchaser's residence.
Systematically ascertaining such information was beyond the scope of
this Article. Nonetheless, evidence exists suggesting that some
purchasers of bankrupted slaves resided in New Orleans. For example,
the U.S. Marshal sold "Slave Elizabeth" to an "S. W. Nye" for $495 on
September 13, 1842.314 An 1842 New Orleans directory sets forth only
two listings for individuals with the last name of Nye: (1) Seth W. Nye,
a "customhouse officer" residing at 2 Rampart Street; and (2) Samuel
Nye, a customs inspector, also with an address at Rampart Street.3 15 Of
course, more information is needed to confirm that one of these
individuals was the same S.W. Nye who purchased Elizabeth. Even so,
it seems reasonable to conclude that some purchasers at bankruptcy
slave sales resided in New Orleans, 316 especially considering that most
311. See id. at 1; see also Report & Account of Joseph Reynes Assignee at 1, In re Ducros &
Morphy, No. 61 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 1842) (setting forth the monies and notes "received for a Sugar
plantation situated in the Parish of St. Bernard, together with ... 23 Slaves").
312. See Ducros & Morphy Account Sales, supra note 276, at 2.
313. See supra note 306.
314. Account Sales, In re Bridge, No. 259 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 1842).
315. NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 17, at 307.
316. For yet another example, consider that "J. R. Jennings" purchased "Slave Milly" for $400
at a bankruptcy slave sale on New Year's Eve in 1842. Account Sales, In re Walden, No. 274 (E.D.
La. Dec. 31, 1842). At least as of February 1843, James R. Jennings was a deputy clerk of the
Eastern District's federal district court. See NEW-ORLEANS BEE, Feb. 22, 1843, at 1 (setting forth
many bankruptcy notices with James R. Jennings listed as "Dep'y Clerk of the U.S. District Court"
or "Dy. Clerk of the U.S. District Court"); see also H.R. DOC. No. 29-223, at 37 (1846) (excerpting
a letter by N.R. Jennings, the clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
dated July 17, 1846, which describes "James R. Jennings, the former deputy clerk of this court").
Also, a J.U. Lavillebeuvre returned "Slave Betsy" after purchasing her at one of the bankruptcy
slave sales conducted in In re Vairin & Kelly. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 110-11. A
contemporaneous directory of New Orleans lists J.U. Lavillebeuvre as a commission merchant,
with his business located at 28 Common Street and his residence located at 9 Circus Street. NEW
ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 17, at 239.
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bankruptcy slave sales involved the sale of few slaves, 317 which is
consistent with the pattern of slaveownership in Southern cities during
the antebellum period. 318
Whether or not the Eastern District bankruptcy slave trade can
be characterized as having been a specialized subset of the highly local
New Orleans slave market, it is clear that a great deal of the Eastern
District bankrupt slaveowners resided or had their principal place of
business in New Orleans. 319 As such, it is a fair inference that a good
deal of the bankrupted slaves resided or worked in New Orleans. This
matters because "slavery as an urban institution differed greatly from
its rural counterpart," 32 0 particularly the potential for "[t]he
development of an extensive life outside the immediate surveillance of
the owner." 32 1
The increased freedom of movement for urban slaves, which
New Orleanian newspaper editors sharply criticized, 322 gave rise to a
unique set of restraints for controlling slaves in Southern cities-
namely, a "legal framework for urban slavery" 3 2 3 that tended "toward
more rules rather than less, toward complexity rather than simplicity,
toward harshness rather than leniency." 324 Enforcement of that
framework relied heavily on the hegemony of local legal control,
317. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. Of the eighty-eight cases with a bankruptcy
slave sale, approximately 86% (76 of 88) of those cases involved only a single bankruptcy slave
sale, thereby making it highly likely that the slaves sold at that sale constituted all of the slaves
owned by the bankrupt. Of the seventy-six cases involving a single bankruptcy slave sale,
approximately 76% (58 of 76) of those cases were nonjoint cases-that is, the case involved a single
bankrupt. Because one of those cases, In re Pilcher, involved only the sale of a fractional interest
in a slave, see Pardo, supra note 11, at 110 n.188, the number of slaves sold has been recorded for
fifty-seven of the fifty-eight nonjoint cases in which a single bankruptcy slave sale occurred. That
group of cases accounts for approximately 56% (57 of 101) of the Eastern District bankruptcy slave
sales. For those sales, approximately 49% (28 of 57) of them involved the sale of only one slave,
and approximately 74% (42 of 57) of them involved the sale of four or fewer slaves. When using
case file documents and newspaper notices to document the bankrupt's residence or principal place
of business, see supra notes 299-303 and accompanying text, approximately 88% (50 of 57) of the
bankrupts in the above-referenced fifty-seven cases resided or had their principal place of business
in New Orleans. The percentage of New Orleanian bankrupts in this group of cases rises to 98%
(56 of 57) when also using a New Orleans directory to document residence or principal place of
business. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
318. See WADE, supra note 26, at 21-22.
319. See, e.g., supra note 317.
320. WADE, supra note 26, at 27.
321. Id. at 145; see also BLASSINGAME, supra note 293, at 2 ("The anonymity available in a
large seaport and the sizeable number of free Negroes made it impossible for New Orleans
slaveholders to maintain the same kind of rigid control over their 14,484 bondsmen as did planters
who had a readily identifiable and largely immobile labor force.").
322. See WADE, supra note 26, at 48-49, 51-52, 92.
323. Id. at 109.
324. Id. at 106.
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exercised both by a large police force, 325 and especially by the local
judiciary.326 Given this backdrop, we might expect that many of the
Eastern District's bankrupted slaves, prior to being thrust into the
bankruptcy system by the caprice of their owners, had to contend on a
daily basis with the law-whether having to conform their behavior
because of the law's long shadow or whether having been directly
confronted by the law's reification in the form of the police and the
municipal courts. A slaveowner's bankruptcy filing represented an
added layer of legal complexity and harshness, this time in the form of
federal law, which would run further roughshod over the lives of
bankrupted slaves.
C. Waiting for Bankruptcy Auction Day
What happened to a bankrupted slave between the time that the
court entered the decree declaring his or her owner to be a bankrupt
and the time that the U.S. Marshal sold the slave at auction to a new
owner? 327 The reports from the Eastern District sales books do not
provide any information on this front. Some of the documents from the
Eastern District case files, however, suggest that some of the slaves
may have been jailed while awaiting sale. Before turning to that
evidence, it is worth clarifying a brief observation about slaves and
325. In his discussion of the "elaborate police systems" established by Southern cities to control
their slave population, Wade notes that "travelers were often astonished at their extent." Id. at 98.
James Stuart, a European who visited New Orleans in March and April 1830, commented on the
city's "corps of mounted gens d'armes," noting that "the appearance of an armed police" rendered
New Orleans unlike "the free cities of America." 2 JAMES STUART, THREE YEARS IN NORTH AMERICA
194, 202 (Edinburgh, Robert Cadell 1833), discussed and quoted in WADE, supra note 26, at 98-
99. Toward the end of the 1850s, "New Orleans ... had a complement of 300 day and night
policemen under a chief, four lieutenants, and ten sergeants." WADE, supra note 26, at 100, 302
n.70. To place the size of the police force in context, consider the following: According to U.S. census
data, during the two-decade period spanning 1840 to 1860, while the total population of New
Orleans increased from 102,193 to 168,675, its slave population decreased from 23,448 to 13,385.
Id. app. at 325-26. Or put another way, while the total population grew by approximately 65%,
the slave population decreased from approximately 23% to approximately 8% of the total
population. This pattern is emblematic of the demographic shift that occurred in Southern cities
during the antebellum era. See id. at 16.
326. See WADE, supra note 26, at 105:
Municipal courts were . .. the judicial centers of urban slavery. In them lay the final
power of discipline over bondsmen outside the master's premises.... This meant that
authority, so clearly focused on the master in the country, would be at least shared if
not dominated by a public tribunal. . . . This diffusion of power was a unique feature of
bondage in the towns.;
see also KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH
192 (6th prtg. 1968) ("Courts, police, and militia were indispensable parts of the machinery of
control.').
327. Most of the Eastern District's bankrupted slaves were sold at public auction. See infra
text accompanying notes 404-405.
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bankruptcy made by Richard Wade in his work on slavery in Southern
cities during the antebellum period.
Discussing the jailing of urban slaves when they violated the
law, Wade notes that they "would not languish [in prison] long" as a
result of intervention by their owners, who "insisted that their property
not be detained needlessly." 32 8 He then contrasts this scenario (in an
endnote) to the imprisonment of slaves as a result of the bankruptcy
process: "In bankruptcy cases, of course, the opposite occurred. Slaves
might remain in jail until the courts disposed of the property."329 To
support this claim, Wade refers to the observations made by Fredrika
Bremer, a Swedish writer, during her travels in America from 1849
through 1851,330 whom Wade describes as having "r[u]n across a group
of women slaves in a New Orleans jail who claimed to have been there
for two years." 33 1 Wade unfortunately fails to include any other details
regarding Bremer's encounter with the female slaves. A closer look at
Bremer's recounting of the experience, however, reveals that she very
likely did not encounter bankrupted slaves.332
Bremer visited the New Orleans jail on January 4, 1851.333 She
described her encounter with the female slaves, in part, as follows:
There sat under this piazza a group of negro women, apparently enjoying the sun, which
was then shining warmly. They looked so good and quiet, and they all, especially two
young girls, bore so evidently the stamp of innocence and of good disposition, that I asked,
with no small degree of astonishment:
"Why are these here? What crimes have they committed?"
"They have committed no offense whatever," was the reply. "But their master having
given security for a person who is now bankrupt, they are brought in here to prevent their
being seized and sold by auction to cover the demand; and here they will remain till their
master finds an opportunity of recovering them." 3 3 4
Bremer's account clearly reveals that the owner of the
imprisoned women was distinct from the individual described to be
328. WADE, supra note 26, at 185.
329. Id. at 312 n.18.
330. See Adolph B. Benson, Introduction to AMERICA OF THE FIFTIES: LETTERS OF FREDRIKA
BREMER, at vii, ix, xvi (Adolph B. Benson ed., 1924).
331. WADE, supra note 26, at 312 n.18 (citing AMERICAOF THE FIFTIES, supra note 330, at 272-
74).
332. Concerns exist about relying on accounts by travelers to depict the domestic slave trade.
See, e.g., 1 ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 51 (new ed. 1995) ("Most so-called observations or
travel accounts were actually polemics against or for slavery."); WADE, supra note 26, at 285
("Visitors usually spent only a few days in each city, talked to a limited number of people, and
came to the South with fixed views on the Negro and slavery. But some, like Frederick Law
Olmstead, convey an enormous amount of information as well as many perceptive insights.").
333. See AMERICA OF THE FIFTIES, supra note 330, at 272.
334. Id. at 273.
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"bankrupt" by the person who showed Bremer the jail-specifically, the
mention that the slaveowner gave security for the "bankrupt"
individual. This suggests the possibility that a creditor loaned money to
the individual, before he became bankrupt, on the condition that the
slaveowner would guarantee the individual's debt-that is, if the
individual failed to pay the debt, the creditor would have the right to
seek repayment of the debt from the slaveowner. 335 Or perhaps the
creditor loaned the money to the individual on the condition that the
slaveowner offer his slaves as collateral for the individual's debt-that
is, if the individual failed to pay, the creditor would have the right to
seize the slaveowner's slaves, sell them, and use the sale proceeds to
satisfy the individual's debt.336 Whatever the credit arrangement may
have been, it is clear that the slaveowner had not been declared a
bankrupt and thus that the imprisoned women did not fall within the
category of "bankrupted slaves" as defined in this Article. 337
Judith Schafer, in her study of slave sales advertised in New
Orleans newspapers in 1850, notes that most were court-ordered sales
and that "[i]n many of these auctions, the slave was seized and
imprisoned until the date of auction."338 Similarly, in her study of
Louisiana slavery, she observes that, "[a]s soon as a creditor filed . .. a
suit [in a debt-seizure case], the court in which the creditor filed issued
335. Cf. KILBOURNE, supra note 34, at 3 (noting that the "pattern of contingent guaranties,
which emerged in the early decades of the nineteenth century, was decisive in the evolution of the
credit system and was repeated countless times as the economy of the region grew and credit
markets consolidated in places such as New Orleans").
336. For a discussion of antebellum credit transactions involving slaves as collateral, see id.
at 49-74; MORRIS, supra note 44, at 121-31; Martin, supra note 35. For a general discussion of the
different types of antebellum financial transactions involving a creditor's demand of security, see
BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 30-31.
337. The credit arrangement between the parties does illustrate the nature of the "interlinked
strands within the credit system" of antebellum America where "the economic fortunes of
antebellum proprietors were inextricably bound up with one another." BALLEISEN, supra note 62,
at 31. Accordingly, one might be tempted to argue that, although the Bremer example did not
involve bankrupted slaves, the bankruptcy process did set off a chain reaction that eventually led
to the imprisonment of the women in the New Orleans jail. The Bremer account, however, does
not provide sufficient detail to conclude that a court had declared the individual, for whom the
slaveowner gave security, to be a bankrupt. As Balleisen has noted, Americans in the 1800s used
the terms "'bankrupt' and 'insolvent' interchangeably ... in their everyday speech" when
"refer[ing] to individuals who could not pay their just debts, whose creditors would not grant
extensions in the time of payment, and who, as a result, had to stop the transaction of business on
their own responsibility." Id. at 234 n.3. Put another way, use of the term "bankrupt" did not
necessarily mean that a court had decreed an individual to be a bankrupt under the 1841 Act.
Given that Congress repealed the 1841 Act on March 3, 1843, Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat.
614, and given that the female slaves whom Bremer encountered in January 1851 told her that
they had been in the jail for two years, see AMERICA OF THE FIFTIES, supra note 330, at 274, it
seems highly unlikely that the "bankrupt" individual in the Bremer account had been declared a
bankrupt. Any case commenced after March 3, 1843, let alone in 1849, would have been improper,
and thus a court would not have entered a bankruptcy decree in such a case.
338. Schafer, supra note 39, at 41.
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an order of sequestration for the slave or slaves involved, which meant
imprisonment in the parish jail pending the outcome of the suit." 3 3 9
Courts issued such orders with the goal of "prevent[ing] debtors from
leaving the state with their property." 340
All of this brings us back to the question of what the experience
of the Eastern District's bankrupted slaves may have been while
awaiting sale on bankruptcy auction day. Recall that, upon the district
court declaring a debtor to be a bankrupt, the bankrupt's property and
property interests vested in the assignee, whom the 1841 Act tasked
with liquidating the bankruptcy estate.341 In furtherance of this goal,
federal district courts promulgated local rules commanding or enabling
the assignee to "take . . . possession and control of the estate." 3 4 2 What
did assignees in the Eastern District do with bankrupted slaves? Did
such slaves, like the slaves in the nonbankruptcy debt-seizure cases
described by Schafer, find themselves routinely jailed?
We have already seen in the case of Arthur Morrell that the
federal district court issued various writs of possession with regard to
Morrell's slaves upon the requests of James Bach, the appointed
assignee. 343 For one of those requests, Judge McCaleb ordered, "[L]et a
writ of possession issue directed to A S Robertson marshal of this Court
to seize the slaves in said petition in possession of the Bankrupt & his
wife, and keep them in his custody until the further order of this
Court."344 When Bach sought permission from the court to sell two of
the slaves seized by the U.S. Marshal, Drake and China, the assignee's
sale petition indicated to the court that "both [slaves were] in the Parish
jail of the Parish of Orleans." 3 4 5
Additional records from the Eastern District confirm that other
bankrupted slaves, like Drake and China, were imprisoned. 346 For
339. SCHAFER, supra note 44, at 171.
340. Id.
341. See supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
342. BANKR. D. KY. R. LX (1842) (repealed), reprinted in KY. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note
189, at 36; see also, e.g., BANKR. D.D.C. R. 40 (1842) ("[T]he assignee on proper evidence and by
motion to the court, may have the requisite order or process of the court, to put him in possession
of the bankrupt's estate .... ) (repealed), reprinted in D.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at
10; BANKR. D. VT. R. 53 (1842) (same) (repealed), reprinted in VT. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note
96, at 10.
343. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
344. Bach Petition for Slave Seizure, supra note 18, at 1 (emphasis added).
345. Bach Petition to Sell Slaves Drake and China, supra note 22, at 3.
346. Also, New Orleans newspaper advertisements announcing bankruptcy slave sales
sometimes indicated the jailing of bankrupted slaves. See, e.g., NEW-ORLEANS BEE, Jan. 9, 1843,
at 2:
By virtue of an order of court, issued from the honorable the District Court of the United
States . . ., I will expose at public sale . . . the following described property and slaves,
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example, in the joint case of Justus Vairin and James J. Kelly, Richard
Nugent, the assignee, reported having "Paid Jail fees of Slave Alfred
$16.50 to Jailor." 3 4 7 In the case of Frangois Coulon Jumonville, the U.S.
Marshal conducted an asset sale in March 1846, at which he sold
"Mariah, ... aged about 28 years, said to be a good subject," and no
other property.348 Against the $275 paid by Joseph Moss for Mariah, the
U.S. Marshal charged the estate "jail fees" in the amount of $12.00.349
Finally, in the case of James Grice, who surrendered Burrell, a
"valuable cook," and Robertson, an "Engineer," upon filing for
bankruptcy, 350 the assignee in the case, William H. White, charged the
estate $8.87 for "[jail fees of Slave Robertson," and $35 for "[k]eeping
negroes Robertson and Burrell and clothes." 351
Without systematically reviewing all of the records in the
Eastern District case files for those cases in which a bankruptcy slave
sale occurred, 352 I cannot make any claim regarding how frequently
bankrupted slaves were jailed. Yet evidence has shown us that the
bankruptcy process did cause some bankrupted slaves to be
viz: ... The right, title and interest of the bankrupts in and to the mulatto Easton,
about 45 years, now in jail.
347. Amended Report of Assignee at 1, In re Vairin & Kelly, No. 89 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1842).
348. Account Sales, In re Jumonville, No. 611 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 1846).
349. Id.
350. Schedule of J.M. Grice, In re Grice, No. 184 (E.D. La. Apr. 24, 1842).
351. Assignee's Report at 2, In re Grice, No. 184 (E.D. La. Dec. 26, 1842). For a discussion of
the daily cost of jail fees for slaves in Ascension Parish, see SCHAFER, supra note 44, at 171 n.33.
Other slave-related expenses paid by assignees included medical expenses for and municipal
taxes on slaves. For an example of medical expenses for slaves, Joseph B. Marks, the assignee in
the joint case of William and Samuel Stackhouse, reported a payment to "Campbell & Mackie for
medical services to slave Solomon" in the amount of $51.00. Account Filed by the Assignee at 1, In
re Stackhouse & Stackhouse, No. 76 (E.D. La. July 19, 1842). A New Orleans directory from 1842
includes listings for Dr. Campbell, located on Camp Street between Girod and Julia Streets, and
for Dr. J.M. Mackie, located at 43 Natchez Street. NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 17, at 62,
259. For an example of municipal taxes on bankrupted slaves, the case file for Louis Germain
Sassinot, In re Sassinot, No. 153 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 1842), includes a group of receipts bounded by a
piece of paper listing at the top "No. 153, L. G. Sassinot, Bankrupt," followed by a caption titled
"Bills paid by Th[eophile] Barbancey assignee," and last followed by the year, 1842. Included
within those receipts is a receipt (in French) dated May 1, 1842, for the amount of $7.50, issued by
the police department for the First Municipality of New Orleans, indicating that the payment
received was in connection with the assessment of an 1841 property tax. The back of the receipt
indicates that the $7.50 was paid on account of five slaves ("5 Esclaves - $7.50"). The U.S. Marshal
sold a total of five slaves in Sassinot's bankruptcy case. See Account Sales, In re Sassinot, No. 153
(E.D. La. Aug. 22, 1842) (indicating that the U.S. Marshal sold "Slave Tom"); Account Sales, In re
Sassinot, No. 153 (E.D. La. July 21, 1842) (indicating that the U.S. Marshal sold "Slave Ann or
Hannah," "Slave John," "Slave Gibson," and "Slave Sarah").
352. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 103-09 (discussing scope of review of Eastern District case
files).
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incarcerated. 353 What, then, might have been the living experience of
incarcerated bankrupted slaves?
In his discussion of antebellum prison conditions encountered by
urban slaves, Wade begins by noting that European travelers tended to
comment favorably on those conditions, pointing to the commentary by
Karl Bernhard on the "remarkable neatness" of a Charleston jail. 35 4
Along similar lines, recall Fredrika Bremer,355 who visited various New
Orleans prisons, describing their "outward management" to be
"excellent," with "[o]rder and cleanliness prevail[ing] throughout." 3 5 6
Or, for a local view, consider the observations made in the 1845
guidebook, Norman's New Orleans and Environs, with its inherent
boosterism of the city, describing the living conditions in the Second
Municipality's prison:
The prisoners are kept at constant labor; and their food, though not luxurious, is of a
wholesome nature, which may, when their abstinence from intemperate habits is taken
into consideration, account for the excellent state of their health. It would not be
hazarding much to say that many here were never before accustomed to so many of the
comforts of life ... for they lodge upon clean and comfortable bedding, surrounded by
moscheto bars; and, once a week, at least, can enjoy the luxury of a bath. 3 5 7
Wade does quick work of eviscerating any notion that prison
conditions would have been humane. They were nothing short of
appalling, he argues, noting that conditions were the worst for black
prisoners. 358 He makes his case by focusing on the conditions of jails in
New Orleans, recounting how "a committee of the First Municipality
353. Other evidence from this study supports further inferences regarding the incarceration
of bankrupted slaves. It has been observed that "[s]laves sold at auction at the St. Louis and St.
Charles Hotels [in New Orleans] were held nearby in slave jails." McInnis, supra note 208, at 115.
As discussed further below, all of the bankruptcy slave sales held in New Orleans were public
auctions, with the majority of slaves from that group of sales sold at the St. Louis Hotel. See infra
text accompanying notes 411, 416. Consistent with the practice of slaveowners hiring out their
slaves to third parties, see supra note 293, the possibility also exists that some assignees may have
hired out bankrupted slaves. Cf EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE
SLAVES MADE 390-91 (First Vintage Books 1976) (1972):
Between 5 and 10 percent of the slaves of the South could expect to be hired out during
any given year in the late antebellum period. . . . These slaves came from relatives of
deceased slaveowners, who were settling the estate; from authorities who were sorting
out bankruptcy; from mobile planters who were setting up new plantations and needed
time to get ready for a full work force; and from settled planters who had bought a large
group of slaves and could not absorb it immediately.
(emphasis added).
354. WADE, supra note 26, at 184, 312 n.14.
355. See supra notes 330-334 (discussing Fredrika Bremer, a Swedish writer who traveled in
America from 1849 through 1851).
356. AMERICA OF THE FIFTIES, supra note 330, at 272.
357. BENJAMIN MOORE NORMAN, NORMAN'S NEW ORLEANS AND ENVIRONS 131-32 (Matthew
J. Schott ed., La. State Univ. Press 1976) (1845).
358. See WADE, supra note 26, at 184.
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issued a sharp rebuke to its jailor when it found the walls without
whitewash, great overcrowding, [and] sick slaves mingling with the
healthy." 359
Wade also discusses a New Orleans grand jury report from 1837,
which described two of the city's three jails as "worse than 'dreadful'
accounts had indicated," including the Second Municipality's prison
(i.e., the one described in such glowing terms in Norman's New Orleans
and Environs), where black prisoners "were kept in five 'dens' which
measured ten feet square with a small door fifteen inches wide
providing the only outlet," during which time "[t]he temperature
outside was between 90 and 95 degrees, while the rooms were much
hotter and filled with 'filth and abominable odors.' "360
These are the types of conditions that would have awaited the
Eastern District's bankrupted slaves who were incarcerated as a result
of being swept into the federal bankruptcy process, and all as a result
of their bankrupt slaveowners' desire for financial freedom. In extreme
circumstances, it was not unheard of for Louisiana slaves incarcerated
in debt-seizure cases to die in custody as a result of horrendous prison
conditions. 361 And at least one Eastern District bankrupted slave,
Felicit6, died before the U.S. Marshal could sell her. 36 2 Having been
unable to consult the associated case file, I do not know whether she
was incarcerated at the time of her death. Regardless, given that
incarceration of bankrupted slaves in terrible prison conditions
occurred in the Eastern District, it seems reasonable to conclude that
some bankrupted slaves from other judicial districts may have similarly
been incarcerated and thus possibly have met their demise while jailed.
Finally, we might ask how long the status of bankrupted slave
lasted for the black men, women, and children owned by the federal
government as a result of the 1841 Act. The duration of that status can
be measured by calculating the number of elapsed days from the date
that the district court decreed the bankrupted slave's owner to be a
bankrupt to the date of the sale at which the bankrupted slave was sold.
Recall the significance of these two dates: on the bankruptcy decree
date, the federal government would become the owner of the
bankrupted slave; and on the sale date, the federal government would
cease to be the owner.363 Accordingly, the duration of bankrupted slave
359. Id.
360. Id. (quoting NEW-ORLEANS BEE, July 13, 1837, at 2).
361. SCHAFER, supra note 44, at 171-72 ("David Cox seized Jim, a slave belonging to John
Myers, and had him jailed because Myers had failed to pay Cox $307 for rent of land and slaves.
The twenty-two-year-old slave died in the unheated jail .... .").
362. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 112.
363. See supra Section I.C.2.
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status signified the duration of the federal government's ownership of
the bankrupted slaves. And, for some of those individuals, that period
of time (or a portion thereof) represented a period of incarceration.
Based on information from the Eastern District docket books,
the Eastern District case files consulted for this study, and the Eastern
District sales books, I have been able to calculate the duration of
bankrupted slave status for the slaves sold in nearly 60% (60 of 101) of
the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave sales. That set of sales involved
approximately 65% (313 of 480) of the Eastern District bankrupted
slaves. For this group of individuals, the median and mean durations of
bankrupted slave status were, respectively, 125 days and 276 days. The
shortest duration occurred for Alfred and Betsy, whom the U.S.
Marshal sold forty days after the district court declared Justus Vairin
and James Kelly to be bankrupts; 364 and the longest duration occurred
for James, whom the U.S. Marshal sold 3,997 days after the district
court declared Arthur Morrell to be a bankrupt. 365
364. Compare Account Sales, In re Vairin & Kelly, No. 89 (E.D. La. May 23, 1842) (reporting
bankruptcy slave sale of Alfred and Betsy), with 1 EDLA DOCKETS, supra note 177, at 89
(indicating that the court decreed Vairin and Kelly to be bankrupts on April 13, 1842).
365. Compare Morrell Account Sales, supra note 29, at 1 (reporting bankruptcy slave sale of
James), with Petition for Writ of Possession, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that "the said A Morrell
filed in this Honl Court, his petition on the 3rd of February 1842, praying to be declared a
Bankrupt").
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FIGURE 3: DURATION OF BANKRUPTED SLAVE STATUS
o
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Post-Bankruptcy-Decree Month in Which Slave Sale Occurred
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the duration of bankrupted
slave status based on the month in which the bankruptcy slave sale
occurred following the bankruptcy decree date of the bankrupted slave's
owner. 366 For example, we see that the U.S. Marshal sold approximately
45% (139 of 312) of the slaves in the third month following the date of
the bankruptcy decree for the owners of those slaves-that is, anywhere
from sixty-one to ninety days after the bankruptcy decree date. 3 6 7
Additionally, the U.S. Marshal sold approximately 29% (89 of 312) of
these slaves at least six months after they had attained bankrupted
slave status.
366. Although I was able calculate the duration of bankrupted slave status for the slaves sold
in approximately 59% (60 of 101) of the Eastern District bankruptcy slave sales, one of those sales,
which occurred in In re Pilcher, involved the sale of a fractional interest in a slave. See Pardo,
supra note 11, at 110 n.188. Because the sales of such interests were not included when coding the
number of slaves sold at a bankruptcy slave sale, see id. at 110, and because the U.S. Marshal sold
no other slaves in Pilcher, see id. at 110 n. 188, the data illustrated in Figure 3 represent the fifty-
nine observations for which there were no missing values for the number of slaves sold and the
number of days that elapsed from the bankruptcy decree date to the slave sale date.
367. For purposes of illustrating the duration of bankrupted slave status, elapsed months were
measured in thirty-day increments to avoid rounding issues.
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The 1841 Act called for a "speedy settlement and close of the
proceedings in each case in bankruptcy," which entailed, among other
things, reducing the estate's assets "to money ... at as early periods as
practicable." 368 The Act also set forth a two-year benchmark, measured
from the bankruptcy decree date, as the period of time within which an
entire case should be administered, "if practicable." 3 6 9 Judged by these
standards, apologists for assignees involved in the bankruptcy slave
trade might say that Figure 3 demonstrates that they made the best of
a terrible situation, expeditiously carrying out their duties with respect
to most of the Eastern District's bankrupted slaves. But such an
observation would be misguided for two reasons.
First, complicity is complicity. Whether the federal
government's ownership of slaves lasted one day, one week, one month,
or one year, any one of those time periods represents an abomination.
Second, using the 1841 Act's estate-administration standards to
evaluate the government's temporal ownership of bankrupted slaves
obfuscates the true extent of the duration. Evaluating institutions, such
as courts, according to collective temporal metrics can provide useful
analytical frames. 370 Accordingly, why not use a similar approach in
analyzing the 1841 Act's capacity to inflict harm? The collective number
of days that black men, women, and children suffered the status of
bankrupted slaves in the Eastern District totals 58,462 days. 371 Put
another way, from the aggregate perspective, the federal government
was the owner of Eastern District bankrupted slaves for, at a minimum,
approximately 160 collective years. 372 Add to that figure the collective
years from the other twenty-two slave districts, 373 whatever that
number might be, and one can then begin to gain an actual sense of the
temporal scope of the federal government's slaveowner status.
368. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 10, 5 Stat. 440, 447 (repealed 1843).
369. Id.
370. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-
Appointment Experience, 64 FIA. L. REV. 1137, 1148 (2012) ("One hundred twelve out of 114
Supreme Court Justices have had at least some private practice experience. Collectively, those 112
Justices spent 1,898 years in the practice of law before joining the Court, almost seventeen years
per Justice.").
371. This figure is based on the fifty-nine observations for which there were no missing values
for the number of slaves sold and the number of days that elapsed from the bankruptcy decree
date to the slave sale date. See supra note 366.
372. Recall that the duration of bankrupted slave status was not calculated for 167 Eastern
District bankrupted slaves. Had their duration status been included, the collective number of days
would clearly have been higher.
373. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE PERPETRATORS OF AND PROFITEERS FROM
BANKRUPTCY SLAVE SALES
In his work on the 1841 Act, Balleisen has observed that "the
bankruptcy system provided hundreds of court officials and dozens of
newspapers with substantial income," 37 4 much of that income being
derived from the proceeds of liquidated estate property, 375 which would
subsequently be paid out in one form or another (e.g., court fees) to those
involved in the administration of bankrupt estates. 376 The rise of this
profiteering network within the bankruptcy system reflected, according
to Balleisen, "the capacity of America's capitalist culture to extend the
entrepreneurial impulse-to find, even in the very occurrence of
commercial catastrophe, the raw materials for profit."37 7
In the abstract, availing oneself of economic opportunities
created by legal systems may be all very well and good. But when the
"raw materials for profit" are human beings, we need to assess quite
differently what was happening in the antebellum bankruptcy system.
As Russell has argued in his work on court-ordered slave sales under
state law in antebellum South Carolina, the courts there "operated
much like commission-merchant firms," with a profit motive driving the
work of the judicial system. 378 Ultimately, those courts came to
represent "a statewide auctioneering firm . .. that coordinated a large
assembly of sheriffs, masters in chancery, ordinaries, and other state
officials ... who ... drew profit from sales [of slaves] by operation of
law." 3 7 9
Eventually, the day arrived when bankrupted slaves were to be
sold. As we will see, the 1841 Act gave the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana and its officials "a visible and prominent
role in constituting and ordering slave auctions." 380 To have arrived at
374. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 139; cf. Astounding Facts, LE COURRIER DE LA LOUISIANNE
(New Orleans), Aug. 23, 1841, at 3 (reporting that, during the debate on the bankruptcy bill on
August 10, 1842, "[Senator] Pope said the bill should be entitled 'An act for the benefit of lawyers,
commissioners, assignees, clerks, marshals, and their dependents.' These would be the persons
who would make the most of it. . . .").
375. Cf. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 151 ("Of all the economic opportunities created by the
1841 Bankruptcy Law, those with the greatest potential lay with the property relinquished by
bankrupts.").
376. See supra note 62 (discussing 1841 Act provision on fees and charges). For a description
of the fees paid to court clerks, bankruptcy assignees, and U.S. Marshals and the payments made
to newspapers for publishing legal notices in connection with 1841 Act cases, see BALLEISEN, supra
note 62, at 137-39.
377. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 136.
378. Russell, supra note 31, at 1273.
379. Id. at 1275.
380. Russell, supra note 149, at 477.
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the date of the bankruptcy slave sale required the concerted action of
various participants in the bankruptcy system-bankrupt slaveowners,
bankruptcy assignees, the federal district court, New Orleanian
newspapers that published bankruptcy notices, and U.S. Marshals,
among others. Similar to the antebellum South Carolina courts, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana operated like a
slave auctioneering firm. This Part describes the nature of the
involvement of some of the principal perpetrators of and profiteers from
the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave trade, focusing on the role of
the federal district court, the bankruptcy assignees, and the U.S.
Marshals.
A. Judge McCaleb and the Eastern District's Bankruptcy Assignees
Writing on the role of judges and court officials in court-ordered
slave sales, Russell has observed that we cannot consider the former
"merely complicit bystanders in the institution of slavery" given that
"they occupied managerial roles" in structuring and supervising such
sales.3 81 Rather, judges, with the help of court officials, "strengthened
and legitimized the institution of slavery." 3 8 2
Looking to the Eastern District, those primarily responsible for
orchestrating the bankruptcy slave trade were Judge Theodore Howard
McCaleb and the group of individuals who served as assignees in the
cases involving bankrupted slaves. Judge McCaleb, a Mississippian
educated at Phillips Exeter Academy and Yale College, 383 received a
commission to serve as the only U.S. District Judge for both the Eastern
and Western Districts of Louisiana on September 3, 1841, having been
nominated by President Tyler on the first of that month. 384 He remained
the Eastern District's federal district judge through 1861,385 thus
making him the overseer of the district's bankruptcy slave trade for its
entire duration from April 1842 through February 1853.386
While on the bench, Judge McCaleb served as one of the four
original faculty members of the University of Louisiana's law school,
381. Id.
382. Id. at 479.
383. Paul Brosman, The First Hundred Years, 22 TUL. L. REV. 543, 544 (1948); see also
NATHANIEL CHEAIRS HUGHES JR., YALE'S CONFEDERATES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIoNARY 137
(2008).
384. McCaleb, Theodore Howard, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fje.gov/history/judges/mccaleb-
theodore-howard (last visited Aug. 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Z4QV-DZ5A]. When Congress
organized Louisiana into two federal judicial districts in 1823, it authorized only a single judgeship
to serve both districts. See Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch.44, § 1, 3 Stat. 774, 775.
385. McCaleb, supra note 384.
386. See supra text accompanying note 283.
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which would one day become Tulane Law School, holding the title of
Professor of Admiralty and International Law,3 87 and eventually
serving as the school's dean. 388 Judge McCaleb, responsible for having
trained a cadre of future lawyers, 389 and described by Tulane Law
School's dean in 1948 as having authored opinions that "were highly
respected by the bar" and as being "accomplished as an orator and
public lecturer," 390 was the same person who, "embrac[ing] the
Confederate cause," 391 resigned his position on the district court upon
Louisiana's secession from the Union. Make no mistake about it: Judge
McCaleb was a willing, able, and active participant in the Eastern
District's bankruptcy slave trade.
Judge McCaleb, of course, could not operate autonomously in
directing bankruptcy slave sales. Rather, someone had to prompt him
into action. Those who did so were the bankruptcy assignees tasked
with the duty to liquidate the Eastern District's bankruptcy estates that
included bankrupted slaves. The assignees responsible for
administering the eighty-eight cases involving bankruptcy slave sales
consisted of thirty-five individuals. Among them were some noteworthy
persons, such as James R. Jennings, the deputy clerk of the federal
district court, 392 and Thomas Slidell, who would ultimately serve as
chief justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court from 1853 to 1855.393 But
perhaps the most noteworthy of them all was Judah Phillip Benjamin
(also known as J.P. Benjamin), 394 "who would emerge as the most
prominent New Orleanian of his century," 395 serving as one of
Louisiana's U.S. Senators, 396 declining a nomination to serve on the
387. Brosman, supra note 383, at 543-44.
388. See McCaleb, supra note 384.
389. See REINDERS, supra note 4, at 140-41:
They [i.e., the faculty of the University of Louisiana's law school, including Judge
McCaleb] forced their charges into a dawn-to-dark routine of lectures, preparing of
briefs, and conducting cases in moot courts. From these superbly trained students came
lawyers who later attained outstanding recognition in politics and at the bar.
390. Brosman, supra note 383, at 544; cf. REINDERS, supra note 4, at 140 (describing Judge
McCaleb as one "of the outstanding jurists in the Crescent City").
391. Id.
392. See supra note 316.
393. SCHAFER, supra note 44, at 44.
394. In his role as assignee, Benjamin directed approximately 8% (8 of 101) of the Eastern
District's bankruptcy slave sales. At those sales, the U.S. Marshal sold approximately 6% (30 of
480) of the Eastern District's bankrupted slaves. One of those sales also involved a bankrupt's one-
quarter interest in 100 slaves, see Account Sales, In re Fortier, No. 567 (E.D. La. June 13, 1843), a
figure not included in the total number of the Eastern District's bankrupted slaves, see Pardo,
supra note 11, at 110.
395. ROBERT DOUTHAT MEADE, JUDAH P. BENJAMIN: CONFEDERATE STATESMAN 44 (1943).
396. Id. at 86.
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U.S. Supreme Court, 397 and serving as Attorney General, Secretary of
War, and Secretary of State for the Confederacy at different points
during the Civil War.3 98 We thus witness the participation of leading
members of the Eastern District's legal community in running the
bankruptcy slave trade, which perhaps is not surprising given that
"[t]he characteristics of individuals who profited from the 1841
Bankruptcy Act were usually those of insiders-either to the workings
of the bankruptcy system in a given place, or to the particular
circumstances of individual bankruptcies." 39 9
In thinking about Judge McCaleb and the Eastern District's
assignees as some of the main perpetrators of the district's bankruptcy
slave trade, we need to know how the 1841 Act choreographed their
actions in order to better understand their respective complicities. The
Act did not specify the conditions pursuant to which the assignee was
to sell estate property, instead merely instructing that "it . .. [was] the
duty of the court to order and direct a collection of the [estate's] assets,
and a reduction of the same to money, . . . consistently with a due regard
to the interests of the creditors." 400 Accordingly, Congress granted the
courts wide latitude in structuring bankruptcy asset sales-in terms of
time, place, and manner-so long as the arrangements comported with
the best interests of the creditors in achieving liquidation and
distribution of the bankruptcy estate.
Some district courts, relying on their rulemaking authority
under the Act, 4 01 promulgated rules establishing a default structure for
asset sales that would entail public auction of estate assets for cash.402
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, on the
other hand, opted to promulgate a rule that, while recognizing the
court's ultimate authority to approve assignee sale petitions,
nonetheless deferred in the first instance to the business judgment and
397. Id. at 84-85.
398. Id. at 161, 208, 235. For a more recent biography of Benjamin, see ELI N. EVANS, JUDAH
P. BENJAMIN: THE JEWISH CONFEDERATE (1988).
399. BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 158. A professional network clearly existed among those
who served as Eastern District assignees. For example, Benjamin collaborated with Slidell in 1834
to compile a digest of decisions by the Louisiana Supreme Court. See MEADE, supra note 395, at
37. And in the 1850s, Benjamin's law partners were Edward A. Bradford and William C. Micou,
id. at 85, both of whom directed Eastern District bankruptcy slave sales as assignees under the
1841 Act. Like Benjamin, Bradford and Micou received nominations to serve on the U.S. Supreme
Court. See id. at 85.
400. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 10, 5 Stat. 440, 447 (repealed 1843).
401. See supra note 235.
402. See, e.g., BANKR. D.N.C. R. 47 (1842) ("The sale of the bankrupt's estate shall be at public
auction, and for cash, unless on the report of the assignee, or with his assent, it is otherwise
specially ordered by the court.") (repealed), reprinted in N.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 62,
at 7; BANKR. D. VT. R. 60 (1842) (same) (repealed), reprinted in VT. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra
note 96, at 10.
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expertise of assignees in structuring sales that would maximize asset
values for the benefit of creditors. 403
From the historical evidence, the Eastern District's assignees,
with the district court's blessing, overwhelmingly deemed public
auction, rather than private sale, to be the ideal method for selling
bankrupted slaves. 404 For approximately 81% (82 of 101) of the
observations in the case study's dataset, sufficient information was
unearthed to document some characteristics of the Eastern District
bankruptcy slave sales. Among that subset of sales, approximately 94%
(77 of 82) of them definitively involved public auction, as confirmed by
descriptions in the Eastern District sales books and the legal notices in
New Orleans newspapers. 405 Thus, we witness that the Eastern
District's assignees and Judge McCaleb, through their coordinated
efforts, made the act of purchasing a bankrupted slave "a public
occasion-a spectacle." 406
Russell's conceptualization of slave auctions provides a very
useful frame for thinking about the significance of assignees' recurring
recommendation and Judge McCaleb's repeated approval to structure
bankruptcy slave sales as public auctions:
Auctions represented perfectly the relational nature of property in slaves. . . . These
public sales took place before a number of spectators and bidders. The persons who viewed
the sales and participated in the bidding were, of course, interested in the sales as events
or spectacles and also as opportunities to purchase. But the spectators and viewers might
also be interested-in the legal sense-in the outcome of the auctions, as the sales
reconfigured existing property interests in the slaves being sold. With each sale, new
constellations of persons holding property interests formed. . . . Considered conceptually,
slave auctions were one of the mechanisms by which Southerners distributed and shared
their stake in slavery. Slave property, as a social relationship, was an expression of that
distributed commitment to the institution.40 7
In light of this framing, we should look to answer two key
questions. First, how did Eastern District bankruptcy slave auctions
differ as events or spectacles, if at all, from nonbankruptcy court-
403. See Nugent Record Transcript, supra note 231, at 18 (reproducing Eastern District
bankruptcy rule providing that an assignee's sale petition "in all cases, [had to] be accompanied
by a schedule, which shall contain ... a suggestion of the terms and conditions, the time and place
of the sale, which, in the assignee's opinion, shall be most suitable for the interest of the
conditions").
404. Cf. McInnis, supra note 208, at 112 ("Much of that commerce in slaves [in New Orleans]
took place at auctions. Auctions were a vital part of the city's economy .... ).
405. See, e.g., NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Aug. 1, 1843, at 4 ("By virtue of an order of court
issued from the honorable the District Court of the U S for the Eastern District of Louisiana, I will
expose at public sale ... the following described property: The slave Julia or Juliet Ann, a negress,
aged 43 years." (emphasis added)).
406. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 201; cf. Russell, supra note 149, at 477 ("The dehumanization
and subordination of the slave auction had direct support from legal officials and institutions.").
407. Russell, supra note 149, at 480-81 (emphasis added).
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ordered slave auctions? And second, how did the Eastern District's
assignees and Judge McCaleb use the 1841 Act to reconfigure existing
property interests in bankrupted slaves?
1. The Spectacle of Bankruptcy Slave Auctions
When thinking about court-ordered slave auctions, scholars
have submitted that the accurate image is that of a sale that occurred
on courthouse steps. 408 Put another way, "the usual image conjured by
the phrase 'slave auction'-that of a commercial sale taking place in a
large city such as Charleston, South Carolina or Richmond, Virginia-
is misleading." 4 0 9 Accordingly, the conventional wisdom has been that
an "auction image from the commercial slave marts" should not be part
of the story of court-ordered slave sales. 410
And yet, the conventional wisdom does not hold when shifting
the focus to bankruptcy slave auctions in the Eastern District. If we
consider the eighty-two observations from the case study's dataset with
sufficient information to document some characteristics of the Eastern
District bankruptcy slave sales, all of the New Orleans sales-a total of
seventy-three observations (i.e., approximately 89% of the eighty-two
observations)-involved the public auction of 318 bankrupted slaves, or
approximately 66% (318 of 480) of the Eastern District's bankrupted
slaves. And crucially, as described below, all of these public auctions
took place at three of the city's various commercial exchanges. Thus,
when we think of the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave auctions, the
spectacle played out as a series of commercial sales in New Orleans,
America's third-largest city in 1840 and its largest slave market. 411
I obtained information on the location of the Eastern District's
bankruptcy slave sales from three sources: the U.S. Marshal's reports
in the Eastern District sales books, assignee sale petitions, and legal
notices of those sales published in New Orleanian newspapers. For the
seventy-three observations involving sales in New Orleans, each was
identified as being held in one of the following locations: (1) Banks
408. See DEYLE, supra note 32, at 168 ("The most common venues for court-ordered sales,
however, were the monthly auctions held on the front steps of virtually every county courthouse
across the South."); Russell, supra note 31, at 1278 ("The site of these [court-ordered slave] sales
was not an auction block beside an urban wharf, but rather the steps of any district's courthouse.");
cf. McInnis, supra note 208, at 102 ("The slave trade took place in nearly every town and city in
the South. In most, however, the trade did not have a permanent physical location. Commonly,
slaves were sold on court days, usually outdoors at a location near the courthouse . . .
409. Russell, supra note 31, at 1278.
410. Id.
411. See supra notes 202-203.
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Arcade, 412 (2) the City Exchange, (3) Hewlett's Exchange, and (4) the
St. Louis Exchange. It is important to note that references to the City
Exchange and to the St. Louis Exchange were to the same location-
that is, the St. Louis Exchange, which was located in the St. Louis
Hotel, 413 "was originally known as the City Exchange." 414 Accordingly,
the bankruptcy slave auctions in New Orleans took place in one of three
locations: Banks Arcade, Hewlett's Exchange, and the St. Louis
Exchange.
In discussing the New Orleans bankruptcy slave auctions, I will
focus my commentary on auctions at Banks Arcade, for three reasons.
First, Hewlett's Exchange did not feature prominently in the Eastern
District bankruptcy slave trade: only a single bankruptcy slave auction
took place there. 415 Second, the remaining bankruptcy slave auctions in
New Orleans were evenly split between the St. Louis Exchange and
Banks Arcade, with thirty-six auctions at each. While the U.S. Marshal
sold more bankrupted slaves at the former (i.e., 223 slaves) than at the
latter (i.e., ninety-three slaves), therefore possibly suggesting that the
focus should be on the St. Louis Exchange, the literature on the New
Orleans slave market has already discussed that location extensively 416
but has given Banks Arcade only a passing mention.4 17 Accordingly, to
add a new dimension to our understanding of the New Orleans slave
market, I have chosen to tell the story of the bankruptcy slave auction
through the lens of Banks Arcade. And third, as will shortly be revealed,
412. Banks Arcade is named after its original owner, Thomas Banks. See Architectural
Inventory, in 2 NEW ORLEANS ARCHITECTURE 93, 183 (Mary Louise Christovich et al. eds., 2d prtg.
1978); Mary Louise Christovich & Roulhac Toledano, Banking and Commerce, in 2 NEW ORLEANS
ARCHITECTURE, supra, at 65, 70. Like others, I have chosen not to use the possessive (i.e., Banks'),
instead referring to the location as "Banks Arcade." E.g., REINDERS, supra note 4, at 210;
Christovich & Toledano, supra, at 70. Some scholars have used the possessive incorrectly, thus
altering the last name of Thomas Banks. See BANCROFT, supra note 204, at 324 ("Bank's Arcade");
DEYLE, supra note 32, at 154 (same); WADE, supra note 26, at 199 (same).
413. See, e.g., MCINNIS, supra note 29, at 164, 168.
414. 2 JOHN SMITH KENDALL, HISTORY OF NEW ORLEANS 687 (1922).
415. See Account Sales, In re Chase, No. 672 (E.D. La. Dec. 27, 1843) [hereinafter Chase
Account Sales]. Hewlett's Exchange was located at the corner of Camp and Common Streets.
Christovich & Toledano, supra note 412, at 71. A map of New Orleans produced for an 1845
guidebook, Norman's New Orleans and Environs, marks the exchange's location. That map
appears as an inset in the back of the 1976 facsimile reproduction of the guidebook, see NORMAN,
supra note 357, and can also be viewed online, Norman's Plan of New Orleans & Environs, 1845,
LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/resource/g4014n.ct000243/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/8VX5-8DNH].
416. See, e.g., BANCROFT, supra note 204, at 333-37; MCINNIS, supra note 29, at 164-71;
WADE, supra note 26, at 201.
417. BANCROFT, supra note 204, at 324 (describing Banks Arcade as "one of the five or six most
popular [slave] marts"); DEYLE, supra note 32, at 154 ("One visitor described Bank's [sic] Arcade,
a prominent slave mart on Magazine Street, as 'lighted from above by a large sky-light, and paved
with marble.' "); WADE, supra note 26, at 199 ("On the same day J. B. Phillips offered 'a number of
negroes' at Bank's [sic] Arcade .... ).
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the bankruptcy slave auctions at Banks Arcade can be characterized by
a cruel hypocrisy unique to that location, which warrants discussion.
In her work documenting the geography and architecture of the
Southern slave trade, Maurie McInnis identifies various distinctions
that made the New Orleans slave trade sui generis. Because of the
massive scope of the trade in New Orleans, the city found itself among
a select group of "cities with a large slave market [that] had a
significant infrastructure dedicated to the buying and selling of
humans," such as Richmond, in contrast to most other Southern towns
and cities where "the trade did not have a permanent physical
location." 418 The New Orleans slave trade further distinguished itself
from the cities with a dedicated slave-trade infrastructure by "boldly
assert[ing] itself as part of the competitive commercial landscape," in
contrast to, for example, the Richmond slave trade, which was "tucked
away" and "occupied a shadow landscape, largely unseen by the city's
elite residents." 419 In short, the New Orleans slave trade was "the most
conspicuous" of all the major markets, 4 2 0 "tak[ing] place in grand public
spaces," such as "in the octagonal bar at the St. Charles Hotel and in
the rotunda of the St. Louis Hotel." 4 2 1
As previously mentioned, all but one of the New Orleans
bankruptcy slave auctions took place at the St. Louis Exchange and
Banks Arcade. And just like the St. Louis Exchange, Banks Arcade
featured prominently in the Crescent City's commercial landscape.
Designed by architect Charles F. Zimpel, Banks Arcade was constructed
in 1833 on Magazine Street and ran the entire block between Natchez
and Gravier Streets, consisting of a continuous three-story edifice made
of red brick "with granite pillars at the first level and a parapet with
central pediment." 422 Stores occupied the front of the building on
Magazine Street, "behind which [a] glass pedestrian arcade extended
through the block." 4 2 3 Within the building were "a hotel, offices, the
armory of the Washington Artillery (Armory Hall), saloons, a
restaurant, and the Toutine, a spacious, lushly decorated coffee
418. McInnis, supra note 208, at 102; see also id. at 103 ("What was particularly distinctive in
these larger markets is that cities had dozens of permanent business establishments, both
buildings and persons, dedicated to the trade.").
419. Id. at 112.
420. MCINNIS, supra note 29, at 164.
421. McInnis, supra note 208, at 113.
422. Architectural Inventory, supra note 412, at 183; see also REINDERS, supra note 4, at 210-
11 (describing Banks Arcade in similar terms). A map of New Orleans produced for an 1845
guidebook, Norman's New Orleans and Environs, marks the location of Banks Arcade. See supra
note 415.
423. Architectural Inventory, supra note 412, at 183.
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house."424 Additionally, the Commercial Bulletin had its office in the
building, located at the corner of Gravier Street.425
Based on this description, it should be apparent that Thomas
Banks, the owner of Banks Arcade, at one point had fulfilled his vision
of creating a premier commercial venue,426 one that would become,
whether by design or not, "one of the five or six most popular [slave]
marts" in New Orleans. 427 As a result, Banks Arcade constituted one of
New Orleans's "very public places [in which] . . . the disparity between
the refinement that Southern riches allowed and the barbarity of the
slave trade on which Southern riches depended was most conspicuously
contrasted." 428 But with the bankruptcy slave auctions recommended
by the Eastern District's assignees and authorized by Judge McCaleb,
a new variable was introduced into this equation-namely, a very
public display of how the Southern riches of bankrupt slaveowners had
crumbled away in financial ruin, of how that ruin had prompted them
to seek bankruptcy relief, and of how that decision ultimately
necessitated the auctioning of their slaves as the price of discharge,
thus exposing them to the cruelty of the slave trade. Accordingly,
bankruptcy slave auctions starkly juxtaposed the bankrupt's financial
freedom with the continued enslavement of his or her slaves, with the
barbarous spectacle of public auction as a transfer point.
While one can say that the hypocrisy permeating this
juxtaposition was inherent in any bankruptcy slave auction (or, for that
matter, any slave auction or private slave sale to pay the debts of a
slaveowner), that hypocrisy was especially exacerbated in the context
of bankruptcy slave auctions at Banks Arcade. You see, Thomas Banks
was one of the Eastern District's bankrupt slaveowners who found
himself in financial ruin, in his case "because of his support of the Texas
Revolution and financial speculations in New Orleans." 4 2 9 The same
Thomas Banks who not only owned Banks Arcade when he filed for
424. REINDERS, supra note 4, at 211.
425. Architectural Inventory, supra note 412, at 183.
426. See id. (stating that Banks Arcade "was intended to be a gathering place for merchants
and to serve the community above Canal [Street] in the same manner as Maspero's Exchange did
below Canal"); Christovich & Toledano, supra note 412, at 70-71 (stating that "Banks Arcade ...
was envisioned by its promoter, Thomas Banks, as a commercial center on Magazine Street to
compete with Maspero's Exchange in the French Quarter").
427. BANCROFT, supra note 204, at 324.
428. MCINNIS, supra note 29, at 164.
429. Architectural Inventory, supra note 412, at 183.
2018] 1149
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
bankruptcy relief,430 but also the one who lived there.431 The same
Thomas Banks accused by Francis Conrad, the assignee in his case, of
having made a fraudulent gift of three slaves, Maria, Ben, and Mary, to
his sister-in-law, Ann Fogarty, on the eve of filing for bankruptcy. 432
The same Thomas Banks in whose bankruptcy case the U.S. Marshal
sold a total of eight bankrupted slaves at two public auctions at Banks
Arcade, including Maria, Ben, and Mary. 4 3 3
Not only did Thomas Banks' eight slaves suffer the indignity of
public auction at a time when their former owner had been granted his
financial freedom, 434 they also experienced that suffering within a
venue that, as Banks' prebankruptcy asset, had been instrumental in
purchasing his financial freedom. And so too did the other eighty-five
bankrupted slaves publicly auctioned at Banks Arcade. For a period of
time, then, this commercial center on Magazine Street represented the
full array of the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave trade, serving as
(1) the home of a bankrupt slaveowner, (2) the headquarters of one of
the main New Orleans newspapers that printed hundreds of legal
notices announcing bankruptcy slave sales, and (3) the setting where
the U.S. Marshal subjected many of the Eastern District's bankrupted
slaves to the dehumanizing ritual of the slave trade.
Finally, we should return to my claim that Judge McCaleb and
the Eastern District's assignees, working in tandem, made the act of
purchasing a bankrupted slave a public spectacle. I have made the case
that the district's bankruptcy slave sales were conspicuously public, but
I have yet to substantiate that these sales were a spectacle. On this
score, a description by a European traveler's visit to Banks Arcade
should suffice:
430. See Houston Record Transcript, supra note 231, at 90-91 (reproducing documents from
Banks' bankruptcy case, including his bankruptcy petition, filed on July 30, 1842, and an excerpt
from his schedule of assets, also filed on that date, stating that Banks owned "[t]he block of three
story brick buildings, forming the entire front of Magazine street, between Gravier and Natchez
streets, with rear block known as the Arcade Exchange, valued at $350,000.00"). In today's dollars,
the value provided by Banks for Banks Arcade in his schedule of assets would have been
approximately $8.86 million. See supra note 30 (discussing adjustment of dollar figures to present-
day dollars).
431. Architectural Inventory, supra note 412, at 183. ("Thomas Banks resided in his arcade at
No. 19 Natchez."). A New Orleans directory from 1842 includes a listing for Thomas Banks at 19
Natchez Street. NEW ORLEANS DIRECTORY, supra note 17, at 19.
432. See Transcript of Record at 2-3, 8, 25-26, Forgay v. Conrad 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848)
(No. 147) [hereinafter Forgay Record Transcript].
433. Account Sales, In re Banks, No. 353 (E.D. La. July 22, 1846) (reporting on sale of three
bankrupted slaves, Maria, Ben, and Mary, and no other assets); Account Sales, In re Banks, No.
353 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 1843) (reportingon sale of five bankrupted slaves and other assets).
434. Judge McCaleb granted Thomas Banks a discharge on December 5, 1842. See Forgay
Record Transcript, supra note 432, at 24. The U.S. Marshal sold Banks' former slaves in February
1843 and July 1846. See supra note 433.
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To the stranger, one of the most interesting places in the city is the auction-mart in Bank's
[sic] Arcade, where negroes are disposed of in the same manner that animals are in
England.... The auction-mart is a large room, about 150 feet long by 35 feet wide, well
lighted, and provided with seats for the slaves, desks for the transaction of business, and
an auctioneer's stand. The negroes are placed upon an elevated platform immediately in
front of the crier.. .. The auctioneer commenced by reading a printed description of the
negro first put up .... Mhe bidders caused him to strip his coat off, and began to examine
his person. One felt the muscles of his arm; another opened his mouth, and inspected his
teeth, as you would those of a horse; and then his joints and bones were examined, to see
whether he was in all respects sound.. .. Jests were bandied about at the expense of the
poor creature; and after a determined effort on the part to make the most of his man, the
boy was sold to the highest bidder and removed from the platform. 4 3 5
The manner of conducting a bankruptcy slave auction and a
nonbankruptcy slave auction probably did not differ all that much. At
bottom, "the sale of slaves by a leading auctioneer was ... a storytelling
and physical performance[ ]"436 that revoltingly disregarded the
humanity of those being sold.4 37
2. Reconfiguring Property Interests in Bankrupted Slaves
Having considered the manner in which the Eastern District's
bankruptcy slave auctions differed from nonbankruptcy court-ordered
slave auctions, the question remains of how the district's assignees and
Judge McCaleb used the 1841 Act to reconfigure property interests in
bankrupted slaves. In the simplest case, a bankruptcy slave sale would
reconfigure existing property interests in bankrupted slaves in a very
straightforward fashion. To illustrate, imagine a debtor who filed for
bankruptcy relief and who fully owned a slave at that time, with no
other individual or entity having an interest in the slave. Upon being
decreed a bankrupt, the bankrupt's ownership interest in the slave
would vest in the bankruptcy estate, making it the owner while
simultaneously divesting the bankrupt of his prior ownership
interest.438 This constituted the first reconfiguration of the property
interest in the slave.
Subsequently, the assignee would look to sell the slave with the
district court's approval. 439 Sale of the slave to a third-party purchaser
435. New Orleans, 18 CHAMBERS'S EDINBURGH J. 314, 315 (1853).
436. McInnis, supra note 208, at 115.
437. Cf. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 255-56 n.7:
Auction houses had the same sort of lay-out and made the same sort of provisions for
buyers to inspect slaves as did traders. This meant that the same daily reproduction of
racial knowledge on the part of slave holders . . . characterized auction sales as other
sales even though the mechanism of sale-especially in its presentation of buying a
slave as a competition between white men-was more exaggerated.
438. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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would have the effect of transferring title from the bankruptcy estate to
the purchaser, 4 4 0 thus constituting the second reconfiguration of the
property interest in the slave. Provided the slave had been purchased
with cash, and provided the slave could not be returned to the
assignee,4 4 1 the sale would signify the termination of the federal
government's interest in the slave.
But of course, things are often more complex than the simplest
case, and bankruptcy slave sales were no exception. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive account of the
permutations that could produce varied reconfigurations of property
interests in bankrupted slaves. Nonetheless, I will briefly discuss two
variations on the simplest case to illustrate how matters could become
more complicated. The first scenario involves a debtor who filed for
bankruptcy while owning a mortgaged slave, and the second scenario
involves a third-party purchaser who could not afford to pay the full
purchase price in cash.
Broadly speaking, a mortgage involves a transaction pursuant
to which a debtor agrees to give an interest in some of his or her
440. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443:
[T]he assignee . . . shall be vested with all the rights, titles, powers, and authorities to
sell, manage, and dispose of the same [i.e., the property vested in him], ... as fully, to
all intents and purposes, as if the same were vested in, or might be exercised by, such
bankrupt before or at the time of his bankruptcy declared ....
(repealed 1843).
441. Cf. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 131:
Louisiana had strong warranty laws designed to rebalance the relationship between
seller and buyer. The asymmetry of information in the slave market had been addressed
in the Louisiana Civil Code by the law of redhibition . . . . Specific provisions of the Civil
Code limited actions for redhibition to those cases in which the problem was not
apparent upon 'simple inspection' and not explicitly exempted from the general
warranty. The sales of slaves (and animals) could be voided for 'vices' of either body or
character.
(footnote omitted). My review of the Eastern District case files and associated court records
generally did not uncover evidence of "specific declarations, which took the form of either a written
statement of the maladies or 'vices' that were specifically excepted from . . . warranty or simply a
clause voiding the standard form of warranty ('guaranteed against the vices and maladies
prescribed by law)." Id. This appears consistent with Johnson's observation that "[s]uch
provisions . . . were comparatively rare, appearing on only six percent of the Acts of Sale notarized
by buyers in the New Orleans market." Id. But see Kotlikoff, supra note 307, at 37, 46 (finding
that, "for [a] sample of 3,024 individual slaves sold during the years 1804 to 1862" in New Orleans,
"84.3 percent were fully guaranteed").
That said, recall the sale of Drake and China in the case of Arthur Morrell. See supra text
accompanying note 345. The legal notice in the Commercial Bulletin announcing that sale stated
that the U.S. Marshal would sell "at Banks' Arcade ... China, a woman aged about 49, and Drake,
a boy aged about 16 years." NEW-ORLEANS COM. BuLL., June 24, 1843, at 3. The notice further
stated as follows: "[B]oth slaves will be sold together, as the boy is an idiot and has been taken
care of by the woman. They will be sold without guarantee whatsoever." Id. (emphasis added).
For an example of the return of a slave purchased at a bankruptcy slave sale, see Pardo, supra
note 11, at 110-11.
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property (i.e., the collateral) to a creditor in order to secure repayment
of debt owed to the creditor. As a result of the transaction, the creditor
acquires a right to have the collateral seized and sold in the event of the
debtor's failure to comply with the repayment terms-that is, a right
contingent on the debtor's default. Upon sale of the collateral, the
creditor can apply the sale proceeds to satisfy the debt. Furthermore,
sale of the collateral transfers its title from the debtor to the third-party
purchaser.
Returning to the scenario of a case under the 1841 Act, imagine
a debtor who filed for relief and at the time owned a slave. Further
imagine that, long before seeking bankruptcy relief, the debtor had
mortgaged the slave, 442 and that the debtor had defaulted on the
mortgage shortly before the bankruptcy filing. Upon being decreed a
bankrupt, the slaveowner's property interest in the slave would vest in
the bankruptcy estate (again, the first reconfiguration of the property
interest in the slave). Unlike the simple case, however, the estate would
have taken the slave subject to the mortgagee's noncontingent interest
(given the debtor's prebankruptcy default) to have the slave seized and
sold. 4 43 This scenario thus raises the issue of the assignee's power, if
any, to sell the bankrupted slave encumbered by a mortgage.
While modern bankruptcy law expressly provides a bankruptcy
trustee (i.e., the present-day analogue to the 1841 Act assignee) the
authority to sell estate property free and clear of any interest in the
property, including a mortgage, if certain conditions are satisfied, 444 the
1841 Act was unclear on the matter. Recall that the Act did not "annul,
destroy, or impair ... any liens, mortgages, or other securities on
property" that were valid under state law and undisplaced by specific
provisions of the Act. 4 4 5 One federal district court opined that this
language clearly reflected Congress's "intention . .. that such
442. See KILBOURNE, supra note 34, at 56:
Louisiana law classified slaves as immovable for purposes of conveyancing. The
creation of a valid security interest in a slave could only be accomplished with a
mortgage instrument in notarial form. The instrument obtained its ranking vis-i-vis
third parties according to time of filing in the parish mortgage office registry. Once
recorded, the instrument preserved the creditor's security interest in the property
described therein for a period of ten years, and it could be reinscribed for an additional
ten-year period.
443. Cf. Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 331 (1845) (Catron, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (incorporating opinion of Justice Baldwin, decided in his capacity as Circuit
Justice of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which stated that the 1841 Act "vests all the
property and the rights of property of the bankrupt in the assignee . . . [who] then stands in the
position of the bankrupt before and at the time of his bankruptcy declared" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
444. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012).
445. See Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (repealed 1843).
11532018]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
mortgages should be protected as privileged liens."4 4 6 Furthermore, the
Act expressly gave the assignee the "full authority, by and under the
order and direction of the proper court in bankruptcy, to redeem and
discharge any mortgage. . ., upon any property, real or personal,...
and to tender a due performance of the conditions thereof." 447 But
nowhere did the Act expressly give the assignee the power to sell
mortgaged property free and clear of the encumbering mortgage.
Forced to grapple with the issue of the assignee's sale power,
federal courts engaged in residual bankruptcy policymaking to fashion
limits on what the assignee could do in such a situation.448 One district
court took the view that, absent the mortgage creditor's consent, the
only option available to the assignee to remove the mortgage from the
collateral would be to exercise the redemption power expressly granted
by the Act-specifically, by paying the mortgage creditor the balance of
the debt owed to it.449 Alternatively, the same court took the view that,
if the creditor consented, "the court (could] order a sale of mortgaged
premises, where the creditor applies to the court for that purpose, and
that, under the decree ordering such sale, a good, valid, and sufficient
legal title to the premises may be made to pass to the purchaser." 450
Finally, a federal circuit court held that the sale of mortgaged property
by the assignee for an amount less than the amount owed to the
mortgage creditor would fail to discharge the mortgage-that is, the
third-party purchaser would take the property subject to the
mortgage. 451
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
took a different approach than these courts, exercising its residual
bankruptcy policymaking in the form of local bankruptcy rules to
address the gap in the 1841 Act. 4 5 2 Moreover, its approach represented
a muscular flexing of federal power at the expense of state law, which
stood in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's dictum in an 1846
decision stating that, under the 1841 Act, mortgages were "to be held of
446. Yeadon v. Planters' & Mechs.' Bank, 30 F. Cas. 793, 794 (D.S.C. 1843) (No. 18,130).
447. § 11, 5 Stat. at 447.
448. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing residual bankruptcy
policymaking).
449. See Yeadon, 30 F. Cas. at 794 ("I understand the law to be that the court in bankruptcy
cannot dispose of such security of a creditor without his consent, but that the assignee may, under
the direction of the proper court in bankruptcy, redeem and discharge the same." (emphasis
added)).
450. Yeadon, 30 F. Cas. at 794-95.
451. See Ex Parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 326, 332 (1845) (Catron, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (incorporating opinion of Justice Baldwin decided in his capacity as Circuit
Justice of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
452. For a modern-day example of bankruptcy courts using their local rulemaking authority
to engage in residual policymaking, see Pardo & Watts, supra note 210, at 436-38.
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equal obligation and validity in the courts of the United States as they
would be in the state courts." 4 5 3 The Eastern District's federal district
court promulgated a rule that, upon the court's granting an order
approving an assignee's petition to sell estate property, the court's order
would
ipso facto annul the mortgages, liens, and privileges existing on the property ordered to be
sold; and the recorders of the mortgages shall, on the presentation of such order, cancel
all inscriptions existing on their records against such property, and the mortgages, liens,
and privileges shall attach to the proceeds of the sale in the same manner, to the same
extent, and with the same effect, as to the property sold.454
We see that, irrespective of creditor consent, the Eastern
District's federal district court fashioned a rule that would wipe out a
creditor's mortgage on estate property and transfer it to the sale
proceeds from that property-a decidedly different result than that
reached by the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 4 5 5
And while the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
promulgated a rule that would generally give mortgage creditors the
power to dictate the sale terms for their collateral, 456 such a rule was
tantamount to coerced consent. Put another way, mortgage creditors in
the Eastern District of Louisiana did not have the choice to opt out of
the bankruptcy process and instead exercise their state-law rights in
the collateral.
An example of the operation of the rule for cancelling mortgages
in the context of a bankruptcy slave sale illustrates how the residual
policymaking by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana reconfigured existing property interests in bankrupted
slaves. On March 10, 1843, the district court declared James A. Chase
a bankrupt. 457 At that time, Chase owned "a runaway negro man named
Jack,"458 who was subject to a mortgage held by Charles H. Taney
securing debts totaling $541.66.459 Chase owned no other property. 460
453. Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 316.
454. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 231, at 94 (emphasis added).
455. See supra note 451 and accompanying text.
456. Houston Record Transcript, supra note 231, at 94:
Creditors by mortgage, lien, or privilege, shall in all cases be permitted to fix the terms
of sale of the property subject to their claims; provided, that in no case shall they be
permitted, in opposition to the assignee, to fix the terms of credit shorter than those to
which the bankrupt himself was entitled.
457. See Chase Discharge Petition, supra note 301, at 1.
458. Petition to Sell Estate of Bankrupt at 2 sched. A, In re Chase, No. 672 (E.D. La. Nov. 8,
1843) [hereinafter Chase Assignee Sale Petition].
459. Proof of the Debt of C.H. Taney at 2, In re Chase, No. 672 (E.D. La. May 24, 1843).
460. Report of Assignee at 1, In re Chase, No. 672 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 1846) [hereinafter Chase
Assignee Report] (stating "that the only property surrendered by the bankrupt in this case was
one runaway slave whom the assignee has not been able to find").
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On November 8, 1843, J.P. Benjamin, the assignee appointed in Chase's
case,4 61 filed a petition to sell Chase's estate, consisting solely of Jack. 462
Two days later, Benjamin filed a petition to cancel the mortgage on Jack
"so that he [could] convey a clear and unencumbered title to any
purchaser," while simultaneously reserving Taney's rights in law to the
proceeds of the sale of . .. [Jack], upon the final distribution thereof." 463
On December, 27, 1843, at Hewlett's Exchange, Deputy U.S.
Marshal J.P. Walden sold "all the Bankrupt's right title and interest in
and to a Run Away negro man Jack" to an individual with the last name
Butler, acting on Chase's behalf, who ended up "being the last and
highest bidder for the sum of Twenty three Dollars" in cash. 4 6 4
Ultimately, the sale expenses of $32.96 exceeded Butler's payment of
$23.00.465 Given that those proceeds were subject to Taney's mortgage,
securing his claim in excess of $500, no money would be distributed to
Chase's other creditors, let alone Benjamin, the assignee.4 66 Moreover,
given that Taney's mortgage had been cancelled, he would have no right
to have Jack seized and sold, should he ever be found, to satisfy the
remaining debt owed to Taney (i.e., $518.66). Nor could Taney pursue
Chase for this amount by virtue of the bankruptcy discharge. 467
Significantly, the mortgage cancellation in In re Chase
exemplifies how the Eastern District's local bankruptcy rule added a
layer to the reconfiguration of property interests in bankrupted slaves.
Following the first reconfiguration-that is, the transfer of ownership
of the mortgaged slave from the bankrupt to the bankruptcy estate
mortgage cancellation further reconfigured the property interest by
461. See supra notes 394-399 and accompanying text (describing Benjamin's background).
462. See Chase Assignee Sale Petition, supra note 458.
463. Petition of J.P. Benjamin Assignee to Sell the Property & to Erase & Cancel the
Mortgages at 1, In re Chase, No. 672 (E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1843).
464. Sale by the Marshal of Slave Jack at 1, In re Chase, No. 672 (E.D. La. Dec. 27, 1843). As
Balleisen has noted, "[B]ankrupts regularly took advantage of their inside information, buying
back the assets surrendered to the bankruptcy court." BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 154. He further
notes that "[w]hen bankrupts bought back assets soon after they received a discharge, they
probably did so with funds borrowed from relatives or friends." Id. at 271 n.47. Based on the
information contained in the Eastern District sales books, see Pardo, supra note 11, at 91-93
(discussing information contained in the Eastern District sales books), 29% (29 of 100) of the U.S.
Marshal's reports on bankruptcy slave sales involved at least one third-party purchaser (1) who
had the same full name or same last name as the bankrupt, or (2) who had a different last name
than the bankrupt, but whom the U.S. Marshal's report indicated as buying the slave on behalf of
someone with the same full name or same last name as the bankrupt. While more investigation is
required into the identity of these purchasers, these circumstances suggest that, to a certain
extent, bankrupts repurchased the slaves whom they had surrendered.
465. See Chase Account Sales, supra note 415.
466. See Chase Assignee Report, supra note 460, at 1 (stating "that said slave [i.e., Jack] is
specially mortgaged for more than his value . . . & that there is consequently no prospect of any
funds ever being received by [the] assignee").
467. See supra notes 79-81.
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completely eliminating the mortgage creditor's interest in the
bankrupted slave (i.e., the second property-interest reconfiguration).
This reconfiguration, in turn, enhanced the liquidity of bankrupted
slaves. A prospective purchaser would know that, if deemed the
successful bidder at the bankruptcy slave auction, he or she would
acquire unencumbered ownership of the slave (i.e., the third property-
interest reconfiguration), thus alleviating any concerns of post-sale
collection efforts by the former mortgage creditor-which would not
have been the scenario under the holding established by the Circuit
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 468 Accordingly, through
its residual policymaking, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana promulgated a local bankruptcy rule that
displaced state-law property rights and that, when applied in the
context of bankruptcy slave sales, further entrenched the federal
government's involvement in the domestic slave trade. 469
Another instance in which bankruptcy slave sales reconfigured
property interests in bankrupted slaves arose when a third-party
purchaser could not afford to pay the full purchase price in cash. Of
course, if the sale terms recommended by the assignee and approved by
the court required the payment of cash,470 then a prospective third-
party purchaser who could not pay the full cash price would obviously
not be the winning bidder. Setting cash-only sale terms would
potentially have an adverse effect on the liquidity of a bankrupted slave
by (1) limiting the pool of prospective purchasers to those with access to
cash and (2) constraining the ceiling of bid amounts, which would be
defined by the limits of cash accessible to prospective purchasers. On
the other hand, a credit-based sale, pursuant to which a portion of the
purchase price would be financed, could increase the liquidity of a
bankrupted slave by expanding the pool of prospective purchasers and
raising the ceiling of bid amounts. 471 These dynamics would have
468. See supra note 451 and accompanying text.
469. If, for example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana had taken
the view that the 1841 Act limited an assignee to redeeming mortgaged property before it could be
sold, surely there would have been cases in which assignees would have foregone that right based
on a cost-benefit calculus (In re Chase being a prime example), instead allowing the mortgage
creditor to exercise its rights in the collateral outside of the bankruptcy forum. In turn, this may
have reduced the degree of the federal government's involvement in the domestic slave trade.
470. See supra note 403 and accompanying text (discussing process by which the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana established terms for the sale of estate property under
the 1841 Act).
471. See Martin, supra note 35, at 818:
Data collected from mortgages in the public records of Virginia, South Carolina, and
Louisiana shows that, with the reassurance of slave mortgages, neighbor borrowed from
neighbor and friends endorsed the debt contracts of friends. As a result, those buying
slaves were able to expand their holdings in slaves more quickly because they did not
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mattered very much to an assignee given that his compensation was
based on the disbursements he made, with the fee calculated as
decreasing percentages of increasing amounts of such disbursements. 4 72
In short, pecuniary self-interest would motivate an assignee to obtain
and recover the highest possible price.
In financing the purchase of a slave, or any other asset for that
matter, one concern for the assignee would be default by the third-party
purchaser-that is, the purchaser's failure to comply with his or her
payment obligation. One way to mitigate that concern would be to
finance the purchase on a secured basis. 473 In the case of bankrupted
slaves, the assignee could look to finance the purchase price, for
example, by requiring some amount of cash down payment with the
remaining balance to be paid over time and secured by a mortgage on
the bankrupted slave. If the purchaser defaulted at some point, the
assignee could have the bankrupted slave seized and sold to satisfy the
unpaid obligation.
Before looking to the practice that prevailed in the Eastern
District bankruptcy slave trade, we should consider the prevailing
practice outside of bankruptcy. One study has concluded that, for slave
sales in local markets, "the overwhelming tendency was to sell, not for
cash, but for long credit (most often a down payment of about one third,
and the balance with interest over one, two, or three years)." 4 7 4
Similarly, a study of Louisiana slavery observes that "[s]eldom were
slave sales cash transactions" and that "[m]ore commonly, however,
part of the purchase price was paid in cash, the remainder in two or
three annual installments." 47 5 On the other hand, a study of East
Feliciana Parish in Louisiana contends that "[c]ollateralized credit
have to save the entire purchase price before making their acquisitions. For sellers,
credit sales using mortgages expanded the pool of potential buyers ....
472. See, e.g., BANKR. D.N.C. R. 46 (1842):
The compensation to the assignee shall be . .. five per cent. on all moneys received and
paid out, not exceeding one thousand dollars: two and a half per cent. upon the excess
for sums exceeding one thousand and not exceeding five thousand dollars, and one per
cent. for all sums above five thousand dollars.
(repealed), reprinted in N.C. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 62, at 7; BANKR. D. VT. R. 58 (1842)
(same) (repealed), reprinted in VT. BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note 96, at 10. For the modem-day
analogue of this compensation scheme, see 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (2012).
473. Another possibility would be to arrange for a third party to guarantee the payment
obligation of the purchaser. See, e.g., Petition of M. Marigny Assignee of the Estate of Felix Lefebre,
In re Lefebvre, No. 252, at 1 (E.D. La. July 9, 1842) ("He [i.e., the assignee] further prays that the
real estate and slaves . . . be sold at a credit of 1 & 2 years for notes satisfactorily endorsed .... ).
For a discussion regarding errors in the assignee's sale petition in In re Lefebvre, including
omission of the letter "v" from the bankrupt's last name in the title of the petition, see Pardo, supra
note 11, at 113.
474. TADMAN, supra note 110, at 137.
475. JOE GRAY TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN LOUISIANA 27 (1963).
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transactions probably represented only a small percentage of all credit
arrangements in the antebellum period"476 and further notes that "[t]he
slave market was a cash market." 4 7 7 Finally, in terms of court-ordered
slave sales, Deyle states that "slaves were normally sold on long credit"
and that, "[w]hile numerous examples of judicial sales for cash exist,
they were the exception and in some places apparently quite
unusual." 478
I obtained information regarding the terms of bankruptcy slave
sales from the U.S. Marshal's reports in the Eastern District sales
books, the petitions filed by assignees for a court order approving the
sale of bankrupted slaves, and the legal notices published in the New
Orleans newspapers. With this information, I ascertained the sale
terms for approximately 71% (72 of 101) of the observations in the case
study's dataset. Within that group, only 25% (18 of 72) of the sales
involved credit sales of bankrupted slaves. Importantly, that group of
eighteen sales involved approximately 38% (182 of 480) of the Eastern
District's bankrupted slaves. The federal judiciary thus financed a
significant portion of the Eastern District bankruptcy slave trade,
helping prop up the market for slaves.
More critically, when assignees financed with court approval the
purchase of bankrupted slaves, they often did so on a secured basis,
taking a mortgage on the slaves. By approving such transactions, Judge
McCaleb reconfigured property interests in those slaves in such a way
as to further entrench the federal government's involvement in the
bankruptcy slave trade.
Recall that a mortgage on a bankrupted slave created a
contingent property interest in the slave-that is, upon the mortgage
debtor's default, the mortgage creditor could exercise its right to have
the slave seized and sold to satisfy the outstanding payment obligation
secured by the mortgage. Accordingly, whenever an assignee executed
a credit sale of a bankrupted slave on a secured basis, the property
interests in that slave involved two reconfigurations: first, the transfer
of ownership from the estate to the third-party purchaser; and second,
the creation of the mortgage interest in favor of the bankruptcy estate.
Until the purchaser fully paid off the payment obligation resulting from
the credit sale, the bankruptcy estate's mortgage interest would
continue in the slave, provided that the assignee took the proper steps
476. KILBOURNE, supra note 34, at 73.
477. Id. at 3. That study does observe, however, that, among the collateralized credit
transactions in East Feliciana Parish, "[s]laves represented 80 percent of the security, even in
transactions in which mortgages were executed on land and slaves." Id. at 73.
478. DEYLE, supra note 32, at 170.
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to prevent that interest from lapsing. 479 As such, although no longer the
owner of the slave, the federal government nonetheless retained a
property interest in the slave-an interest that the government would
have to protect through monitoring, 480 and an interest that the federal
government might ultimately have to enforce in the event of the
mortgage debtor's default.
An example from the case of John Richardson illustrates this
point. In June 1842, U.S. Marshal Algernon Sidney Robertson sold,
among other assets, ten bankrupted slaves that had belonged to
Richardson, including Tom, Jacob, Squire, and Charlotte and her two
children, Lucy and George. 4 8 1 Robertson sold the slaves on credit, "[o]ne
third cash, the balance at six and twelve months after date of sale for
approved endorsed notes, bearing mortgage upon the slaves, and if not
punctually paid to bear an interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum
from maturity." 482
Apparently, the purchasers of Tom, Jacob, Squire, and Charlotte
and her two children defaulted on their notes, thus prompting the
seizure and resale of the slaves. In January 1843, U.S. Marshal
Robertson once again sold Tom, Jacob, Squire, and "Charlotte and her
three children,"483 thus suggesting that Charlotte had been pregnant
when originally sold and had given birth by the time of the second sale.
Having experienced the sting of defaulting purchasers, the assignee set
more stringent sale terms the second time around, requiring "two-
thirds of the purchase money to be paid in cash, and the balance on the
6th of June, 1843, for approved endorsed notes, bearing mortgage upon
the property sold." 48 4
Even though the assignee demanded a larger down payment and
a shorter repayment term for the second bankruptcy slave sale in In re
Richardson, the fact remains that the sale involved secured financing,
which had the effect of further multiplying the reconfiguration of
property interests in the bankrupted slaves. When the court decreed
Richardson a bankrupt, his ownership interest in the slaves vested in
the bankruptcy estate (the first reconfiguration). When U.S. Marshal
Robertson sold Tom, Jacob, Squire, and Charlotte and her children at
479. See supra note 442.
480. See Russell, supra note 149, at 518 ("1Mortgages of slaves created ... [a] monitoring
incentive for the mortgagee. The mortgagee of a slave would want to be sure that the mortgagor
managed the slaves in such a way that they would continue to be valuable if the mortgagee were
to foreclose.").
481. Account Sales at 2, In re Richardson, No. 112 (E.D. La. June 6, 1842).
482. NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., June 4, 1842, at 4.
483. Account Sales, In re Richardson, No. 112 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1843) (emphasis added).
484. NEW-ORLEANS COM. BULL., Jan. 25, 1843, at 4.
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the first sale on a secured basis, the third-party purchasers acquired an
ownership interest in the slaves (the second reconfiguration), and the
bankruptcy estate acquired a mortgage interest in them (the third
reconfiguration). When Robertson sold this group of slaves at the second
sale on a secured basis, the prior third-party purchasers lost their
ownership interest (the fourth reconfiguration); the bankruptcy estate
lost its original mortgage interest in the slaves (the fifth
reconfiguration); 485 the new third-party purchasers acquired an
ownership interest in the slaves (the sixth reconfiguration); and the
bankruptcy estate acquired a new mortgage interest in them (the
seventh reconfiguration). And until the new third-party purchasers
finished paying the outstanding balance of the purchase price for the
bankrupted slaves, the assignee would once again be tasked with
monitoring and protecting the estate's mortgage interest in the slaves.
Russell has argued that "slaves, as objects of property, were
surrounded by a web of legal interests or rights that tethered together
nonslave parties," 486 and that this conceptualization "offers the
possibility of more insight into the complicated relationships of both
slavery and Southern society." 48 7 The various examples of reconfigured
property interests in bankrupted slaves that I have discussed
demonstrate how the federal government interwove itself into the fabric
of the domestic slave trade in ways that have, until now, gone
unexamined. By orchestrating the sale of bankrupted slaves under the
1841 Act, Judge McCaleb and the Eastern District's assignees rooted
slavery deeply into the operation of the bankruptcy system in that
district. This account gives us a newfound vantage from which we can
assess the federal government's complicity in legitimating slavery in
antebellum America.
B. Profiting from Bankrupted Slaves: U.S. Marshal Robertson
The sale of bankrupted slaves generated proceeds that had to be
distributed among the various parties to a bankruptcy case. Depending
on the amount of proceeds, court officials-like the assignees and the
U.S. Marshal-and creditors might receive some payment. And, of
course, there were other parties in interest who might also be entitled
to a distribution. Ultimately, all who received a distribution from such
sales were recipients of money representing some fraction of the price
485. Recall that the Eastern District's local bankruptcy rule canceled, upon the issuance of the
federal district court's order approving a sale of estate property, any existing mortgages on that
property. See supra text accompanying note 454.
486. Russell, supra note 149, at 520.
487. Id. at 504.
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of a human being. These proceeds constituted the traces of the black
men, women, and children who had lived out part of their lives as
bankrupted slaves. And for the court officials who received such
proceeds, the payments also constituted part of the income derived from
their occupations. In other words, they made a living, in part, by
coordinating and running the bankruptcy slave trade.
To illustrate this point, I will focus on the commission earned by
one of the Eastern District's U.S. Marshals, Algernon Sidney Robertson,
as a result of selling estate property. 488 With one exception, I obtained
the information on the identity of the U.S. Marshal conducting the
bankruptcy slave sales and the amounts involved in the sale, including
the U.S. Marshal's commission, from the Eastern District sales
books. 489 That information indicates that Robertson conducted
approximately 92% (93 of 101) of the Eastern District's bankruptcy
slave sales. 490 For the ninety-four bankruptcy slave sales conducted
from 1842 through 1844, Robertson conducted every one of those sales
with the exception of one, which J.P. Walden, one of his deputies,
conducted. 491 U.S. Marshals William F. Wagner and William S. Scott
conducted the remaining seven sales. Wagner conducted three sales in
1845 and two sales in 1846, while Scott conducted one sale in 1851 and
the Eastern District's last sale in 1853. Given that Robertson conducted
nearly all of the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave sales, the
discussion in this Section focuses on him.
President Tyler nominated Robertson to serve as the U.S.
Marshal for the Eastern District on January 18, 1842, and the Senate
488. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 93 (discussing the U.S. Marshal's commission).
489. See id. at 91-93 (discussing information contained in the U.S. Marshal's reports
appearing in the Eastern District sales books). A report by J.P. Walden, a Deputy U.S. Marshal,
which appeared in the bankruptcy case file for In re Chase, indicates that Walden conducted the
bankruptcy slave sale in that case. See supra note 464 and accompanying text. The corresponding
report in the Eastern District sales book, however, indicates that Algernon Sidney Robertson, the
U.S. Marshal, had conducted the sale. See Chase Account Sales, supra note 415 (reporting
"Account Sales of property in the . . . case and sold by A Sidney Robertson U.S. Marshal"). In this
instance, I relied on the record in the case file and coded the Deputy U.S. Marshal as having
conducted the bankruptcy slave sale.
490. It should be noted, however, that the reports in the Eastern District sales books would
occasionally indicate in the signature section of the report that a Deputy U.S. Marshal had signed
the report on the U.S. Marshal's behalf, even though the report itself indicated that the U.S.
Marshal had conducted the sale. See, e.g., Account Sales, In re Bridge, No. 259 (E.D. La. Sept. 13,
1842) (reporting "Account Sales of Property assigned in the ... case, and sold by Algernon Sidney
Robertson U.S. Marshal," and indicating at the bottom of the report "(Signed) for A. Sidney
Robertson U.S. Marshal," followed by "J. E. Layet dy. U.S. Marshal"). Whether those deputies
conducted the sale, or whether they received a portion of the U.S. Marshal's commission, cf.
BALLEISEN, supra note 62, at 138 (stating that "the U.S. marshal and his deputies received
payments for taking charge of bankrupts' assets and transporting them to the assignee"), I do not
know. Given the information that I currently have, I assume that Robertson conducted these sales.
491. See supra notes 464, 489 and accompanying text.
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confirmed Robertson's appointment on February 2, 1842,492 one day
after the 1841 Act took effect. 493 Accordingly, Robertson had been
installed just in time to oversee the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave
trade from the very beginning. During his tenure in that position, he
sold approximately 97% (465 of 480) of the Eastern District's
bankrupted slaves. Given this level of involvement, it is not too hard to
imagine that, in the same way that "[slome sheriffs could be just as
skillful in making [s]lave sales as professional auctioneers," so too
might Robertson have become particularly proficient at auctioning
bankrupted slaves.
To gain a more detailed sense of Robertson's financial stake in
the Eastern District bankruptcy slave trade, consider the following
figures. First, sufficient information existed in the Eastern District
sales books to document the total amount of proceeds generated from
the sale of bankrupted slaves (both for sales only involving slaves and
for sales also involving other assets) for approximately 92% (86 of 93) of
the bankruptcy slave sales conducted by Robertson. The median and
mean nominal amount of slave proceeds (i.e., the amount recorded in
the Eastern District sales books) generated at those sales were,
respectively, $482.50 and $1,088.73. In today's dollars, 494 those
respective amounts would have been approximately $12,559 and
$28,049. Totaling the amount of slave proceeds generated at
Robertson's sales, the nominal amount was $93,631, or approximately
$2,412,187 in today's dollars.
How much did Robertson earn as a commission from the sale of.
bankrupted slaves? The manner of ascertaining Robertson's
commission attributable to slave proceeds depended on whether the
bankruptcy slave sale only involved the sale of slaves or whether
Robertson sold other assets in addition to the bankrupted slaves.
Approximately 96% (89 of 93) of the reports in the Eastern District sales
books corresponding to bankruptcy slave sales conducted by Robertson
listed the nominal amount of the sales commission that he earned at
each sale. For sales only involving the sale of bankrupted slaves, the
entire nominal amount of the listed commission could be attributed to
slave proceeds.
On the other hand, for sales involving assets in addition to
bankrupted slaves, only a portion of the nominal amount of the listed
commission could be attributed to the slave proceeds. Unfortunately, I
492. See 6 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 12, 23 (Washington, D.C., Govt Printing Office 1887).
493. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
494. See supra note 30.
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have not been able to locate a document indicating the compensation
structure for the U.S. Marshal in the Eastern District of Louisiana
during this period. To estimate the U.S. Marshal's commission
attributable to slave ,proceeds in sales involving additional assets, I
calculated the percent commission that the U.S. Marshal earned by
dividing the nominal amount of his commission by the total amount of
proceeds generated at the sale (i.e., the sum of the proceeds from the
sale of both slaves and the other assets). I then multiplied the percent
commission by the total amount of proceeds generated from the sale of
the bankrupted slaves. That figure constituted the estimated amount
of the commission attributable to the sale of the bankrupted slaves.
For the group of eighty-nine cases for which Robertson's percent
commission could be calculated, the median and mean percentages for
each bankruptcy slave sale were, respectively 1.9% and 1.8%-that is,
Robertson's earned commission constituted 1.9% of the total proceeds
in the median sale and 1.8% of the total proceeds in the mean sale. As
for the proportion of the nominal amount of his commission that could
be attributed to the proceeds from the sale of bankrupted slaves, which
could be calculated for approximately 92% (86 of 93) of the sales that he
conducted, the median and mean percentages were, respectively,
approximately 47.4% and 51.2%. In other words, the sale of bankrupted
slaves generated a significant amount of Robertson's commission.495
In terms of the amount earned by Robertson from the sale of
bankrupted slaves, calculated for approximately 92% (86 of 93) of the
sales that he conducted, the median and mean nominal amounts of his
commission attributable to slave proceeds were, respectively, $9.64 and
$16.19. And the total nominal amount of commissions that he earned
attributable to slave proceeds was $1,392.11, of which he earned
$707.41 from thirty-nine sales in 1842, $660.39 from forty-three sales
in 1843, and $24.31 from four sales in 1844.
To place these figures in perspective, focus on the amounts that
Robertson earned in 1842 and 1843. During the same time period, the
nominal amount of Judge McCaleb's annual salary was $3,000.496
Accordingly, from the commissions earned from slave proceeds in 1842
and 1843, Robertson earned the approximate equivalent of,
respectively, 23.6% ($707.41/$3,000.00) and 22.0% ($660.39/$3,000.00)
495. Cf. Russell, supra note 31, at 1256 ("Slaves were the central assets of the Southern
economy. At [court-ordered] sales, they were the most important assets sold; more important than
the accumulated personal property of households; more important than the crops, farm
implements, and livestock; and more important than the land itself.").
496. Judicial Salaries: U.S. District Court Judges by State, 1789-1891, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/judicial-salaries-u.s.-district-court-judges-state-1789-1891#
(last visited Aug. 11, 2017) [https://perma.ce/T4EY-F9QJ].
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of Judge McCaleb's annual salary. Robertson clearly earned income
from other sources, including commissions earned from nonslave
proceeds in bankruptcy cases, as well as from fees earned from duties
performed in nonbankruptcy cases.497 It thus seems reasonable to
conclude that Robertson profited considerably from his participation in
the Eastern District's bankruptcy slave trade.
CONCLUSION
Returning to the story of James in Arthur Morrell's bankruptcy
case, February 5, 1853, constituted a significant date for both James
and for the history of the 1841 Act in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
For James, the date signified the end of one chapter of subjugation-
living for 3,997 days as a bankrupted slave-and the beginning of the
next chapter of subjugation in his life-this time as George Clark's
nonbankrupted slave. 4 9 8 As for the 1841 Act, James's sale in all
likelihood constituted the last bankruptcy slave sale in the district, 499
thus marking the end of the bankruptcy slave trade in the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
By telling the story of James and the stories of other bankrupted
slaves, this Article has begun the long overdue examination of the role
that the federal bankruptcy system played in the domestic slave trade
of antebellum America. Whether unbeknownst to Congress or not, its
design of the 1841 Act not only made the collision of bankruptcy and
slavery inevitable, but it also set the stage for making the federal
government a widespread slaveowner actively engaged in selling slaves.
Furthermore, because the Act's statutory design contained many gaps,
Congress created the opportunity for residual bankruptcy policymaking
by courts, which further exacerbated, at least in one federal judicial
district, the government's entrenchment in slavery. And
notwithstanding the quick repeal of the 1841 Act, we witness that the
bankruptcy slave trade subsequently continued in the Eastern District
for approximately eleven years, claiming as its victims nearly 500 black
men, women, and children. While the bankruptcy system has brought
a great deal of relief from financial distress for millions upon millions
of individuals over approximately the past 120 years, we should never
lose sight of the fact that the forbearer of modern bankruptcy law, the
497. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (describing seizure and sale of slaves at
public auction by U.S. Marshal Robertson in nonbankruptcy cases).
498. See supra notes 29-30, 365 and accompanying text.
499. See Pardo, supra note 11, at 96-103 (discussing how the limitations of certain archival
sources consulted for this Article's case study preclude providing a complete account of the Eastern
District's bankruptcy slave trade).
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1841 Act, visited great harm and suffering on the black men, women,
and children forced into the condition of bankrupted slaves.
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